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1  INTRODUCTION
1.1 The impact of consensus democracy and corporatism
In comparative political economy many theories have been formulated about the 
relation between, on the one hand, politics and institutions and on the other hand 
policy choices and socio-economic performance. This is a study of specifi c types 
of political-economic institutions, those of consensus democracy and corporatism. 
For the past decades these institutions have played a crucial role in the explanation 
of political and socio-economic performance. In his analysis of democratic systems, 
Lijphart (1999) makes a distinction between consensus and majoritarian democracy. 
MacRae (1997) distinguishes adversarial versus consensual politics. The political-
economic institutions of policy concertation among organised interests can be 
characterised as corporatist versus pluralist. Hall & Soskice (2001: 8) make a 
distinction between coordinated and liberal market economies. This study analyses 
the impact of different types of institutions on socio-economic policy-making in 
twenty developed democracies. In the political-economic literature it is argued 
that types of institutions matter for socio-economic performance, but this study 
shows that there is no general set of institutions that is superior for all instances. 
Therefore, it is necessary and relevant to examine under which conditions and to 
what extent consensus democracy and corporatism are related to better socio-
economic performance.
 Comparative politics has been concerned with, among other things, the 
differences and similarities of national democratic systems. How can these be 
explained by social, historical and economic factors and how do they function? In 
the 1970s, for example, differences were found in policy outputs and performance 
between governments with different political colour. After this ‘Does politics matter?’ 
debate (see Castles 1982), institutions received more attention (see March & Olsen 
1989; Shepsle 1989). Political choices can have consequences for policy-making, 
institutions constrain the choices that are available for the actors.
 The comparative study of democratic political systems has mainly focused on 
the categorisation and causes of cross-national differences. These studies implicitly 
examined the impact on political performance. Pluralist theorists stated that 
political stability is only possible in homogeneous societies (Almond 1956), while 
the consociational school in comparative research showed under what conditions 
social cleavages coincide with a stable regime (Lijphart 1977).
 Since the 1970s, corporatist scholars have shown the importance of the interest 
groups of workers and employers for political decision-making in two ways. First, 
trade unions and employers’ organisations tried to infl uence political actors in 
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decision-making about socio-economic policy. Second, in post-war West European 
democracies bargains and social pacts were made between workers and employers 
on socio-economic issues, in several cases without direct government interference 
(Schmitter & Lehmbruch 1979; Lehmbruch & Schmitter 1982; Keman, Woldendorp 
& Braun 1985).
 In the 1970s and 1980s several studies argued that corporatist institutions have a 
positive impact on socio-economic performance. In corporatist political economies, 
workers and employers agreed on wage moderation in exchange for employment 
and welfare provisions. Some recent studies still claim the success of corporatism 
(Crepaz 1992; Compston 1997; Wilensky 2002). Wilensky (2002: 482) concludes 
that corporatist bargaining arrangements are among the most important sources of 
good economic performance and that ‘democratic corporatism also fosters restraint 
on nominal wages’. Others claim that this effect disappeared or never even existed 
(Therborn 1987; Flanagan 1999). Flanagan (1999: 1171) found that
‘a relationship between [collective bargaining] structure and performance 
probably existed in the late 1970s and early 1980s, but that relationship had 
disappeared by the 1990s and may not have existed in the 1960s’.
Some studies indicate other possible effects, such as a non-linear relationship 
between corporatist institutions and performance. Calmfors & Driffi ll (1988) argue 
that decentralised or centralised wage bargaining structures have better performance 
than intermediate structures. This short overview shows the wide disagreement in 
contemporary comparative political economy about the consequences of corporatist 
institutions for socio-economic performance.
 The study of consensus democracy was initially focused more on causes than on 
effects of institutions. From the 1990s, studies were done on the impact of consensus 
democracy on socio-economic performance. Again, there is no consensus about 
the impact of consensual institutions. While Crepaz (1996) and Lijphart (1999) 
found that consensus democracy is at least not outperformed by majoritarianism, 
Anderson (2001) questions the conceptualisation and operationalisation as 
developed by Lijphart (1999) and he found that ‘a change from a plurality/single-
member district to a PR electoral system would be detrimental to performance’ 
(Anderson 2001: 448) and ‘the four core elements of consensus democracy are 
associated with inferior rather than superior performance’ (Anderson 2001: 450). 
Armingeon (2002: 99) concludes that ‘consensus democracy does not lead to a 
kinder, gentler and better democracy.’
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 Lijphart’s fi ndings about the impact of consensus democracy on performance 
may be overestimated, since he makes no distinction between different types of 
institutions. As Lijphart includes several strongly diverging institutions in his index 
of consensus democracy, it becomes diffi cult to determine which institution causes 
which effect. Therefore at least three elements of Lijphart’s conceptualisation 
of consensus democracy must be separated: executive-legislative relations, 
corporatism and federalism (see also Armingeon 2002; Lane & Ersson 2000; 
Keman & Pennings 1995). By incorporating so many different types of institutions 
in the concept of consensus democracy, it has become risky to draw conclusions 
about its consequences for socio-economic policy-making.
 Until now most impact studies in comparative political economy only focused 
on one specifi c type of institution. The focus in these studies seems to have been 
too narrow, whereas Lijphart’s and Crepaz’ studies use a conceptualisation of 
institutions that seems to be too broad and unspecifi c. The ambition of this study is 
to bring consensus democracy and corporatism together in a comparative analysis 
of their effects on socio-economic performance. Their differences and similarities 
are analysed as well as their separate and combined effect on performance. This is 
conducted from a cross-national and from a diachronic comparative perspective.
 The problem that has to be solved here fi rst is that many rivalling theories explain 
the same phenomena. These theories are rejected and confi rmed by different kinds 
of data and research methods. This theoretical and empirical puzzle deserves an 
encompassing study of these crucial institutions in comparative political economy. 
The claim of this study is that institutions still affect the problem-solving capacity 
of actors with regard to socio-economic policy-making. However, the institutions of 
consensus democracy and corporatism each play a different role.
 This study also demonstrates that institutions are neither static nor given, but 
are subject to change. Institutions can be adapted to changing socio-economic 
performance. From this follows that performance can have an impact on institutions 
and can be a motive for institutional change. This means that this study does 
more than examining the impact of institutions on performance. Institutions are 
not constant but changing, and changing performance can lead to necessary 
adaptations of institutions. This is underestimated in most political economy studies 
so far.
 This study analyses the claim that corporatism and consensus contribute to 
better socio-economic performance. Can this claim be maintained after taking into 
account the expressed criticism? This study aims to make several improvements. 
A new conceptualisation and operationalisation of consensus democracy and 
corporatism is presented that is more valid, reliable and sensitive to time. An explicit 
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distinction is made between consensus democracy and corporatism. To analyse 
this empirically, a combination of variable-oriented comparisons and case-oriented 
comparisons is used.
1.2 Politics between consensus and confl ict
In political decision-making, diverging interests and preferences of actors – such 
as voters, political parties or interest groups – often lead to confl icts. There are 
different ways to resolve these confl icts. In a democracy, a majority of one or a 
group of actors can gain all political power and deny the desires of the defeated 
minority. This style of decision-making is confl ict-driven and relates mainly to 
preferences of the majority where the ‘winner takes all’. This majoritarian type of 
democracy may appear to be effi cient, but it often neglects the interests of minority 
groups and has a destabilising potential. Majoritarian democracy has the form of 
a zero-sum game. An alternative way of confl ict solving is the integration of most 
of the minority groups in the decision-making process, thereby creating a pattern 
of consensus building by means of consultation. In the long term, the politics of 
consensus formation can lead to a more stable decision-making process than a 
majoritarian democracy – which is expressed in a ‘better and kinder’ performance 
(Lijphart 1999: 275).
 This study examines the effects of both types of institutions, between consensus 
and confl ict by means of cooperation and polarisation. How do twenty developed 
democracies1 deal with confl ict solving and how do institutions, ranging from 
consensus building to polarising mechanisms, infl uence socio-economic policy-
making and related performance? Two decision-making arenas are analysed: the 
political decision-making process of voters, political parties and government, and 
policy concertation among organised interests, including bargaining between trade 
unions and employers’ organisations. The institutions of consensus democracy 
and corporatism are used to characterise the decision-making process in shaping 
socio-economic policy and affecting performance. These can be used to examine 
the institutional dynamics of consensus and confl ict.
 Cooperation expresses the actors’ willingness to work together to reach a goal 
that is in their mutual interest. Cooperation describes the type of actors’ behaviour 
and their interaction. In game-theoretical terms cooperation occurs in a situation 
where actors select an option that allows for an optimal outcome. If one or more 
players do not want to cooperate, they try to maximise their own pay-off at the cost 
of their opponent. As a result, lack of cooperation leads to a sub-optimal outcome.
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 When actors reach a consensus this means that an agreement is made that is 
acceptable to the actors involved and carries their support. Consensus can be the 
result of cooperative behaviour. The relation between cooperation and consensus 
is that the former may contribute to the latter. Cooperation and consensus are 
facilitated by consensual institutions. The aim of this study is to understand how these 
institutions are developed and how they contribute to consensus and cooperation. 
The absence of consensus, for instance by a lack of cooperative behaviour, can 
lead to confl ict. Confl ict is understood as a situation in which actors cannot reach 
an agreement by using the available decision rules. To solve a deadlock in formal 
decision-making additional rules or completely new rules can be helpful to prevent 
escalation. When these other institutional arrangements fail, formal rules may 
cease to exist and confl ict, with the use of violence, appears the only way of political 
action. This study uses the dichotomy between consensus-based and confl ict-
based institutions. This dichotomy characterises the functioning and the effects 
of institutional arrangements. No actor actually wants confl ict, but the interactions 
between actors and institutions can result in institutions that polarise minorities 
instead of incorporating them and overarching different interests. In this study, the 
institutions of consensus democracy and corporatism are conditions for cooperative 
behaviour and, subsequently, consensus. The institutions of majoritarian democracy 
and pluralism are conditions for polarising behaviour and subsequently confl ict.
 A distinction can be made between the type of institutions and the effects of 
institutions. The crucial feature of consensus democracy and corporatism is that 
they facilitate consensus and cooperation, but that does not necessarily lead to 
consensus and cooperation. Majoritarian democracy is said to neglect minorities 
and to contribute to polarisation, but can also result in cooperation. Actors operating 
in a majoritarian system can become aware of the rules of the game and use a 
strategy of consensus and cooperation to prevent deadlock and confl ict. In other 
words, majoritarianism can also lead to consensus and consensual institutions do 
not always prevent confl ict. It is the goal of this study to examine the extent to which 
these different types of institutions matter for socio-economic policy-making.
1.3 The study of political institutions
Political science contributes to information about the creation of political institutions, 
their working and their impact on social life. People have different preferences, 
needs and tastes. For the satisfaction of some goods, cooperation between groups 
of people is imperative. Certain goods can only be produced if collective institutions 
are created (Hardin 1982; Mueller 2003). Deploying an army to protect a territory 
against an enemy, for example, leads to a collective action problem. An army is a 
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collective good which an individual citizen can almost impossibly provide for on his 
own. The money needed to erect an army must, therefore, be collected from a large 
group of citizens. Avoiding a situation in which some people do not contribute (i.e. 
free riders) while others do, can be a problem. In sum the resources for providing 
the collective good may turn out to be insuffi cient.
 Which institutions are created and what they do depends on the system of 
political decision-making. Politics is about the aggregation of private desires into 
political action (Arrow 1963; Sen 1970; Laver 1997). For a long time political 
science has taken this process for granted. Political decision-making, however, is 
not just a black box or a mindless machine. Decision-making is a highly dynamic 
and complex process of interaction between actors - such as citizens, politicians 
and bureaucrats - and their institutional context. Hence, political actors are not just 
waiting for the outcomes of the political process but they will try to actually infl uence 
its decision-making process (Dunleavy 1991).
 The research presented in this thesis has been carried out in the tradition of 
the comparative study of political institutions (Tsebelis 1990; Peters 1999; Keman 
1997a; Lane & Ersson 2000). The classic comparative study of political institutions 
focuses mainly on formal institutions. This research tradition provides a host of 
theoretical and empirical fi ndings on the functioning of formal institutions and 
appears to be myopic, since it fails to explain and predict stability that occurred in 
several cases where it was not to be expected. Pluralist theory for example, states 
that a stable democracy is only possible in a homogeneous society (Almond 1956). 
This hypothesis was proven wrong by consociationalist theory, which showed 
that in several small countries a deeply divided political culture could coexist 
with a stable democracy (Lijphart 1968; Lehmbruch 1967; MacRae 1974). The 
political stability that actually did occur in some heterogeneous societies such as 
Austria, Switzerland, the Netherlands and Belgium, was explained by institutional 
arrangements between its political elites, which enable cooperation between 
rivalling minorities. Recent studies on this topic have been published by Luther & 
Deschouwer (1999) and Steiner & Ertman (2002).
  The classic theories in comparative politics have a focus on formal 
institutions in common. The neo-institutionalist approach in comparative politics does 
not only look at formal institutions, it also takes informal institutions into account. 
It analyses how actors actually deal with the working of the rules. The interest of 
this study lies in the effects of institutions. What is their role in the aggregation of 
preference into outcomes? And most importantly; how do institutional arrangements 
adjust the effect and working of formal rules? Neo-institutionalism also looks at the 
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way institutions affect outcomes (Peters 1999: 1; Lane & Ersson 2000: 58-73). 
Finally, a rational-choice inspired institutional theory links institutional context to the 
actors’ behaviour (Czada, Héritier & Keman 1998; Scharpf 1997).
 This study is based on the assumption that the key goal of decision-making 
institutions is the transformation of individual preferences into collective outcomes. 
Institutions are not merely seen as neutral procedures. The underlying hypothesis 
is that actors try to adjust the working of institutions in order to receive higher pay-
offs. Institutions affect which outcomes result from the preferences and actions of 
the actors, whereas actors create institutional arrangements to adjust the outcomes 
in order to achieve better pay-offs.
 Two types of institutions can be distinguished (see also Ostrom 1990: 
Chapter 2):
1) the formal working of institutions (these are the rules for use: formal constraints 
on behaviour);
2) in addition, informal institutions adjust this process (these are the rules in use: 
informal regulation of behaviour).
 Formal institutions can be enforced legally and sanctioned independently, while 
informal institutions are habits or unwritten agreements between actors of a group 
that are the result of group action (Keman 1997a). Figure 1.1 shows the relations 
between formal and informal institutions in a general model of decision-making. 
The aggregation of preferences into output by formal institutions is infl uenced 
by informal institutions. Without creating informal institutions, other output would 
have been the result. Formal and informal institutions combined together form the 
institutional arrangements.
 formal
 institutions
actors’  output
preferences informal
 institutions
Figure 1.1 General model of political decision-making
The input of the decision-making process consists of actors’ preferences. The output 
of decision-making consists of political decisions, i.e. policy choices. Preferences 
are considered to be exogenous. This does, of course, not mean that preferences 
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are not sensitive to already existing knowledge of actors about the rules of the game 
and the past and future output of the decision-making process. The infl uence of 
output on preferences is indicated by a dotted line in Figure 1.1. Actors’ preferences 
must be separated from the strategic manoeuvres that actors can employ to try to 
improve the chances of selection of their most preferred outcomes. Preferences 
are considered the starting point for actors on which they will base their strategy in 
the decision-making process (e.g. Scharpf 1987; Keman 1996). This study focuses 
on the role of institutions in political decision-making and socio-economic policy-
making.
 How do informal institutions adjust the working of the formal institutions? 
A strategy can be developed by an individual actor to alter outcomes, whereas 
informal rules can only be created by a group of actors, because these rules 
are formed by conventions or routines of a group2. In Figure 1.1, these informal 
institutions are visualised as a fi lter that adjusts the working and effects of the 
formal institutions. The crucial distinction between formal and informal institutions is 
that the former can be imposed and monitored externally, such as a law, while the 
latter are agreements between actors that cannot be legally enforced.
 The analytical framework of this study draws on the achievements made by 
rational choice theory and neo-institutionalism (see Scharpf 1997; Shepsle 1989; 
Laver 1997; Tsebelis 1990; Czada, Héritier & Keman 1998; Peters 1999: Chapter 
3; Goodin & Klingemann 1996: Part II). These approaches help to understand the 
link between actors’ preferences and behaviour, their institutional context (i.e. the 
interaction between the formal and informal rules of the game) and the resulting 
collective outcomes in terms of socio-economic policy performance.
 Several assumptions have been made within the conceptual framework:
- actors’ behaviour is goal oriented;
- institutions transform the actors’ preferences into collective outcomes;
- informal institutions adjust the effect of formal institutions on preference 
aggregation;
- institutions eventually affect socio-economic performance;
- actors try to change institutions to achieve higher pay-offs by getting 
more favourable political decisions which result in a better socio-economic 
performance.
 This study focuses on two specifi c models representing institutional arrangements 
that can be conceived as alternatives: consensus versus majoritarian democracy 
and corporatism versus pluralism. 
11
Introduction
 Lijphart, among others, argued that there is another way of confl ict solving apart 
from the majoritarian system of decision-making. This model is named consensus 
democracy (also concordance or Proporz-Demokratie) to emphasise two things: It 
deals with a different style of decision-making and it can - in strongly segmented 
societies - lead to less confrontation and more cooperation. Others have used 
‘negotiation democracy’ as a term to emphasise that the players have to negotiate 
and to cooperate (Kaiser 1997; Armingeon 2002).
 The discussion about macro-economic management in Western democracies 
is not only about interaction between political parties and party government. It 
has been argued that the interaction between political decision-making and the 
role of interest groups has a relevant impact on socio-economic policy-making. 
It is therefore relevant to examine the way in which government and organised 
interests – i.e. trade unions and employers’ organisations - interact in shaping 
socio-economic policy-making. Is it possible to distinguish certain patterns in these 
relations that result in institutional arrangements which can have a crucial impact 
on socio-economic policy-formation and related performance? This study seeks to 
fi nd out to what extent the institutional arrangements of consensus democracy and 
corporatism explain the relation between actors, policy choices and performance.
 Lijphart’s model of consensus democracy (1984; 1999) is taken as a reference 
point for the political system of decision-making. The model of corporatism is used 
for the system of organised interests, including industrial relations. Since the 1970s, 
corporatism received attention in Western democracies (Schmitter & Lehmbruch 
1979; Lehmbruch & Schmitter 1982; Winkler 1976). Both institutional arrangements 
have institutional processes in common that are seen to be conducive to consensus 
and cooperation. It has been argued that cooperation and consensus have a positive 
effect on political stability and socio-economic performance3. The underlying 
hypothesis in this study is that institutional arrangements promoting consensus 
and cooperation perform better than models based on confl ict. By exploring 
this hypothesis it is possible to show whether or not these specifi c institutional 
arrangements can explain or account for different outcomes in terms of policy-
making and socio-economic performance in Western capitalist democracies.
1.4 Research question
The purpose of this study is to explain the role of formal and informal institutions 
of consensus democracy and corporatism in socio-economic policy-making in 
developed capitalist democracies. It contributes to prior empirical and theoreti cal 
studies on public policy formation in these democracies. Analytical improvements 
will be endeavoured by integrating the system of political decision-making and 
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industrial relations, relating institutional context and institutional change to both 
actors’ behaviour and socio-economic output and performance from a comparative 
and dynamic perspective. This is important, because too often consensus 
democracy and corporatism are treated separately or one is seen as part of the 
other (cf. Lijphart & Crepaz 1991 and Crepaz & Lijphart 1995 versus Keman & 
Pennings 1995; see Lane & Ersson 2000; Pennings 1997).
 A better understanding of the impact of institutional arrangements on socio-
economic policy-making and performance contributes to the discussion about the 
management of political and social problems that all countries have to cope with, 
such as high unemployment rates, infl ation and public debts. This study can and will 
not provide practical solutions for current problems. It will, however, provide useful 
information about institutions regarding their actual functioning, their impact, their 
effectiveness, their effi ciency in avoiding negative spillovers and their legitimacy 
and responsiveness to the needs of citizens who accept these institutions.
 This research project investigates how different political and political-economic 
institutional arrangements - like consensus vis-à-vis majoritarian types of democracy 
on the one hand, and corporatist vis-à-vis pluralist types of policy concertation 
among organised interests on the other hand - operate and how the combined 
models affect socio-economic policy-making and performance in Western capitalist 
democracies. This study, therefore, focuses on the following research question:
Under what conditions and to what extent do the institutions of 
consensus democracy and corporatism contribute to better socio-
economic performance in twenty developed democracies?
At the heart of this study are two relations. The fi rst relation concerns the linkage 
between corpora tism and consensus democracy. How are these two institutional 
arrangements, which theoretically share a search for consensus-building, related 
and do these co-exist (or not) in advanced Western democracies?
 The second examined relation is the linkage between these institutional 
models and socio-economic policy-making and performance in Western capitalist 
democracies. Comparative analysis makes it possible to examine the effects different 
institutions can have on socio-economic policy. Institutions are not necessarily the 
only determinants of socio-economic policy outputs and performance. The impact 
of institutions on performance can depend on external conditions, such as global or 
local trends in economic growth, the size of a country, openness of the economy and 
international cooperation (Kitschelt et al. 1999; Scharpf & Schmidt 2000; Traxler, 
Blaschke & Kittel 2001). Therefore the analyses control for several possible external 
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effects. This study mainly examines the importance of both consensus democracy 
and corporatism. The goal is to unravel the political-institutional dimension, not 
primarily the socio-economic factors. The most fruitful way to do this is to analyse 
the linkages between actors’ behaviour and their institutional context.
The research question leads to several sub-questions that will be addressed in this 
thesis:
1 How are institutions conceptualised, how are they conceived in relation to political 
behaviour, and how are they operationalised for empirical analysis?
2a What is consensus democracy, how is it defi ned and how can it be measured 
properly in comparative research?
2b How did consensus democracy develop in twenty developed democracies 
between 1965 and 1998?
3a What is corporatism, how is it defi ned and how can it be measured in comparative 
research?
3b How did corporatism develop in twenty developed capitalist democracies 
between 1965 and 1998?
4 What are both the conceptual and the empirical relation between consensus 
democracy and corporatism; which relations can be found between both institutional 
arrangements, cross-national and through time?
5 What is the impact of consensus democracy and corporatism on socio-economic 
performance?
To answer these questions, the following research design is used. First of all, 
this study will assess the role of consensus democracy and corporatism in socio-
economic policy-making. These concepts are redefi ned or measured in another 
way than done in other comparative studies. Secondly, this study focuses explicitly 
on the relation between institutions and actors in socio-economic policy-making. 
This results in a research design that contains both a cross-national quantitative 
comparative study and a comparative qualitative analysis of four cases. The 
selected cases for comparative analysis are derived from the results of the broad 
comparative analysis. The contribution of this study is a new and updated analysis 
of the impact of consensus democracy and corporatism on socio-economic 
policy-making and performance. This way the external validity of both concepts is 
enhanced and it can contribute to validate existing insights. Results are not merely 
based on a general macro-level comparison of aggregated data. Four cases are 
selected based on their position on the dependent variable - socio-economic policy-
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making and performance - and the independent variables - the institutional models 
of consensus democracy and corporatism. Not only will this help to understand 
interrelations between the two models of institutionalising consensus and policy-
making and performance, but it will also enhance the internal validity of the cross-
national analysis (see Pennings, Keman & Kleinnijenhuis 1999; Landman 2000).
1.5 Methods, research design & data
The following approach is used for a systematic analysis of the research question. 
Consensus democracy and corporatism are discussed as well as the way to 
measure them. The impact of these models on socio-economic policy-making and 
performance is examined by comparing twenty developed capitalist democracies, 
which are also members of the OECD. This comparative study is done in two stages. 
In the fi rst stage, a general comparison of twenty countries between 1965 and 
1998 is made. This comparison shows the patterns of consensus democracy and 
corporatism cross-nationally, through time and in terms of their interrelationships. 
In addition these institutional models are related to socio-economic policy-making 
and performance. Aggregated quantitative data are used for this comparison. More 
detailed case analyses clarify how actors are related to institutions and institutional 
change within one country. 
 Four countries are selected from the entire group and examined in more detail. 
These countries are selected based on the way they fi t the general conclusions 
concerning the impact of the institutional models on socio-economic performance. 
These countries are the Netherlands, New Zealand, Portugal and Sweden. Each 
represent a different mix of institutionalisation of consensus democracy and 
corporatism and show a distinctive pattern of policy performance. These case 
analyses can reveal the different processes that are at work in these different 
institutional environments and in particular the role of actors. The selection of the 
cases is discussed in Chapter 6.
 The scope of analysis is twenty developed democracies. For these countries 
both main concepts used in this study are applicable and a wide range of reliable 
political and economic data are available. This group is restricted to democracies, 
because in these regimes individuals and groups of people have the opportunity 
to elect their political representatives, to reveal their preferences and to infl uence 
socio-economic policy-making. This excludes countries with an authoritarian 
regime, where there are no free and fair elections and where there is no freedom 
of organisation (see Keman 2002). Although the specifi c institutional arrangements 
that are the key elements of this study have occasionally been applied to other 
countries - such as India and South Africa - they have to be considered specifi cally 
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valid for these advanced industrialised countries. An additional argument is the 
restriction to select only countries with a mixed economy, which are characterised 
by a free market, private property of the means of production and a long history of 
democratic governance. Last but not least, the scope of analysis is limited to the 
period between 1965 and 1998. Including the pre-1965 period leads to problems 
with regard to data collecting. A period of 34 years is suffi cient for a cross-time 
analysis in respect to the research question. This period contains political and 
institutional changes that took place in most countries which were caused by 
changes in society, the stagfl ation crisis of the early 1970s and the transition to 
democracy in three countries: Greece, Spain and Portugal.
 The analysed countries are selected from the members of the OECD4. Recently 
joined OECD-members – i.e. after 1990 - are not selected because these countries 
currently have only a recently established political system and data are not 
available. Two small countries – Iceland and Luxemburg - are not selected either. 
Conceptually both would fi t the group, but because of their small size they each 
have a particular economic structure. Finally, Turkey and Japan are not included 
in the universe of discourse, because it is highly questionable that the concepts of 
consensus democracy and corporatism mean the same there as they do elsewhere 
in established democratic politics. Hence, these countries are more similar than 
different regarding the relations between state and society.
 The following twenty countries are included in the analysis: Australia, Austria, 
Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK 
and the US. Most of these countries have appeared in many comparative studies 
of public policy. Some of them, however, need further explanation. Spain, Portugal 
and Greece are included in this analysis, despite of the fact that these countries 
have had long-standing experiences with strongly authoritarian regimes. From the 
mid 1970s, these countries have transformed into a democratic political system. 
Exactly this transition makes them interesting cases of institutional change. 
Moreover, they are European countries and EU-members5 and are therefore quite 
similar to the rest of the group when compared to countries that have not been 
taken into consideration6.
 Since these twenty countries are long-time members of the OECD, a wide 
range of data about these countries is available (see Appendix C). The comparative 
method is used to fi nd differences in institutional arrangements and socio-economic 
policies in relatively similar countries (Pennings, Keman & Kleinnijenhuis 1999; 
Peters 1998; Lane & Ersson 1994b). In particular, fl uctuations in time as well as 
over time have to be recognised in contrast to a static view. In addition to the 
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cross-national comparisons, time series analysis can reveal developments of the 
institutional models. A dynamic approach examines how actors try to create new 
institutions or change existing institutions and institutional arrangements to improve 
socio-economic performance.
 The dependent variable of this study is socio-economic policy-making. 
Socio-eco nomic policy-making can be divided in policy outputs and socio-economic 
performance (Lane & Ersson 2000; Keman 1997b). The former measures direct policy 
outputs or policy choices, the latter the actual effects of these outputs on society. 
Policy outputs that can be measured are government expenditures representing 
specifi c policy programmes, such as labour market policy and welfare programmes. 
Socio-economic performance is partly affected by policy choices and by other 
factors, which are outside the theoretical framework of this study. Performance can 
be measured by different kinds of indicators, such as unemployment rates, infl ation 
rates and growth of GDP. The main relations between the concepts are given in the 
conceptual model of Figure 1.2.
Figure 1.2 Conceptual model
Figure 1.2 represents the conceptual model that functions as a basic guideline 
for the central question of this study. Actors and their preferences are placed on 
the left. The political actors are voters, political parties and government. The most 
Consensus
Democracy
Corporatism
Policy
choices
Socio-
economic
Performance
Actors
Preferences
feedback & spill overs
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important actors in policy concertation (including industrial relations) are trade 
unions and employers’ organisations. The institutional arrangements are encircled. 
The fi rst relation that will be examined concerns the interaction between actors 
and institutions, resulting in institutional arrangements, which are called consensus 
democracy for the system of political decision-making and corporatism for the 
system of policy concertation among organised interests. In this study, the relations 
between these institutional arrangements are examined both theoretically and 
empirically.
 The dependent variable socio-economic policy-making is placed on the right-
hand side of Figure 1.2. A deliberate distinction is made between policy choices and 
socio-economic performance. In Figure 1.2, actors affect the policy-making process 
through institutional arrangements. What are the actions as mediated by these 
institu tions on the policy-making process? As already mentioned, the impact of both 
consensus democracy and corporatism on socio-economic policy is infl uenced by 
external factors or intervening variables. The goal of this study, however, is limited 
to the political-institutional context of macro-economic management in capitalist 
democracies. The cross-national part of this study discusses some contextual 
variables that can have an effect on the working of these institutional arrangements. 
Comparative case analysis allows for the inclusion of specifi c conditions that may 
have been relevant in understanding certain effects of consensus democracy and 
corporatism that do not surface in a cross-national analysis.
 The arrows in Figure 1.2 indicate the major effects that are expected to emerge. 
The conceptual model is based on the expectation that actors behave on the basis 
of their preferences and that institutions transform these into collective decisions. 
Furthermore, the main emphasis lies on the working of these institutions and the 
way they make a difference for the resulting policy choices and performance. As 
indicated in the model there is also an effect of policy outputs and policy perfor-
mance on the actors’ preferences and behaviour. Actors can change their behaviour 
because of their perception of past policy choices and socio-economic performance. 
This study is primarily focused on the effects of these institutional arrangements 
and the way actors try to adjust these institutional arrangements. The main goal 
is to unravel the relationship between consensus democracy and corporatism and 
its implications for policy-making and performance in twenty democracies. Part II 
elaborates on the conceptual model after the main concepts are presented and 
operationalised. This results in the extended conceptual model that is discussed in 
Chapter 4.
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1.6 Two phases of socio-economic problem-solving
The assumption is that institutions can have an impact on performance. The 
relation between actors, institutions and performance can be understood as a two-
sided relationship. Two phases can be distinguished. In the fi rst phase, the actor’s 
perception of past and present performance can infl uence the actors’ behaviour 
and strategy in both their acting in decision-making and changing or developing 
institutional arrangements. In the second phase, these institutional arrangements 
can make a difference for policy choices and performance. These two phases of 
socio-economic problem-solving is an elaboration of the debate about the impact 
of institutions on performance that is applied in this study.
 The central thesis in this study is that actors are preference driven and that 
institutions can be changed by actors in order to reach certain policy and performance 
goals. Hence, two stages can be distinguished. In the fi rst stage, actors acknowledge 
the crisis at hand and adapt their behaviour. This stage emphasises the impact of 
performance on actors’ behaviour and institutional arrangements. In the second 
stage, policy is reformed and institutions are changed to maximise performance. 
This stage focuses on the impact of institutions on performance.
Phase 1: Performance infl uences actors’ behaviour and strategy; as a result 
institutional arrangements can be changed by actors.
The power of actors depends on their success and support of voters and members. 
Their success and support depends on policy choices and performance. This means 
that political parties, government, trade unions and employers’ organisations have 
an incentive to make policy choices and develop performance that is good for their 
voters or members. In this respect, performance infl uences the preferences and 
strategy of actors. Actors try to change institutions or actors can act jointly so that 
institutions change. These institutions are changed in a way which actors believe to 
be most likely to contribute to favourable policy choices and better performance.
Phase 2 : Actors and institutions determine policy choices and performance.
The second phase deals with how institutions actually shape policy choices 
and performance. Institutions either constrain possible outcomes or create new 
outcomes that without these institutions could not have been chosen.
Arena 1 Political decision-making
Voters, political parties and government interact in collective binding decision-
making. Voters’ behaviour is not analysed here at a micro-level, but voters are 
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important to explain the interests and actions of political parties. Parties can for 
instance adjust their ideology to receive a broader support among voters.
Arena 2 Policy concertation among organised interests
Interest groups interact in shaping socio-economic policy. These actors operate in 
institutionalised forms of consultation and they can make agreements and pacts.
This study analyses these arenas separately and the relations between both 
arenas. This study shows that these arenas are not always equally important for 
socio-economic policy.
Within each of these arenas two levels can be distinguished. At the lower level of 
the political system voters interact with higher level actors: parties and government. 
These actors interact in making binding political decisions. In policy concertation 
among organised interests workers and employers are at a lower level and trade 
unions and employers’ organisations at a higher level. These actors interact in wage 
bargaining, social pacts and affecting socio-economic policy-making. According to 
this theoretical framework this study focuses on two phases, two levels and two 
arenas of socio-economic problem-solving.
1.7 Hypotheses
The following relations are expected to be found in the empirical parts of this study. 
The fi rst hypothesis is that the institutions of consensus democracy and corporatism 
are not static, but change over time. The second hypothesis is that consensus 
democracy operates differently from corporatism and has a different impact on 
socio-economic policy-making and performance. The institutions of consensus 
democracy are more related to political stability, while corporatist institutions are 
more focused at socio-economic policy-making.
 Institutions enable the expression of actors’ preferences and behaviour: 
institutions as instruments for change. Here we are interested in the contribution 
of the institutions of consensus democracy and corporatism to socio-economic 
performance.
 When formal institutions fail, additional informal institutions are created to 
prevent a deadlock in decision-making. Consensus democracy and corporatism 
have institutions that are more open to adaptation by actors in cases of diffi cult 
decision-making and economic crisis. For this reason consensus democracy and 
corporatism give actors the best opportunity to adjust strategies of socio-economic 
management to changing economic conditions. The institutions of majoritarian 
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democracy and pluralism are more rigid in this respect. This leads to the third 
hypothesis that consensus democracy and corporatism lead to better socio-
economic performance in advanced Western democracies.
 It is expected that consensus democracy and corporatism lead to other policy 
choices than majoritarian democracy and pluralism. Consensus democracy and 
corporatism create more channels of input of voters, political parties and interest 
groups in decision-making. These institutions made a crucial difference in the 
development of the welfare state. In countries with more consensus democracy, 
governments were more sensitive to voter demands for active social policy. In 
corporatist countries workers were better organised and had more infl uence to 
claim a better system of social protection. The fourth hypothesis is that consensus 
democracy and corporatism contribute to a larger welfare state. Since the late 
1980s, the welfare state has come under pressure. Social policy weighs down 
heavily on government revenues. Welfare states in consensus democracies and 
corporatist countries are better protected against reforms and cutbacks than in 
majoritarian democracy and pluralism, where change of the status quo meets less 
powerful opposition. This lack of strong opposition and a solid majority government 
facilitate radical policy reform in a majoritarian democracy. It is expected that welfare 
states in consensus democracies and corporatist countries are more resilient than 
in majoritarian democracies and pluralist countries.
1.8 Plan of the book
In the comparative analysis of Part II, Chapter 2 presents the consensus model of 
democracy. The conceptual history of consociational theory and the operationalisation 
of consensus democracy - including some alternative approaches - are discussed. 
This information is used for a new approach of the study of consensus democracy. 
Chapter 3 discusses the conceptual history and the many defi nitions and measures 
of corporatism. This opens new directions to study corporatism. Chapter 4 discusses 
the linkages between consensus democracy and corporatism. Chapter 5 explains 
and describes the impact of newly conceptualised and operationalised consensus 
democracy and corporatism on socio-economy policy formation and performance. 
In the case analyses in Part III, Chapter 6 deals with the selection of four cases for 
further case study analysis. Chapters 7 to 10 analyse four cases in detail, namely 
the Netherlands, New Zealand, Portugal and Sweden. Chapter 11 discusses and 
assesses the results of this study in view of the research question and theoretical 
aims. The main conclusion of this thesis is that institutions do matter, but in a different 
way than was assumed by many other studies. The effects of institutions on socio-
economic performance are not always positive and straight forward and seem to 
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depend on other conditions, such as openness of the economy and central bank 
independence. It seems that performance has to be important for actors’ strategies 
and institutional change as well.
 As confi gurations the institutions of consensus democracy and corporatism do not 
under all conditions contribute to better socio-economic performance. Consensus 
democracy and corporatism are not the same types of institutions and they have 
not the same effect on performance. The research strategy employed in this study, 
which combines cross-national and cross-time comparisons with a comparative 
case analysis, allows for better understanding of the relationship between actors, 
institutions and performance. The cross-national comparisons examine variation 
across – clusters of – countries. The four cases focus on the behaviour of actors in 
order to be able to analyse the way preferences are indeed transformed into policy 
choices. In summary: this study demonstrates how the conditions of socio-economic 
development are coming about and the extent to which this can be understood by 
the interaction between actors and institutions.
Notes
1 The selection of the cases –twenty of the thirty OECD countries – is elaborated in Section 1.5.
2 A strategy is employed by an individual actor – or a group of actors – to manipulate decision-making. 
A rule – both formal and informal - is a norm or an agreement between members of a group.
3 This argument was made more recently by Hicks & Kenworthy (1998), Crepaz (1992).
4 The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) is the continuation of the 
Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), which was founded after World War II 
to promote the economic recovery of Europe and to implement the Marshall plan. The scope of 
the OECD goes beyond Europe and the Paris based organisation provides a wide range of socio-
economic data and analyses.
5 European Union (EU) is used for both the current EU and the European Community (EC).
6 Israel is not a member of the OECD, but would otherwise not have been selected. Confl icts with the 
Palestinians and the military tension with the adjacent countries dominate the political system. The 
strong role of the army and the migration policy has a major impact on the economic structure; not to 
mention the extreme level of political violence and terrorist acts.
22
The institutional dynamics of consensus and confl ict
23
Consensus democracy
PART II COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
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2 CONSENSUS DEMOCRACY
2.1 Introduction
There are different institutional models of political decision-making. An institutional 
model describes both formal and informal arrangements used by actors. In most 
cases formal rules are laid down and can be legally imposed, e.g. by means of a 
constitution. Informal institutions are, by contrast, social rules or practices which 
altogether form specifi c institutional arrangements between actors. Furthermore, 
they adjust the working of the formal institutions. Consensus democracy is a 
specifi c institutional arrangement. It contains both formal and informal rules which 
contribute to the creation and persistence of a system of problem-solving through an 
accommodating strategy of the political elites. Consensus democracy is a system of 
political decision-making based on cooperation and consensus rather than confl ict. 
This is considered the opposite of majoritarian democracy, in which most if not all 
power is concentrated in the electoral majority and a dominant executive.
 This chapter discusses the consensus model of democracy which, according 
to the research question, is expected to have an impact on socio-economic 
performance. First, this chapter gives a description of the conceptual history of 
consociationalism, which was contesting the general tenets of pluralist theory and 
later contributed to the concept of consensus democracy. Second, Lijphart’s model of 
consensus democracy versus majoritarian democracy is presented and discussed. 
Third, the consensus versus majoritarian model of democracy is operationalised, in 
order to examine its empirical relevance in a comparative perspective and to test 
the impact of political institutions on policy choices and performance.
2.2 The development of consociational theory
For a long time, pluralist theory dominated the comparative study of political 
systems (Almond 1956; Dahl 1971; Nordlinger 1981). Pluralists distin guished two 
types of political systems. The Anglo-American system which is considered to be 
a homogeneous, secular political culture, and the continen tal European politi cal 
systems which are characterised by fragmen tation of political culture into political 
subcultures. In pluralist theory, social heteroge neity leads to political instability. 
According to Dahl’s idea of pluralism  this implies theoretically that democracy 
cannot exist in small countries with a strongly segmented society, like the Nether-
lands, Switzer land and Belgium. According to Dahl (1966: 379):
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‘the Netherlands would surely be counted a prime candidate for political disintegration, 
since the country must bear not only some class antagonism but an even more profound 
cleavage over religion’.
Later, Dahl (1971: 105) argues that  ‘any system is in peril if it becomes polarised 
into several highly antagonistic groups’. Dahl sees polyarchy as a feasible form 
of democracy. Polyarchy is guaranteed if suffi cient public contestation is possible 
- meaning that there is enough competition between political organisations and 
elites – and enough political participation is ensured. Dahl (1971: 108) expects that 
polyarchy is ‘more frequently found in relatively homogeneous countries than in 
countries with a great amount of sub-cultural pluralism’ (see also Dahl 2000).
 An explana tion of the political stability that actually did exist in some small 
countries was presented in several case studies (Lijphart 1968, Steiner 1974, Lehm-
bruch 1967). They investigated the me cha nisms by which political systems may 
adapt to threats to their stability and to overcome them from an institutionalist point 
of view. By using so-called consociational devi ces, elite behaviour can overcome 
the negative effects of heterogeneity.
 A number of plural-societal countries (e.g. Switzerland, Austria, the Netherlands 
and – to a lesser extent - Belgium), have remained stable democracies due to 
collaboration between elites and the existence of special mechanisms for elite 
behaviour. Different names were given to the model that explained the puzzling 
linkage between a divided society and political stability. Segmented pluralism (strong 
social fragmentation combined with political effi ciency and stability, Lorwin 1971), 
Konkordanzdemokratie (elite decisions are reached by mutual agreement rather 
than by majority rule, Steiner 1970), corporate pluralism (Lipset & Rokkan 1967 
on Norway) and proportional democracy or Proporzdemokratie (goods and offi ces 
are distributed proportionally according to the size of the subgroups, Lehmbruch 
1967).
 These different terms point to the different approaches of the analysis of 
consociationalism. McRae (1974: 5) distinguishes three principal view points from 
which to approach consociationalism:
1 as a pattern of social structure, emphasising the degree of religious, ideological, 
cultural or linguistic segmentation in society itself (Lorwin 1971: institutionalised 
cleavage structures);
2 as a pattern of elite behaviour and mass-elite relationships, emphasising the 
processes of decision-making and confl ict regulation (Lijphart 1968: overarching 
cooperation between the political elites to counteract the disintegrating tendencies 
in the system);
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3 as an underlying characteristic of political culture arising from historical 
circumstances which may antedate the period of mass politics (Lehmbruch 1967; 
Daalder 1966; Daalder 1971: the existence of older patterns of elite cooperation in 
the pre-modern period has paved the way for a politics of accommodation in an age 
of mass politics).
Pluralist theory states that a democratic system is stable if there are both centrifugal 
forces (social cleavages) and centripetal forces (cross-pressures) at mass level. 
Suppose a society divided in several segments on an ethnic and language 
dimension and a socio-economic dimension. Political stability is unlikely to occur if 
these divisions coincide (i.e. people belonging to one ethnic group all fi t in the same 
socio-economic group). Belgium used to be a good example of this, having ethno-
linguistic subgroups coinciding with socio-economic classes (Dahl 1966: 369).
 Yet, in the Netherlands, pillarisation prevented such cross-pressures at mass 
level. Nevertheless, Dutch democracy is stable and effective. Lijphart (1968) 
showed in his Politics of Accommodation that social heterogeneity does not need 
to be balanced at the same (mass) level; it can also be compensated at elite level. 
In a segmented society, elite competition would lead to a centrifugal democracy. 
To prevent this, political elites cooperated in the past which can, by and large, be 
understood in terms of rational behaviour: Elites have more to lose than to gain 
from an open struggle. Hence, self-interested behaviour of each actor becomes 
identical to collective action or fi nding the ‘core’1.
 Consociationalism was studied by Lijphart as well as by Lehmbruch (1967; 1974) 
and Steiner (1970). Lehmbruch (1967; 1974) also replied to Almond’s distinction 
between two-party and multi-party systems, by developing a third type of political 
system; the non-competitive pattern of amicable agreement. The majority principle 
is not applicable in all countries, (e.g. Switzerland and Belgium). Public offi ce in 
these countries is apportioned among all important linguistic groups and regions or 
religious denominations. 
 Negotiated agreement appears to be the only possible means by which civil 
peace can be presented. A deadlock can be overcome in two ways:
1 The political system is divided on a regional or functional basis in which the 
actors may be free to realise the preferences held by respective groups.
2 The actors may agree on larger scale barter similar to package deals.
These are two possible methods of confl ict management to save the existence of 
the political system. Proporzdemokratie is a non-competitive system, which settles 
issues by amicibilis compositio, that is by negotiated agreement rather than by 
majority.
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 The most interesting part of the Proporz system is how the political problems and 
confl icts are solved on the collective level. Starting point for all Proporz systems is 
the distribution of offi ces according to the principle of parity or Proporz of the rivalling 
groups. In Switzerland, the proportional distribution of offi ces (the magic formula of 
distributing portfolios in coalition governments) is a protection of minority-groups. 
This Proporz can have different forms. Different groups have equal representation, 
each group can have its own domain or offi ces rotate between all parties.
 Hence, there is a variety of institutional conditions to avoid confl ict and stalemates 
and to produce an equilibrium. In his Democracies in Plural societies Lijphart (1977: 
106) elaborated on a new typology, which also contained his own consociational 
democracy. This implied a shift from single country studies to comparative analysis 
of democratic regimes that were not or could not be seen as pluralistic regimes 
(Almond 1956).
Table 2.1 Lijphart’s typology of democratic regimes
       Structure of Society
Homogeneous Plural
Elite
behaviour
Coalescent
Depoliticised
Democracy
Consociational
Democracy
Adversarial
Centripetal
Democracy
Centrifugal
Democracy
Source: Lijphart (1977: 106)
Centrifugal and centripetal types correspond to Almond’s Continental European and 
Anglo-American types respectively. The consociational type represents coalescent 
elite behaviour in a plural society, whereas, the depoliticised type represents a type 
of democracy, that is characterised by ‘closed shop’ bargaining of homogeneous 
societies to avoid stalemate, e.g. Sweden.
‘The trend seemed to be toward a lessening of ideological and religious tensions and a 
simultaneous increase in coalescent decision-making’ 
(Lijphart 1977: 106).
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According to Lijphart (1977: 107) all four types of democratic regimes can be related 
to different degrees of political stability. His main interest in the study of political 
systems was the question to what extent political systems contribute to political 
stability. He expected that the centrifugal type of democracy will lead to instability, 
whereas centripetal and consociational types are stable democracies. In his view 
the stability of the depoliticised type of democracy is less than expected. The use 
of these kinds of vague concepts of stability lead to very general conclusions 
which need further specifi cation. Lijphart (1977: 4) defi ned political stability as a 
multidimensional concept combining system maintenance, civil order, legitimacy 
and effectiveness of governance. This defi nition was based on Nordlinger (1972). 
In his most recent book Patterns of Democracy Lijphart (1999: 300) argues that 
consensus democracy makes a difference with regard to almost all of the indicators 
of democratic quality.
 Lijphart (1977) empirically found some conditions favourable for the stability 
and democracy of a plural society. The small size of a country, the existence of 
external threats, a balance of power among the subcultures, a multi-party system 
with segmental parties, some cross-cutting cleavages, overarching loyalties, a 
representative party-system, isolation of the segments from each other, and traditions 
of elite accommodation. An alternative way of testing the pros and cons of different 
democracy types is to examine the relation between types of democratic systems 
and types of public policy, as proposed by Peters, Doughtie & McCulloch (1977). In 
1999 Lijphart also focused on the relation with socio-economic management.
 Lijphart used his concept of consociational democracy in both empirical and 
normative analysis. It helped to explain political stability that actually occurs in 
countries where pluralist theory predicts instability. Consociationalism has also been 
used as a normative model for plural societies in new democracies in Southern 
and Eastern Europe and some developing countries. Lijphart disputed the artifi cial 
contrast that was made between the democracies in the First World and the Second 
or Third World. His idea was to develop a consociational prescriptive model that 
could be applied to plural societies in countries outside of the First World. Lijphart 
(1977: 153) considered Lebanon and Malaysia as evidence for the applicability and 
feasibility of consociational democracy in these countries.
 The consociational type of democracy can be summarised in four central 
features:
- grand coalition
The grand coalition cabinet is the most typical and obvious consociational solution 
for a fragmented system. The elites of all segments cooperate in a grand coalition 
to make peaceful agreements. Grand coalitions are formed to allow a role for 
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minorities. These groups have to compromise in order to make package deals, 
since there is not a majority. The opposite of the coalescent style of leadership 
in the consociational model is the so-called competitive majoritarian model. This 
model satisfi es the condition of Riker’s size principle which predicts the occurrence 
of minimum winning coalitions (Riker 1962).
- proportionality
Consociational democracy deviates from the principle of the majority rule. In deeply 
divided societies, majority rule can lead to instability and neglect of minorities. 
Proportionality is used as the main principle in distributing offi ces and money 
among rivalling groups. In Switzerland for example, a magic formula had been 
developed to distribute the portfolios of the government, while in the Netherlands 
proportionality is important at the electoral level. The low threshold2 allows small 
parties to receive seats in parliament.
- segmental autonomy and federalism
Grand coalitions deal with the most important political issues of a country. Less 
important issues are left to regulation by its segments. Other segments have 
no right to intervene in the less important issues of other segments. Segmental 
autonomy can be realised by means of territorial federalism, of which Belgium is a 
good example, or by means of functional autonomy, such as in the Netherlands.
- mutual minority veto
The mutual minority veto can give each segment a guarantee for political protection. 
This veto can lead to a minority tyranny. Lijphart (1977), however, is quite optimistic 
about the threat of a deadlock in decision-making caused by vetoing minorities. 
In his opinion every segment will have suffi cient awareness to prevent this from 
happening, as the veto is mutual; all will be hesitant to use it. However, when 
the actual use of an instrument is limited to its threat, its actual power becomes 
extremely limited.
Lijphart’s consociational theory is a kind of behavioural explanation of political 
culture based on sociological analysis. Potential confl ict between the subgroups 
in society is avoided by cooperation between the representatives of the subgroups 
at elite level. This cooperation is a specifi c institutional arrangement between the 
elites of a country to adjust the working of the formal institutions. The next section 
shows how Lijphart transformed his explanation of Dutch consociational political 
culture into a general institutional democratic model.
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2.3 Lijphart’s consensus versus majoritarian model of democracy
In 1984 Lijphart presented his model of consensus versus majoritarian democracy 
for the fi rst time. In 1999, he revised and expanded it. The indicators proposed by 
Lijphart in his work are recalculated in this section for a set of twenty countries in 
the years 1965 to 1998. Later in this chapter, Lijphart’s operationalisation will be 
evaluated and a new index of consensus democracy is presented.
 Work on consociationalism and consensus democracy must be understood 
by its developments through time. In the beginning, consociationalist theory was 
limited almost exclusively to a description of several critical and crucial case 
studies. The main objective was to explain why stable democracies actually did 
occur in certain strongly segmented countries and could not be explained within 
the pluralist framework at that time. Hence, consociationalist theory explained how 
political stability is indeed possible in a divided society. Three different types of 
explanation were developed: from the social structure (Lorwin), as a pattern of 
elite behaviour (Lijphart) and from historical circumstances (Daalder). Lijphart’s 
next step was to develop an institutional model that could be applied to a wider 
set of countries. In Democracies (Lijphart 1984) and Patterns of democracies 
(Lijphart 1999), a distinction is made between two political-institutional models 
of democracy: consensus democracy versus majori tarian democracy. The main 
features of consensus democracy are the existence of an institutional context in 
which major groups in society have a possibility to participate in its political system 
and that confl icts are solved in a cooperative manner. In contrast to this consensual 
manner of political problem-solving, the majoritarian model of democracy consigns 
all political dominance in both parliament and government to one group, but only for 
a limited time.
 By moving from consociational democracy (1977) to consensus democracy 
(1984) Lijphart not only shifts towards the method of cross-national comparison; 
he also moves from a focus on the structure of society to a comparative analysis of 
the institutional arrangements. Lijphart (1977) is a description of consociationalism 
in several countries. The basis of political culture is formed by the structure of 
society. The conditions leading to a stable system are examined. Lijphart (1984) is 
a shift from society to institutions and to the operationalisation of the institutional 
conditions that affect the degree of consensus democracy.
 In 1999 Lijphart made several adjustments of his earlier framework in 
Democracies. First of all, he increased the number of countries from 21 to 36. 
Secondly, he adjusted some indicators, while others were added or deleted. The 
third and genuinely new element is that it contains an analysis of the impact of the 
consensus and majoritarian model on respectively socio-economic and democratic 
performance.
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Table 2.2 Lijphart’s features of consociationalism and consensus 
democracy
Consociationalism Consensus democracy
1977 1984 1999
Grand coalition Oversized coalition Oversized coalition
Cabinet duration Cabinet duration
Effective number of 
parties
Effective number of parties
Number of issue 
dimensions
Proportionality Proportionality Proportionality
Mutual minority veto Bicameralism Bicameralism
Rigid and written 
constitution
Constitutional rigidity
Judicial review
Segmental autonomy 
Decentralisation/ 
federalism
Decentralisation/ federalism
(Direct democracy)
Interest group system
Central bank independence
Source: Lijphart (1977; 1984; 1999)
Table 2.2 shows the connection between Lijphart’s three models. In 1977, he started 
with four essential features of consociationalism: grand coalition, proportionality, 
mutual minority veto and segmental autonomy. Both in 1984 and 1999, the fi rst 
feature of grand coalition was operationalised by the proportion of oversized 
coalitions and average cabinet duration. The effective number of parties can be 
related to both grand coalition and proportionality. Grand coalitions rarely occur in a 
two-party system and a proportional electoral system tends to increase the number 
of parties. In 1999, the number of issue dimensions was deleted as an indicator. 
Mutual minority veto was operationalised by bicameralism and a rigid constitution. 
In 1999, this last indicator was subdivided in two new ones: constitutional rigidity 
and judicial review. Segmental autonomy was operationalised by decentralisation 
and federalism. In 1999, interest group system and central bank independence 
were added as two new indicators. In 1984 a ninth variable, referendum, was 
discussed, but removed from the model on empirical grounds3.
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 Lijphart (1984; 1989; 1999) derived his operationalisation of the consensus 
model by taking the features of the Westminster or majoritarian model. This model 
is based on the principle which concentrates as much political power as possible 
in the hands of the electoral majority. Consensus democracy is regarded as the 
opposite type. Its main principle is that different segments have every opportunity 
to participate in both legislative and executive power. Two dimensions are 
distinguished. The fi rst executive-legislative dimension deals with the relationship 
between government and parliament. The second federal-unitary dimension relates 
to the degree of territorial segmentation. Each dimension is operationalised by fi ve 
indicators. The ten indicators of Lijphart’s model of consensus versus majoritarian 
democracy are reported in Table 2.3.
Table 2.3 Lijphart’s indicators of consensus versus majoritarian democracy
Majoritarian democracy Consensus democracy
Executive-parties dimension
1 Concentration of executive power in
 single-party majority cabinets
2 Executive dominance
3 Two-party system
4 Majoritarian and disproportional 
electoral system
5 Pluralist interest group system
1 Executive power-sharing in broad
   multiparty coalitions
2 Executive-legislative balance of power
3 Multiparty system
4 Proportional representation
5 Corporatist interest group system
Federal-unitary dimension
1 Unitary and centralised government
2 Unicameral legislature
3 Flexible constitution
4 Judicial review by legislation
5 Central banks dependent on executive
1 Federal and decentralised      
government
2 Bicameral legislature
3 Rigid constitution
4 Judicial review by supreme
   or constitutional court
5 Central bank independence
Source: Lijphart (1999: 3-4)
In Democracies (Lijphart 1984) the consensus versus majoritarian models of 
democracy are used to analyse twenty-two political regimes in twenty-one 
countries4. In Patterns of democracy (Lijphart 1999) this was extended to thirty-
six cases. Based on eight indicators Lijphart (1984) identifi es two dimensions of 
consensus democracies. The fi rst dimension characterises executive-legislative 
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relations and is measured by the proportion of minimal winning cabinets, average 
cabinet durability, the effective number of parliamentary parties, the number of 
ideological issue dimensions, and the proportionality of the electoral system. The 
second dimension is a federal-unitary scale measured by the proportion of tax 
collected by central government, constitutional fl exibility, and unicameralism. In 
Patterns (Lijphart 1999) the number of indicators to measure consensus democracy 
increased to ten.
 Due to the way Lijphart has operationalised consensus democracy, the dynamics 
of the measurement is rather limited. For most of his indicators, he uses averages 
between 1945 and 1996. He does not measure for more than two periods: 1945-70 
and 1971-96 (Lijphart 1999: 253-257). In the assessment that follows the scores 
of the ten indicators are calculated differently than in Lijphart (1999). Instead of 
averages over 1945-96, annual scores for twenty countries are calculated for each 
year from 1965 to 1998. For this reason, some of the variables have to be calculated 
differently. In this evaluation the main differences with Lijphart’s calculations are a 
smaller set of countries, a shorter period, and annual scores on the variables. The 
aim of this replication is to make Lijphart’s model sensitive to time and to assess its 
overall validity. These scores are used to evaluate his model and most importantly, 
to develop a different operationalisation of the whole concept. Section 2.5 presents 
a new operationalisation of consensus democracy.
Evaluating Lijphart’s model 
In 1999, Lijphart refi ned his 1984 model. Its main purpose, the division of the world 
in two types of democracy (consensus versus majoritarian) remained the same. 
Two variables did not return in Lijphart (1999). First of all, the number of issue 
dimensions was disregarded as an indicator of the fi rst (executive-legislative) 
dimension. This variable was replaced by interest group system, which is obviously 
something completely different. This variable is based on Siaroff’s index of 
integration of the economy (Siaroff 1999). This variable is discussed in Chapter 3. 
The second omitted indicator, referendum democracy, was actually already deleted 
after the factor analysis in 1984. Originally a third dimension, including the indicator 
of referendum democracy, was constructed but Lijphart (1984: 30-31) omitted this 
variable because direct democracy could not be used to make a distinction between 
the majoritarian and the consensus model.
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 Both in 1984 and 1999, Lijphart used fi ve indicators to measure the fi rst 
dimension. The measurement of the second dimension expanded from three to 
fi ve indicators. Constitutional fl exibility was split into two separate variables. A new 
variable is central bank dependence. This leads to an operationalisation of fi ve 
indicators for each of the two dimensions.
 It is rather surprising to enumerate the characteristics of majoritarian democracy 
in order to operationalise consensus democracy. It might be expected that Lijphart 
would have elaborated a direct operationalisation of the features of consociational 
democracy. Apparently, these features are too broad and too multi-interpretable. 
However, Lijphart (1989: 39-41) tries to clarify the relationship between these 
two concepts. He makes the following connections between the features of 
consociational democracy and the characteristics of consensus democracy: 
grand coalition with executive power-sharing, executive-legislative balance, multi-
dimensional and multi-party system; proportionality with proportional representation; 
segmented autonomy with federalism and decentralisation and minority veto with a 
rigid constitution and bicameralism (see Table 2.2).
 The indicators of the fi rst dimension have been recalculated for twenty countries 
for each year between 1965 and 1998. Table C.1 (Appendix C) contains the 
average values over this time period for each country. The last column shows the 
standardised sum of the z-scores of the fi ve indicators, which is the fi rst dimension 
of Lijphart’s consensus democracy. For this measurement of the fi rst dimension, 
the following formula was used. Dimension 1 of Lijphart’s consensus democracy is 
the sum of the z-scores of:
- the effective number of parliamentary parties;
- the proportion of minimal winning and one-party cabinets;
- cabinet durability;
- disproportionality;
- integration of the economy5.
 In Table C.2 (Appendix C), fi rst the average scores for the countries are calculated 
and, second, the dimension scores are the sums of these averages. Countries are 
placed on both dimensions in Figure 2.1. 
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Figure 2.1 Two-dimensional map of twenty countries on two dimensions of Lijphart’s 
consensus democracy (1965-98)
Countries rank from federal (top) to unitary (bottom) and majoritarian (left) to consensual (right)
Based on own calculations
Country labels: at = Austria, au = Australia, be = Belgium, ca = Canada, ch = Switzerland, de = 
Germany, dk = Denmark, es = Spain, fi  = Finland, fr = France, gr = Greece, ir = Ireland, it = Italy, nl = 
the Netherlands, no = Norway, nz = New Zealand, pt = Portugal, se = Sweden, uk = United Kingdom 
and us = United States.
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Figure 2.2 Average scores of twenty countries on the two dimensions of Lijphart’s 
consensus democracy (1965-98)
Based on own calculations.
Dimension 1 is executive-legislative and dimension 2 is federal-unitary.
Figure 2.2 shows the variation of the average scores on both dimensions for twenty 
countries. There is considerable variation over time on dimension 1. The peak in 
consensus democracy in the early is probably due to high electoral fragmentation. 
In the 1980s we see a decline of the effective number of parties and a rise in minimal 
winning coalitions. Almost by defi nition, the indicators of the second dimension are 
more static.
 Table C.2 (Appendix C) reports the scores on the indicators of the second 
dimension. These scores are calculated in the same way as in Table C.1 (Appendix 
C). The second dimension of Lijphart’s consensus democracy is the sum of the z-
scores of:
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- federal and decentralised government;
- bicameralism;
- constitutional rigidity;
- judicial review;
- and central bank independence.
 Lijphart did a factor analysis based on the ten indicators of consensus democracy 
for thirty-six countries. What will happen if the twenty countries that appear in this 
study, are scrutinised by means of a factor analysis in the period 1965-98? Table 
2.4 shows the factor scores of the variables for the factors that were extracted by a 
principal component analysis. The method of extracting factors is the same as used 
in Lijphart (1984; 1999) by varimax rotation with Eigenvalues over 1.
Table 2.4 Factor analysis of recalculated indicators of Lijphart’s consensus 
democracy (1965-98)
 Factor 1 2 3
 Effective number of parliamentary parties -0.68 0.52 -0.01 
 Minimal winning & single-party cabinets 0.79 -0.42 -0.06
 Cabinet durability 0.77 0.13 0.18
 Disproportionality 0.00 -0.88 -0.08
 Integration of the economy (Siaroff 1999) -0.28 0.83 0.04
 Federal and decentralised government 0.07 0.15 0.94
 Bicameralism -0.19 -0.27 0.84
 Constitutional rigidity -0.02 0.21 0.85
 Judicial review 0.37 -0.13 0.68 
 Central bank independence 0.13 0.17 0.80
 
Source: own calculations based on Lijphart (1984; 1999).
Note:  Factor analysis based on varimax extraction with Eigenvalues > 1
The results of this factor analysis deviate from Lijphart’s output (1984: 214, 
Table 13.1; 1999: 246, Table 14.2). The most striking difference with Lijphart’s 
analysis is that not two, but three factors are extracted with Eigenvalues over 1, 
although the Eigenvalue of the third factor is only slightly larger than 1. Obviously, 
a smaller set of countries and another time period is used but still the result is 
puzzling. For 1984 and 1999 Lijphart reported a factor that confi rmed his parties-
executive dimension consisting of fi ve variables. In the analysis reported in Table 
2.4, this factor is split into two different factors. It seems that disproportionality 
and integration of the economy are not on the same dimension as the effective 
number of parties, minimal winning cabinets and cabinet durability. This indicates 
that using corporatism (operationalised as integration of the economy) as one of 
the indicators of consensus democracy might be problematic. It is, however, more 
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diffi cult to explain why disproportionality does not belong to the same factor. The 
third extracted factor matches Lijphart’s second dimension. The variable central 
bank independence seems to fi t the federal-unitary factor as well. Central bank 
independence must be considered a completely different phenomenon with little 
logical affi nity with consensus democracy.
 The conclusion based on this analysis must be that even the slightest deviations 
of the variables immediately appear to produce different outcomes of the factor 
analysis. Apparently only a specifi c confi guration of variables leads to the same 
results that Lijphart generated. Or to put it differently, the logic may be compelling, 
the validity - as is shown – can be questioned, and the reliability of this type of 
procedure is quite low.
 The placement of the countries in Figure 2.1 can be compared with the conceptual 
mapping in Lijphart (1999: 248). Positive scores in Figure 2.1 indicate consensus 
democracy, whereas in Lijphart’s factor analysis negative scores indicate the same. 
The top right corner of Figure 2.1 shows Switzerland as a clear case of a country that 
scores high on both dimensions. In Lijphart’s analysis, Switzerland is also the most 
typical case of consensus democracy. Belgium, the Netherlands, France and Italy 
have almost the same placement. In the bottom left corner, New Zealand, United 
Kingdom and, to a lesser extent, Greece can be considered majoritarian on both 
dimensions. This matches the mapping by Lijphart. The top left corner contains the 
majoritarian-federal countries United States, Canada, Australia, Germany, Austria 
and Spain. In Figure 2.1, the United States is much more majoritarian on the fi rst 
dimension than in Lijphart’s analysis. The countries in the bottom-right corner of 
Figure 2.1 are located close to the centre
 Dividing consensus democracy in two dimensions appears to be hazardous. 
First, they are two separate concepts. Second, replicating the factor analysis with 
recalculated data leads to three, instead of two, dimensions. Third, according to 
this scatter diagram, it can be argued that the federal-unitary dimension does not 
contribute to a more adequate ranking of the countries on the consensus versus 
majoritarian scale. If we only consider the executive-legislative dimension 1, we 
fi nd the typical majoritarian cases (USA, Canada, UK and New Zealand) to the 
left. To the right we fi nd Switzerland, Denmark, Belgium and Finland. Viewing the 
two-dimensional map from the perspective of the federal-unitary dimension, we 
fi nd Germany, USA, Canada, Australia and Switzerland at the top. These countries 
have only one thing in common: they are federal and decentralised states (Keman 
2000). The institutions in this group cannot be considered as consensual and of 
the same type. At the bottom of the fi gure we fi nd Portugal, Greece, Sweden, 
Finland, UK and New Zealand. This group of countries shares one important 
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feature. Their governments belong to the most highly centralised6. Because of 
this, the federal-unitary dimension can be deleted from the operationalisation of 
consensus democracy, since it basically refers to the implementation of policy 
choices made within the polity. Not consensus formation is the crucial feature, but 
rather co-governance, which may or may not represent an additional feature of 
policy performance.
 Another crucial issue regarding the measurement of consensus democracy is 
of course its persistence over time. We are therefore interested in how the scores 
on consensus democracy vary through time. There are considerable differences 
in variation between all countries. Switzerland has the lowest variation, whereas 
variation is highest in France, Belgium, the Netherlands, New Zealand and Portugal. 
Hence, and this is important, this fi nding demonstrates that the interaction between 
actors and institutions in the reviewed countries is not stable, but subject to change. 
When and how the relationship between formal and informal rules changes (or 
not) is examined by a dynamic use of the conceptual model. This has important 
consequences for analysing the eventual performance of consensus democratic 
politics in terms of policy formation. This type of institutional dynamics and its 
consequences is examined in the case analysis, since cross-national and cross-
time methods cannot reveal these properly.
 Figure 2.2 shows the variation of the mean of the analysed countries between 
1965 and 1998. It is not surprising that the means of the second dimension are 
stable. The scores of the fi rst dimension show much more variation. In fi rst half of 
the period (with the exception of the late 1960’s) the scores on the fi rst dimension 
are positive, whereas these scores are negative in the second dimension. This 
can be interpreted as a decline of the fi rst dimension of consensus democracy 
for this group of countries. The second dimension is less dynamic than the fi rst, 
because most indicators are laid down in the constitution. These fi ndings show 
that examining the cross-time developments of (the fi rst dimension of) consensus 
democracy is signifi cant. The second dimension of consensus democracy can 
be seen as a constant (over time), which therefore does not vary.  Hence it is a 
structural feature of political institutions in the cases under review here.
2.4 Assessment of Lijphart’s perationalisation of consensus democracy
Although this study is strongly inspired by Lijphart’s work on consensus 
democracy, a few of his ideas need adjustment. These adjustments concern 
the operationalisation of consensus democracy as well as the introduction of a 
distinction between institutions that exist in a political system that can contribute 
to a consensual institutional context (such as the number of effective parties and 
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the system of proportional representation) and informal institutions which can 
characterise behaviour typical for a consensual style of politics (such as type of 
government coalition).
 The main criticism on Lijphart’s work on Dutch consociationalism deals with his 
overemphasis on the prudent role of political elites. The leaders of the Dutch pillars 
were fully aware how diffi cult it would be to overcome ideological and religious 
differences between the segments in Dutch society. They agreed on a package 
deal of fundamental issues which had to be regulated and developed a set of 
informal rules for decision-making (oversized coalition, extreme proportionality, 
mutual minority veto and segmental autonomy). The most crucial point was the 
passive role of citizens. People belonged to a single pillar with only limited up- and 
downward mobility. The pillarisation of Dutch society was not a given fact but it 
was stimulated and organised by its elites to legitimise their leading role and give 
them political power. Hence, the role of the political elites was not only to overarch 
differences, but also to maintain them in order to safeguard their dominant position 
in pillar organisations and their representative role in political decision-making 
(Daalder 1995).
 In Democracies, Lijphart (1984) developed consociational theory into the 
comparative model of consensus democracy. Lijphart took the opposite model, 
Westminster or majoritarian democracy, as his starting point. This model is 
operationalised by eight indicators. Its operationalisation is ambiguous. It can be 
understood in different ways. For example: does a large number of electoral parties 
indicate a plural society? Is a consensus model of democracy therefore needed? Or 
does it indicate that political institutions allow for the manifestation of many parties? 
In other words, does a large number of parties indicate a basis for consensus 
democracy which will consequently lead to a fi tting institutional model? Or does it 
indicate that such an institutional model did develop? Does cabinet stability indicate 
- as Lijphart argues - that a single party has all political power, by which it proves to 
be a majoritarian democracy. Or is it an indicator of the accommodating behaviour 
of the elites, proving that it is a consensus democracy? Or is a lack of cabinet 
stability an indicator of consensus democracy - as Lijphart supposes? In essence, 
there is no distinction between cause and effect of the institutional setting.
 Another problem is that many of the indicators used are highly interrelated. First, 
there is a strong - theoretical and conceptual - relation between the proportionality 
of the electoral system on the one hand and the effective number of electoral 
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parties and the number of ideological issue dimensions on the other hand. Second, 
the number of parties and the number of issues are strongly related to types of 
government coalition and cabinet duration (see also Armingeon 2002).
 As stated before, Lijphart’s approach lacks a strong dynamic perspective. If 
an institutional model can contribute to more political stability and better socio-
economic performance, it becomes very important how this changes through time. 
What is needed, therefore, is an operationalisation that also allows measurements 
through time.
 Figure 2.1 demonstrates that the federal-unitary dimension adds little to a 
better understanding of the countries on the consensus versus majoritarian 
democracy. This leads to the conclusion that there is no clear connection between 
the executive-parties dimension of consensus democracy and federalism. Unitary 
states do not tend towards a specifi c kind of legislature chamber format, such 
as unicameralism or asymmetrical bicameralism (Lane & Ersson 1994a: 71). 
The federal dimension has not only conceptually an entirely different meaning, it 
must also be empirically separated from the parties-executives dimension, since 
it does not lead to a classifi cation which makes more sense than one without 
this federal-unitary dimension. This does not mean that federalist structure is not 
relevant for, for example, protecting the rights of minorities and for the articulation 
of their preferences. Yet, it must be seen as something different than a consensual 
institutional arrangement between political and social interests and actors. The 
constitutional structure is important but not intrinsic to consensus politics. Sections 
2.3 and 2.4 discuss Lijphart’s operationalisation of consensus democracy. On the 
basis of my criticism, section 2.5 presents a new way of measuring consensus 
democracy.
2.5 Defi nition and operationalisation of consensus democracy
The model of consensus democracy has been used to analyse the working of 
political systems. The focus of most of these studies was merely on conditions 
that could explain the occurrence of different political systems and their effect on 
democratic stability (Lijphart 1984; Lane & Ersson 1997).  The focus in this study 
is extended in two respects. First, the working of the system of political decision-
making – translating preferences into collective decision-making - is related to 
policy concertation among organised interests. Reason for this is to uncover a 
possible relationship between consensual institutional arrangements in the system 
of political decision-making and policy concertation among organised interests. In 
most of the literature only general hypotheses are put forward that these two can 
be related (Schmidt 1982; Armingeon 1983; Keman 1984; Lijphart & Crepaz 1991; 
43
Consensus democracy
Czada 1987; Keman & Pennings 1995). This study focuses on the nature of the 
relation between these institutions. Is there a direct relationship between the type 
of political system with the system of socio-economic policy-ma king? It is therefore 
important to take a second system in socio-economic policy-making into account: 
policy concertation among organised interests, including bargaining between 
workers and employers. This is discussed in Chapter 3 and the linkages between 
consensus democracy and corporatism are discussed in Chapter 4. Second, the 
effect on socio-economic policy formation is also taken into account, which is the 
topic of Chapter 5. The reason to include policy outputs in the analysis is that it is 
expected that actors’ behaviour is driven by possible gains and losses that result 
from policy performance. Being aware of the available outcomes of the game, actors 
may anticipate by creating certain institutional arrangements, which can be seen 
as an agreement on a certain subject for a specifi c time between specifi c actors. 
Such agreements will not necessarily lead to positive outputs: negative outputs can 
also be produced by decision costs and there will be uncertainty about the actual 
distribution of the outcomes among the actors. The process of institutional change 
will be analysed in more detail in Chapters 7 to 10, by means of case analysis. 
There we focus explicitly on behavioural aspects.
 Consensus democracy is a special institutional arrangement between actors to 
cope with instability in the political system. The degree in which such institutions 
exist in a political system can vary between countries and through time. However, 
it must be stressed that the extent to which actors can infl uence institutions is 
limited because of their infl exibility. In other words, actors have only limited power 
to change institutions and the reason for institutional change is motivated differently. 
Consensus democracy is not an absolute state of an institutional context, but it can 
be used to compare political systems on the degree in which their institutions have 
consensual elements.
 Recall that we have made a distinction between formal and informal institutions. 
How are formal institutions used, which in our view shape institutional arrangements? 
Informal institutions are the result of actual behaviour of actors in order to adjust the 
working of the formal rules. Combining informal institutions with formal institutions 
serves two goals. First, informal institutions will in part refl ect the behaviour of the 
actors, so that it is possible to discover whether or not institutional arrangements 
are the result of consensus-seeking behaviour of the major political actors. This 
point is crucial in our argumentation. In Lijphart’s fi rst work on Dutch consociational 
democracy (Lijphart 1968) it appeared almost a miracle that political elites came 
together and were able to solve deep confl icts. Second, it can be expected that if the 
behaviour of the actors is explicitly incorporated in the analysis, more variation will 
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be discovered over time. This enables - in addition to the traditional cross-national 
comparisons - a more dynamic analysis. This diachronic approach to consensus 
democracy may answer questions as to how political institutions matter and how 
the working of institutions can be understood. With these considerations taken into 
account, consensus democracy is defi ned as follows:
Defi nition: Consensus democracy is an institutional arrangement of political 
decision-making, including both formal and informal institutions, which are based 
on cooperation rather than confl ict between the actors involved.
This defi nition implies on the one hand that institutions affect behaviour of actors 
with regard to decision-making and on the other hand that actors are able to affect 
how institutions are used and maintained. The central elements of consensus 
democracy that have consequences for the operationalisation are:
- both formal and informal institutions are seen as important;
- institutions are not static, but can change over time;
- two-sided relation between actors and institutions: institutions affect behaviour  
 of actors and actors affect which institutions are adjusted.
 Formal rules can be examined in two ways: looking at rules, procedures and 
constitution in written form and by analysing the effects of these rules. This type of 
information is gathered and used for comparative analysis. Data are collected for 
each year between 1965 and 1998, thereby  allowing an analysis through time. The 
measurement of consensus democracy as used here does not include the informal 
rules as such, but the effect of these rules. Grand coalitions are an example of 
this. Several country studies have shown that political elites have the informal 
rule in use that coalitions are formed larger than necessary for a majority. The 
comparative analysis does not measure this informal agreement, but it measures 
the oversizedness of coalitions. Incidence of grand coalitions indicates that political 
elites are likely to have made such an informal agreement. The working of informal 
rules and related behaviour are verifi ed in the case analysis in Chapters 7 to 10.
 The central characteristics of consociational democracy according to Lijphart 
are: proportional representation, surplus coalition, segmental autonomy and 
protection of minorities. The fi rst two features are used to construct an alternative 
empirical model of consensus democracy, while the latter two are discussed later:
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Proportional representation is operationalised by means of:
a1 Parliamentary fragmentation: effective number of parliamentary parties (a high  
number is indicating more consensus democracy)
a2 Disproportionality: reduction of proportionality (consensus democracy is  
expected to have a lower level of disproportionality)
a3 Electoral system: classifi cation from proportional to disproportional
Oversized coalitions are represented by:
b1 Type of government: from oversized to minimal winning coalitions
b2 Dominance of the government over opposition: surplus of the proportion of seats 
of a government coalition.
In selecting the variables for the operationalisation of consensus democracy 
the theoretical framework is important. This framework emphasises that actors 
can change their behaviour and alter institutional arrangements on the basis of 
their preferences. Especially the type of coalitions that are formed is subject to 
changing behaviour of actors. Moreover, the type of coalition that is created is 
not only determined by the actors’ preferences about policy choices. A political or 
socio-economic crisis for example can also increase the willingness to create broad 
coalitions.
 Several indicators that were used by Lijphart are not used for this new 
operationalisation. It concerns the following: 
- Cabinet durability: this is an effect of institutions and not a feature and is therefore 
not used for the operationalisation of consensus democracy. 
- Number of issue dimensions: this variable measures the fragmentation of political 
culture, but it has little to do with political institutions. It can be related to electoral 
fragmentation, but it is nothing but a typical condition of consensus democracy.
- The federal-unitary dimension, measured by the variables unicameralism, fi scal 
centralisation and constitutional fl exibility, is not the same as consensus democracy. 
This dimension is not relevant since it measures the degree in which segments 
have certain autonomy and how strong minorities are protected.
- The degree to which minority groups are represented in parliament can be 
measured adequately by the effective number of parliamentary parties.
- Interest group system, measured by Siaroff’s index of integration of the economy, 
is not used as one of the indicators of consensus democracy. Corporatism is 
analysed in Chapter 3 as a separate institutional model.
Hence, for reasons of internal logic the following indicators are used to measure 
consensus democracy over time.
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Type of government
Woldendorp, Keman & Budge (2000) have developed this indicator to make a 
distinction between different forms of coalitions: single party government, minimal 
winning, single party minority, multiparty minority, surplus and caretaker government. 
This variable is recoded in a variable that ranges in scores from 1 (minimal winning 
or single party government) to 4 (oversized coalition). It follows that high scores on 
this variable indicate the potential presence of consensual practices. In consensual 
institutional arrangements there is no drive for minimal winning coalitions or single 
party governments.
 Minority governments are considered to be somewhere in between minimal 
winning and oversized coalitions. Single party minority cabinets are placed closer to 
minimal winning and single party government and are scored 2. Multiparty minority 
governments are placed closer to oversized cabinets, since more parties are 
involved and are scored 3. It remains problematic to place caretaker governments 
on this scale. Since there are only fi ve cases of a caretaker government, they have 
been replaced by the nearest score in the same year7.
Reduction of proportionality
Many different indices of disproportionality have been developed (Taagepera & 
Shugart 1989; Pennisi 1998; Lijphart 1994). A very simple, but rarely used, variable 
is the relative reduction of proportionality derived from the effective number of 
parties. In the aggregation from votes to seats, larger parties receive, in most cases, 
a larger share of seats than their relative share of votes than smaller parties. In 
these cases this means that the effective number of parliamentary parties is smaller 
than the number of electoral parties. 
Reduction of proportionality = (effective number of electoral parties – effective 
number of parliamentary parties) / effective number of electoral parties
The reduction of the effective number of parties is an effective index for the degree 
of disproportionality of the electoral system. Table 2.5 contains the mean scores of 
this reduction of proportionality.
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Table 2.5 Scores on type of government, reduction of proportionality, electoral 
system and government dominance
 Effective number Type of Reduction Electoral Dominance 
 of parliamentary government proportionality system government 
Country Parties over opposition
Australia 2.48 1.71 0.15 4 9.18
Austria 2.54 1.09 0.05 1 11.12
Belgium 6.66 1.44 0.11 1 12.02
Canada 2.36 1.18 0.25 6 5.99
Denmark 4.89 2.26 0.05 1 -9.24
Finland 5.16 3.5 0.1 1 15.78
France 3.33 2.94 0.33 4.8 11.09
Germany 3.06 1 0.06 2 5.77
Greece 2.19 1.14 0.23 1 6.62
Ireland 2.76 1.59 0.1 3 1.68
Italy 4.31 3.18 0.11 2 4.51
Netherlands 4.74 1.71 0.06 1 10.39
New Zealand 2.12 1 0.26 5.6 5.3
Norway 3.59 1.82 0.15 1 -6.06
Portugal 2.81 1.57 0.16 1 3.12
Spain 2.74 1.5 0.25 1 -0.03
Sweden 3.46 2 0.05 1 -8.92
Switzerland 5.48 4 0.1 1 31.65
UK 2.15 1.03 0.25 6 4.86
USA 1.92 1 0.06 6 0
Group mean 3.48 1.85 0.14 2.6 5.88
Scores are averages between 1965 and 1998.
Sources: Mackie & Rose (1991); Koole & Mair (1995); Electoral studies (several years) Woldendorp, 
Keman & Budge (1998; 2000) and own calculations.
Classifi cation of the electoral system
Instead of measuring the effect of an electoral system, it is possible to develop a 
variable according to the following typology of electoral systems:
1 list proportional representation
2 mixed member proportional representation
3 single transferable votes (STV)
4 alternative vote8
5 plurality rules by means of two rounds
6 single member district with plurality rule (fi rst past the post)
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These categories are ranked from most (1) to least (6) proportional. The list 
and mixed member proportional representation are most proportional, while two 
rounds of plurality votes and single member districts with plurality rule are the most 
majoritarian rules. The alternative vote (AV) can be classifi ed as a majoritarian 
electoral system (Farell 2001:  50; 55-67) and STV as a proportional electoral 
system (Farell 2001: 121-152). The main difference between these systems is the 
district magnitude. AV-systems have single-member districts, while in STV-systems 
districts have more than one seat. AV-systems are majoritarian, because the elected 
candidate holds a majority (of at least 50%) of the votes.
Dominance of government over opposition
In addition to the type of government, it is possible to measure the degree to which 
a coalition is oversized. Most methods of calculating this factor are problematic. 
However, measuring the surplus of the coalitions is the simplest method. In other 
words: how large is the proportion of the government seats that are not necessary 
to receive a majority in parliament.
Domgov = G/S in % - 50%
G is the number of government seats 
S is the total number of seats.
This formula yields positive scores in the case of surplus coalitions and negative 
scores in the case of minority governments. This implies that according to this 
indicator minority governments are considered more majoritarian than minimal 
winning and surplus governments. Strom (1990) has demonstrated that minority 
governments are supported by one or more parties that are not associated with the 
coalition. These parties do not have government portfolios, but they support policy 
proposals. This means that de facto minority governments have a majority support 
in parliament, but it does not indicate that these parties have an agreement to 
construct an oversized or grand coalition. For this reason, despite the occurrence 
of minority governments, the indicator of dominance of government over opposition 
can be used to measure the extent to which actors aim at creating an oversized 
coalition.
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Table 2.6 Bivariate correlations between the fi ve indicators of consensus 
democracy
1 2 3 4
 1 Effective number of parliamentary parties
 2 Reduction proportionality -0.37
 3 Electoral system -0.64**  0.42*
 4 Type of government  0.74** -0.13 -0.42*
 5 Dominance government over opposition  0.24  0.08 -0.01 0.11
 ** signifi cant at the 0.01 level
 * signifi cant at the 0.05 level
Number of cases = 20
Correlation coeffi cients are Spearman’s Rho
Source: own calculations based on Table 2.5.
Table 2.6 shows that, as could be expected, disproportional electoral systems have 
smaller numbers of parliamentary parties, whereas surplus coalitions coincide with 
larger numbers of parties, but are not correlated with disproportionality. 
 In the remainder of this study the following index of consensus democracy is 
used:
The degree of consensus democracy = 
∑ [effective number of parliamentary parties + type of government + dominance 
government over opposition] – [reduction of proportionality – electoral system]9.
Higher scores on effective number of parties, type of government and dominance 
government over opposition indicate a stronger effect of institutions of consensus 
democracy, whereas higher scores on disproportionality and electoral system 
indicate a stronger presence of institutions of majoritarian democracy. The results 
of these calculations are summarised in Table 2.7 and Figures 2.3 and 2.4.
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Table 2.7 Index of consensus democracy in basic statistics (1965-98)
Country Mean N Std. Deviation Range Country label
Australia -0.27 34 0.52 1.93 au
Austria 0.26 34 0.46 1.45 at
Belgium 1.08 34 0.49 2.17 be
Canada -1.28 34 0.20 1.11 ca
Denmark 0.55 34 0.27 1.05 dk
Finland 1.41 34 0.43 1.79 fi 
France -0.53 34 0.63 2.15 fr
Germany 0.00 34 0.22 0.99 de
Greece -0.44 24 0.26 0.91 gr
Ireland -0.43 34 0.27 0.99 ir
Italy 0.68 34 0.55 1.68 it
Netherlands 0.85 34 0.57 1.99 nl
New Zealand -1.38 34 0.36 1.38 nz
Norway -0.11 34 0.22 0.92 no
Portugal -0.11 23 0.35 1.20 pt
Spain -0.47 22 0.26 0.84 es
Sweden 0.18 34 0.32 1.51 se
Switzerland 2.07 34 0.19 0.89 ch
UK -1.41 34 0.14 0.50 uk
USA -1.00 34 0.11 0.43 us
Total 0.00 647 1.00 4.43
Country labels used in fi gures and plots are based on internet domain name extensions.
Source: own calculations based on Table 2.5.
Table 2.7 reports the mean scores on the index of consensus democracy between 
1965 and 1998 for each country and the total mean, which is by defi nition 0. 
Furthermore, the table reports the number of scores for each countries, the standard 
deviation, the range – which is the difference between maximum and minimum 
scores – and the country label as used in the fi gures.
 Figure 2.3 shows the box plots of twenty countries, which are ranked from most 
to least consensual10. The ranking of the countries in Figure 2.3 from consensus 
to majoritarian democracy overlaps Lijphart’s classifi cation to a large extent, but 
differs in several cases. The largest difference can be found in the placement 
of Norway, which scores lower on this index of consensus democracy than on 
Lijphart’s index. This can mainly be explained by the high proportion of minority 
governments in Norway. The four cases that are analysed in Chapters 7 to 10 are 
dispersed over the consensus versus majoritarian scale. The Netherlands has the 
strongest degree of consensus democracy, while New Zealand clearly belongs to 
majoritarian democracy according to this measurement. Sweden and Portugal are 
located in between.
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 This index of consensus democracy is valid, reliable and parsimonious and it 
represents the comparative framework to assess the relations between institutions 
and possible room to manoeuvre of actors. In this way consensus democracy is 
based on the core characteristics of consensual institutions of political decision-
making. Moreover it enables dynamic measurement, which is presented in Figure 
2.3. Note the cross-national differences. Political decision-making classifi ed as 
consensus and majoritarian democracy diverge in this respect, indicating change 
of institutions.
Figure 2.3 Variation on the index of consensus democracy across twenty countries over 
time (1965-98)
Country labels see Table 2.7. For explanation of a boxplot see Appendix C, Figure C1, page 235. 
Figure 2.3 shows that variation over time is non-constant for each country. The variation 
is highest in the Netherlands, France, Italy and Australia. The UK and the US show the 
most stable patterns through time.
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Figure 2.4 Index of consensus democracy in two time periods (1965-81 versus 
1982-98)
Based on own calculations. Country labels see Table 2.7.
In Figure 2.4 countries are drawn based on their positions in two time periods 
with the same number of years: 1965-81 and 1982-98. The strongest development 
towards majoritarian democracy took place in France, Australia and the Netherlands. 
The strongest development towards consensus democracy can be found in Spain, 
Austria and Italy. The least change with regard to consensus democracy between 
these two time periods are Norway, Germany, Portugal, New Zealand and Finland. 
This certainly does not mean that these countries have no institutional variation 
through time, as can be seen in Figure 2.3.
As reported in Table 2.8, factor analysis on the fi ve indicators used for the 
construction of the new index of consensus democracy shows the existence of two 
underlying dimensions.11 As expected, in accordance with the model described at 
the beginning of this section, the fi rst factor relates to proportional representation 
(variables effective number of parties, reduction of proportionality and electoral 
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system) and the second factor to oversized coalitions (variables type of government 
and dominance of government over opposition). This factor analysis shows that two 
dimensions are indeed involved.
Table 2.8 Factor analysis on indicators of consensus democracy
1 2
Effective number of parliamentary parties -0.70 0.47
Reduction of proportionality 0.80 0.21
Electoral system 0.83 -0.16
Type of government -0.30 0.74
Dominance government over opposition 0.16 0.82
* Factor analysis varimax extraction with Eigenvalues > 1.
2.6 Conclusions
This chapter discusses the consensus model of democracy. Consociational 
theory was developed as an amendment to the pluralist thesis that democratic 
stability was unlikely to occur in multi-party-systems and in plural societies. Several 
consociationalist theorists explained by means of case-studies of several Western 
European countries why stability did nevertheless occur in several small countries 
characterised by a segmented political culture. Consociational theory emphasises 
the role of the political elites to overarch the cleavages between the subgroups. 
Especially informal institutional arrangements between the elites have adjusted the 
working of the formal decision rules, which without these arrangements would have 
led to unstable outcomes or stalemates as predicted in pluralist theory. Lijphart 
generalised this consociational model of informal arrangements into the model 
of consensus democracy. This model describes the empirical features of mostly 
formal rules which altogether can be characterised as consensus democracy. 
 The main emphasis in the comparative study of the entire set of countries will 
be put upon formal institutions, which are measured over time, whereas in the case 
analysis more attention can be given to informal institutions.
 The variables of Lijphart’s model have been discussed in this chapter. Apart 
from some remarks about specifi c measurements, there are some substantial 
points to be made. First of all, Lijphart’s operationalisation of consensus democracy 
does not allow for real dynamic measurement. The second problem is his use of 
two dimensions of consensus democracy. The federal-unitary dimension does 
not contribute to a better understanding of the working and effect of consensus 
democracy, because it measures something else, namely how the polity is 
organised, not how it works regarding problem-solving. Therefore, this dimension 
is excluded in this study.
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 Lane & Ersson (2000: Chapter 10) show that Lijphart’s model of consensus 
democracy is more multi-dimensional than he thinks. The separate variables are 
too divergent to use in a single model. The logic of interdependent relations is weak 
or absent. The factor analyses in Table 2.4 and in Lane & Ersson (2000: Table 10.1, 
p. 222) show that Lijphart’s model is less coherent than it seems.
 Based on the discussion of Lijphart’s model a new operationalisation of 
consensus democracy is suggested. This seems to be an adequate alternative. It 
enables analysis through time and it measures the specifi c features of consensus 
democracy more accurately. This model will be used for further quantitative empirical 
comparative analysis. However, additional improvements are needed. The model 
still emphasises on formal characteristics. Informal institutions, which are also 
crucial in understanding the working of decision-making, need attention too. This 
can be done by considering the existence and working of informal institutions in 
part III of this study where 4 cases will be examined.
 In conclusion, the model of consensus democracy presented in this chapter can 
be used for further comparative analysis. It is parsimonious, internally valid and 
reliable. Another important asset is the fact that it is dynamic and therefore more 
sensitive to change. In short: the index of consensus democracy presented in this 
chapter is adequate to answer the research question of this study.
Notes
1 The set of allocations that cannot be blocked by any coalition is called the core of the game (Dixit & 
Skeath 1999: 562).
2 Threshold in Dutch parliamentary elections is equal to the share of votes required for one seat: 
100/150 = 0.67.
3 After a factor analysis Lijphart (1984) concluded that the indicator of direct democracy, measured by 
the number of referendums held, belonged to a third factor, which he found to be non-signifi cant.
4 In Lijphart (1984) France is divided in two democratic regimes: the Fourth and the Fifth Republic.
5 For proportion of single party and minimal winning cabinets, cabinet durability and disproportionality 
the signs are reversed.
6 It can be argued that local government in Sweden is important in providing social welfare. The 
constitutional features of Sweden, however, are mainly centralised.
7 Just deleting these scores would lead to missing values.
8 This electoral rule is only used in Australia. The proportionality effect of the Alternative Vote is 
disputed (see Lijphart 1997; Farrell 2001: Chapter 3).
9 All scores are standardised for each year separately.
10 See Figure C.1 (Appendix C) for an explanation of a boxplot.
11 Factor analysis in Table 2.8 is only used to demonstrate the link between the fi ve indicators and two 
underlying dimensions.
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3 CORPORATISM
3.1 Introduction
Corporatism concerns policy concertation among organised interests. By this 
we mean the system in which socio-economic actors  (trade unions being 
representatives of workers and employers’ organisations) shape socio-economic 
policy. Like in the system of political decision-making, the main interest in policy 
concertation among organised interests is the extent to which these institutional 
arrangements facilitate favourable outcomes in terms of macro-economic 
performance. Since the 1970s, a number of countries – in particular those with 
an open economy - have used corporatism as a national strategy to cope with an 
economic crisis of high unemployment rates and high infl ation rates (Goldthorpe 
1984; Katzenstein 1985; Woldendorp 1997). In the late 1980s and early 1990s, in an 
era of increasing international cooperation and interdependencies, the usefulness 
of national corporatist strategies became a topic of debate regarding its impact 
(Golden, Wallerstein & Lange 1999: 195-197). In the mid 1990s, however, social 
pacts were made in several European countries between socio-economic actors 
and governments while corporatist institutions seemed to be back on the agenda 
(ILO 1995; Molina & Rhodes 2002: 306; ETUI 1997; Grote & Schmitter 1999). 
Golden, Wallerstein & Lange (1999: 223) conclude that
‘industrial relations institutions and trade unions have by and large proved quite resilient 
in the face of considerable domestic and international economic pressures in the past 
decades’.
Given views like this it remains important to examine to what extent institutional 
arrangements like corporatism continue to play a role in socio-economic policy-
making. It is seen as a parallel confi guration to consensus democracy (Czada 
1987; Keman & Pennings 1995).
 This chapter discusses and conceptualises the role of corporatist institutions. 
First, the concept of corporatism is presented: what does it mean, how is it defi ned 
and how can it be measured properly in a comparative perspective? Second, 
recent contributions to the corporatism debate will be discussed. Third, like with 
consensus democracy in Chapter 2, an empirical model is developed to analyse 
the cross-national and cross-time developments of the role of corporatism.
3.2 The development of corporatist theory
Corporatism can be conceived in many ways. In this study it is depicted as a specifi c 
institutional model of decision-making on socio-economic policy issues between 
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organised interests, i.e. capital and labour. Since the 1970s it has received attention 
as a description of a system of interest intermediation which was developed as an 
alternative to pluralist modes of interest representation (Schmitter & Lehmbruch 
1979). Later, a different approach paid attention to government’s strategy to create 
an institutional context to infl uence macro-economic developments (Lehmbruch & 
Schmitter 1982). When related to this type of analysis the term neo-corporatism is 
used to distinguish it from the authoritarian form of corporatism, which for instance 
can be found in Latin-American countries (Keman, Paloheimo and Whiteley 
1987)1.
 The traditions of corporatism2 date from the nineteenth century when Catholic 
ideologists looked for a new system of industrial relations as a reaction to individualistic, 
egoistic capitalism and state-oriented, anti-religious socialism. Confl ict between 
social partners in Catholic corporatism is deemed counterproductive. Therefore, 
trade unions and employers’ organisations had to cooperate to prevent the rise of 
a dominant state. This alternative to the capitalist system of market production and 
private ownership found some application in several non-democratic regimes in 
Latin America and Southern Europe. The fascist variant of corporatism, however, is 
state-enforced cooperation between employers and state-monitored unions. To this 
day, this link with authoritarian regimes has led to considerable scepticism about 
corporatism.
 Corporatist patterns of interest intermediation have received attention in Western 
Europe since the 1970s. Lehmbruch (1977) introduced the term ‘neo-corporatism’. 
Neo-corporatist types of industrial relations were developed in some Scandinavian 
and continental European countries to fi ght an economic crisis that caused high 
infl ation and unemployment rates. Particularly social democratic governments 
used a neo-corporatist strategy to create an institutional environment that facilitated 
voluntary cooperation between trade unions and employers’ organisations.
 The basic idea behind corporatism is the presence of shared interests expressed 
in cooperative relations between social partners and government on socio-economic 
issues. Many corporatist scholars argue that consensual industrial relations have a 
positive impact on the effectiveness of the socio-economic policy-making process 
(Schmidt 1982; Crepaz 1992). As a conse quence, this should lead to better 
policy outcomes and performance. Nowadays, this is disputed. These studies, 
using different conceptualisations and operationalisations of both corporatism 
as the independent variable and a variety of socio-economic indicators as the 
dependent variable, lead to divergent conclusions about the effect of corporatism 
on socio-economic performance (cf. Schmidt 1982; Therborn 1987; Crepaz 1992; 
Keman 1993; Woldendorp 1997; Flanagan 1999).
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 In the literature two dimensions of corporatism are distinguished: the existence 
of an interest groups system and policy concertation by socio-economic interest 
groups. The fi rst dimension sees corporatism as an interest groups system. 
Cooperation between trade unions and employers’ organisations in corporatist 
industrial relations is seen as to be considerable. Government does not try to 
intervene directly by imposing decisions on social partners but facilitates negotiation 
between these groups, thereby enabling them to reach agreements independently 
without central government having to intervene directly (Woldendorp 1995; 1997).
 Lehmbruch elaborated the idea of policy concertation. This second dimension 
- also known as corporatism 2 - concerns the incorporation of interest groups in 
the process of policy formation and implementation. Corporatist theory states that 
socio-economic policy formation by the government is not necessarily a process 
to which everyone has equal access, as pluralist theory asserted. Certain interest 
groups have a stronger involvement in this process than others. This results in a 
system of cooperation between government and social partners.
 There is a difference between these two dimensions of corporatism and 
consensus democracy. First, the scope of the interest groups system is restricted to 
socio-economic issues. Second, concertation emerges outside of the parliamentary 
arena. In this view, corporatism is defi ned as a system in which both political 
decision-making by the government and free competition between voters and 
political parties are adjusted or restricted by allowing certain socio-economic actors 
(e.g. trade unions and employers’ organisations) special privileges and access to 
the policy arena. The underlying ideology is that direct involvement of the most 
important actors leads to a more effi cient system of decision-making which will have 
a stronger legitimacy and where the role of the state regarding macro-economic 
policy is based on power-sharing. Critics of corporatism fear an alternative (if not 
competitive) system of decision-making that is not regulated by means of basic 
laws (constitution) and which is - as a result - less democratic.
 Only peak organisations have access to a government. In pluralism, groups and 
organisations compete for access to the political decision-making arena, in contrast 
to the monopoly of representation in corporatism of selected socio-economic 
actors. Government and parliament remain to be the principle decision-makers and 
responsible to parliamentary control. In corporatist institutional relations, employers’ 
organisations and trade unions can reach agreements. However, the possibility 
of such arrangements occurring depends on the type of corporatism. In societal 
corporatism there is room for actors to develop their own institutional patterns, 
whereas in state corporatism a top down approach must secure the fulfi lment of 
social order as favoured by the authorities (Schmitter 1979).
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 Schmitter (1979) developed an alternative model to pluralism, which was the 
dominant model of interest representation in political science at the time. Schmitter 
(1979: 8-9) considers corporatism to be a system of interest representation that has 
particular institutional features linking the organised interests of civil society to the 
decisional structures of the state. Whether or not corporatism is really that distinctive 
from pluralism (Williamson 1989: 49) can be disputed. Both models share a number 
of basic assumptions, such as the growing importance of formal associational units 
of representation and the persistence and expansion of functionally differentiated 
and potentially confl icting interests, but they offer confl icting views on the institutional 
form that a modern system of interest representation will take. Corporatism 
advocates – according to Schmitter - ‘controlled emergence, quantitative limitation, 
vertical stratifi cation and complementary interdependence’ whereas pluralism 
suggests ‘spontaneous formation, numerical proliferation, horizontal extension and 
competitive interaction’, (Schmitter 1979: 15-16). Pluralism allows equal access 
and equal opportunities to everyone, while corporatism is a ‘closed shop’ where 
important societal interests have access.
 According to Schmitter corporatism is not either absent or present, but 
corporatist patterns vary in their extent as an institutional arrangement. Schmitter 
and other authors developed scales to measure the degree to which institutional 
arrangements that can be characterised somewhere between corporatism and 
pluralism exist within a country. These and other measures of corporatism are 
discussed in Section 3.3.
 Occurrence of corporatist patterns of interest mediation can be linked to 
other institutions. First, in some countries characterised by a corporatist style of 
interest representation, consociational devices play a role in the overarching of 
the cleavages between different subgroups. Chapter 4 explains the connection 
between consensus democracy and corporatism. Austria and Belgium are examples 
of countries in which both institutions play a role. Second, according to many 
observers corporatism appears to be connected to social democratic governments 
(Schmidt 1982; Keman 1993). This seems particularly the case in the Scandinavian 
countries. In order to secure social peace, social democratic governments are 
more willing to involve social partners in the policy-making process by means of 
providing welfare, whereas bourgeois governments have a stronger tendency to 
reduce the size of its government at the cost of the welfare state. These different 
styles of policy-making have an important impact on the type of public policy of 
the government, on the levels of public expenditures and on government size. 
Third, Katzenstein (1985) argues that corporatist institutions play an important 
role in small countries characterised by a large share of external trade in the GDP 
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and a high degree of dependency on world market developments. Fourth, there 
is concurrence between corporatism and organisational structure, such as a high 
union density and employers’ organisation rate, closed shops, centralisation and 
coordination of collective bargaining, a more detached role of the government, and 
the existence of networks of political elites (see Czada 1987, Armingeon 1994). 
Hence, corporatism might very well be an important feature if not explanation of 
policy-making. Therefore proper conceptualisation and measurement is crucial, 
both cross-nationally and cross-time.
3.3 Concepts and scales of corporatism
The ‘Does corporatism matter?’ debate is characterised by wide disagreement 
between the authors on how corporatism should be measured and thus how 
countries are to be placed on a scale of corporatism. Almost every author who has 
written on this topic developed his own measurement and applied it to a group of 
OECD-countries. The early indicators of corporatism were static and measured the 
role of corporatism at one time point or time period. In the 1990s several dynamic 
scales were developed. These static measurements are presented before the more 
recent dynamic scales are discussed.
Lehner (1987: 57) empirically tested the hypothesis that
‘management of distributive confl ict and economic performance in advanced democracies 
is better if their institutional structure can integrate interest intermediation’.
His scale of different modes of interest intermediation is based on Lehmbruch and 
Czada’s typologies. The ordinal scale distinguishes fi ve categories (Lehner 1987: 
58, Figure 1):
1 Pluralism: fragmented and segmented interest intermediation;
2 Weak corporatism: institutionalised participation of organised labour in certain 
areas and a narrow scope of collective bargaining;
3 Medium corporatism: sectoral participation, but a broad scope of collective 
bargaining;
4 Strong corporatism: tripartite concertation with a broad scope, encompassing 
coordination of incomes policies;
5 Concordance: encompassing co-ordination of the interaction between the 
private and the public sector.
Schmidt (1982: 244; 257, footnote 8) defi nes corporatism as a specifi c mode of 
regulating class confl ict. Strong corporatist countries are characterised by:
60
The institutional dynamics of consensus and confl ict
- leaders of the trade unions and employers’ associations who are committed to 
a social partnership ideology;
- state, trade unions and employers’ associations are cooperating in some 
economic policy areas;
- a low strike volume between 1974 and 1978;
- state enacted absence of authoritarian incomes policy.
A low strike volume indicates that there is a high degree of cooperation between 
trade unions and employers’ organisations, because a lack of confl ict averts strikes. 
If social partners can voluntarily agree on a moderation-policy of the wages, there 
is no need for government intervention like an authoritarian incomes policy.
Lehmbruch (1984: 61-62; 65) labels three developments as corporatism:
1 centralised interest organisations;
2 access to government and institutionalised linkage between public administration 
and interest organisations;
3 regulating confl ict between social partners and government, tripartism.
Lehmbruch (1984: 62) distinguishes sectoral corporatism and corporatist 
concertation. By the former he means corporatist representation of interests that 
is limited to specifi c sectors of the economy. The latter is different, because it does 
not just involve a single organised interest but rather a plurality of organisations. 
These organisations manage their confl ict and coordinate their action with the 
government.
 Lehmbruch (1984: 65-66) develops a descriptive scale, which represents the 
degree of corporatism for several OECD-countries.
- pluralism is characterised by pressure-group politics and lobbying by fragmented 
and competing interest groups: US, Canada, Australia, New Zealand;
- weak corporatism is distinguished by institutionalised participation of organised 
labour: UK, Italy;
- medium corporatism has a broader scope of collective bargaining and concerted 
incomes policies: Ireland, Belgium, West Germany, Denmark, Finland;
- strong corporatism is characterised by effective participation of labour unions 
and concertation of major economic interests: Austria, Sweden, Norway, the 
Netherlands;
- concertation without labour: Japan and France are not covered by this 
classifi cation, but these countries have concertation without involvement of labour 
organisations.
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Cameron (1984: 164-166) measures the following characteristics of the organisation 
of the labour movement between 1965 and 1982:
1 the extent of union membership in relation to total labour force size;
2 organisational unity of labour;
3 confederation power in collective bargaining;
4 scope of collective bargaining;
5 the existence of schemes for worker participation in decision-making of 
companies.
The organisational power of labour is calculated by adding  the organisational unity 
of labour to the collective bargaining power of the labour confederation. This must 
be multiplied by the percentage of the labour force that is unionised.
Schmitter (1981: 294) uses the concept of ‘societal corporatism’. This societal 
corporatism is located in the realm of institutional behaviour, not that of individual 
values or collective aspirations. It refers to a mode of arranging the political process. 
Societal corporatism refers to a special pattern of interest intermediation within a 
capitalist economic system. Schmitter uses two structural characteristics of trade 
union movement as indicators of societal corporatism:
1 the degree of organisational centralisation;
2 the extent to which a single national central union benefi ts from a representational 
monopoly.
The main dimension of Keman’s neo-corporatism scale (1988) is the degree of 
cooperativeness in implementing macroeconomic policy. Indicators are social 
partnership and level of state intervention in industrial relations:
1 not neo-corporatist (confl ict regulation by authoritarian policy);
2 not neo-corporatist (some confl ict regulation through cooperation and 
negotiation);
3 either a high level of government intervention or a high level of social 
partnership;
4 neo-corporatist (not always effective or operative);
5 strongly neo-corporatist confl ict-regulation.
Lijphart & Crepaz (1991: 238-240) do not construct a scale themselves. Their 
indicator is based on the measurements of twelve neo-corporatist analysts. They 
use the mean of these values for each country. Although these generated values 
look very precisely determined, they are in fact based on mostly ordinal scales 
with a considerable variation. Lijphart & Crepaz (1991: 240, Figure 1) compared 
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the degree of expert agreement on countries. At the extremes (strong corporatist 
and strong pluralist countries) there is some degree of agreement, but in between 
there is considerable disagreement. Especially the rankings of Japan, Switzerland, 
France and Italy diverge extremely. Despite Lijphart & Crepaz’s confi dence in 
their own composed indicator, the measurements on which their index has been 
based diverge too much to speak of one coherent indicator, because the underlying 
concepts of the authors are too different.
 Table 3.1 contains the rankings of 18 OECD-country according to several 
authors. Countries are ranked on a scale from strong to weak corporatism. Lijphart 
& Crepaz’ scales as well as Cameron’s scales are continuous variables. The other 
ones are ordinal scales. Countries with same rankings are placed in the same 
category. For example in Lehner’s measurement Switzerland and Japan show 
the highest degree of corporatism, therefore no difference is made between both 
countries.
Table 3.1 Ranking of 18 OECD-countries according to different corporatism-
scales
Lijphart & Crepaz
(1991)
Lehner
(1987)
Schmidt
(1982)
Lehmbruch
(1984)
1 Austria 1 Switzerland 1 Austria 1 Austria
2 Norway Japan Norway Norway
3 Sweden 2 Austria Sweden Sweden
4 Netherlands Norway Switzerland Netherlands
5 Denmark Sweden Japan
2 
Switzerland
6 Switzerland  Netherlands
2 
Netherlands
Denmark
7 Germany* 3 Denmark Denmark Germany
8 Finland Germany Germany Finland
9 Belgium Finland Finland Belgium
10 Japan Belgium Belgium Ireland
11 Ireland Ireland Australia 3 Italy
12 France Australia
New 
Zealand
UK
13 Italy 4 Italy 3 Ireland 4 Australia
14 UK UK France New Zealand
15 Australia 5 France Italy US
16
New 
Zealand
US UK Canada
17 US Canada US 5 Japan
18 Canada Canada France
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Table 3.1 continued
Cameron
(1984)
Schmitter
(1981)
Crouch
(1985)
Keman
(1988)
1 Sweden 1 Austria 1 Austria 1 Austria
2 Norway 2 Norway Sweden Norway
3 Austria 3 Sweden Netherlands Sweden
4 Belgium Denmark 2 Norway 2 Switzerland
5 Finland Finland Denmark Netherlands
6 Denmark 4 Netherlands Switzerland 3 Denmark
7 Netherlands 5 Belgium Germany Finland
8 Germany 6 Germany Finland Germany 
9 UK 7 Switzerland Belgium Japan
10 Australia 8 Ireland 3 Japan New Zealand
11 Ireland US Ireland 4 Belgium
12 Switzerland Canada France Italy
13 Italy 9 France Italy France
14 Canada 10 UK UK Australia
15 US 11 Italy Australia 5 Ireland
16 Japan New Zealand UK
17 France US US
Canada Canada
Notes
- countries are ranked from most corporatist (1) to least corporatist (18); 
- for the measurement of Germany only Federal Republic of Germany is considered.
From Table 3.1, the conclusion can be drawn that there are many diverging 
rankings. Most of these scales emphasise different elements (see also Keman & 
Pennings 1995). There is, however, also some agreement. Austria is, for example, 
almost always in top spot. There is also considerable agreement about the high 
rankings of Norway, Sweden and the Netherlands. At the bottom of the rankings 
we fi nd more often than not the UK, Australia, New Zealand, the US and Canada. 
There is no consensus about the rankings of several countries such as Switzerland 
and Japan, which are found at almost every possible position and show highest 
variation.
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 The scales in Table 3.1 and Figure 3.1 are highly correlated, as reported in Table 
3.2. The rankings of these countries3 by the eight corporatism scales are translated 
in scores from 1 (pluralism) to 5 (corporatism). The scores on this 5-point scale are 
visualised in Figure 3.1.
Figure 3.1 Eight static corporatism scales of eighteen countries
Based on Table 3.1
Labels: at = Austria, se = Sweden, no = Norway, nl = the Netherlands, dk = Denmark, fi  = Finland, ch = 
Switzerland, de = Germany, be = Belgium, jp = Japan, au = Australia, nz = New Zealand, ir = Ireland, uk 
= United Kingdom, it = Italy, fr = France, ca = Canada and us = United States.
Figure 3.1 shows that the variation of the scales is highest for Japan (between 
1 and 5) and Switzerland and Ireland. Austria, Sweden, US and Canada show 
the smallest variation. The different corporatism measures are based on different 
underlying meanings and operationalisations. This partly explains the divergence 
of the scores as expressed in Table 3.2, which contains correlation coeffi cients 
between nine static corporatism scales. The lowest coeffi cient is 0.39 (between 
Cameron and Lehner), while the correlation between Schmidt and Lehner, 0.89, is 
the highest of all. In order to illustrate how different (and hence incomparable) these 
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scales are, a short characterisation of the focus of these scales is given. Lehner 
(1987) focuses on coordination by social partners and the scope of collective 
bargaining without government. Lehmbruch (1984) incorporates three aspects: 
centralised interest organisations, access to government and regulating confl ict. 
Schmidt (1982) defi nes corporatism as a specifi c mode of regulating class confl ict. 
Cameron (1984) emphasises the organisation of the labour movement. Schmitter 
(1981) looks at the centralisation of the trade union movement. Keman (1988) 
considers corporatism as a cooperative strategy between social partners in relation 
to government. Lijphart & Crepaz (1991) use a composite index of twelve scales as 
their measurement of corporatism. Calmfors & Driffi ll’s index (1988) measures the 
scope and the centralisation of collective wage bargaining.
 This overview leads to the conclusion that these authors basically measure two 
aspects, namely:
- the structure or context relating the socio-economic actors to the government;
- the room to manoeuvre for these actors as well as the use they make of it.
This distinction is important since structural features may facilitate cooperative 
behaviour, but this behaviour is not a direct refl ection of these features. Consequently, 
the main underlying concepts of these scales can roughly be divided in two groups. 
The fi rst group of scales measures mainly the organisational strength of the actors 
involved, mostly trade union strength. Lehmbruch’s, Cameron’s and Schmitter’s 
scales fi t into this group. The second group deals with the relation between social 
partners and government. Lehner, Schmidt and Keman belong to this second group. 
The conceptual differences between these groups is essential for the study of 
corporatism. The fi rst group deals mainly with societal corporatism and the second 
group focuses mainly on the role of the state in corporatist relations. In Table 3.2, 
the coeffi cients between the scales within both groups are in bold print.
Table 3.2 Correlation coeffi cients between eight static corporatism scales
Lehmbruch (1)
Cameron 0.80 (2)
Schmitter 0.77 0.86 (3)
Lehner 0.50 0.39 0.70 (4)
Schmidt 0.45 0.54 0.84 0.89 (5)
Keman 0.62 0.65 0.81 0.75 0.88 (6)
Crouch 0.71 0.51 0.61 0.64 0.58 0.63 (7)
Lijphart & Crepaz 0.78 0.58 0.61 0.77 0.64 0.66 0.84 (8)
Calmfors & Driffi ll 0.74 0.88 0.81 0.48 0.58 0.77 0.48 0.61
Source: own calculations based on Table 3.1.
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The correlations within both groups are indeed higher than the other correlations, 
confi rming our fi nding that they have a similar conceptual understanding of 
corporatism. The indexes of Cameron, Lehmbruch and Schmitter measure 
coordination and centralisation of interest groups as bipartite relations. Lehner, 
Schmidt and Keman stress the extent to which government facilitates consensus 
and cooperation with and among interest groups.
 Overall, we can conclude that the static scales are diverse. They refl ect a 
fundamental schism in corporatism literature between those that emphasise group 
characteristics versus those that emphasise the structural aspects of corporatist 
institutions.
 During the 1990s a new group of dynamic scales was developed. Table 3.3 
shows that these scales suffer from the same defi ciencies as noted before: they are 
often too narrowly focused on one or two aspects. The basic statistics (mean and 
standard deviation) of these scales are given in Table 3.3 and the ranking of twelve 
to fi fteen countries according to these scales.
Table 3.3 Dynamic corporatism scales
 Compston Siaroff Iversen
Country Mean
Standard 
Deviation
Ranking* Mean
Standard
Deviation
Ranking* Mean
Standard 
Deviation 
Ranking*
Australia 2.87 0.42 11 0.48 0.12 3
Austria 9.74 0.45 1 4.63 0.00 2 0.44 0.00 5
Belgium 5.30 1.15 9 3.91 0.24 9 0.32 0.11 9
Canada 1.70 0.09 16 0.07 0.00 15
Denmark 6.74 2.40 6 4.18 0.24 5 0.47 0.14 4
Finland 7.09 1.08 4 4.17 0.33 6 0.42 0.09 6
France 3.08 1.82 12 2.05 0.19 13 0.12 0.04 14
Germany 4.42 1.06 10 4.13 0.00 7 0.33 0.03 8
Italy 6.71 1.49 7 2.42 0.38 12 0.16 0.05 13
Japan 3.49 0.13 10 0.25 0.04 10
Netherlands 5.91 1.16 8 4.00 0.13 8 0.37 0.07 7
Norway 6.87 1.66 5 4.63 0.00 2 0.53 0.13 1
Sweden 8.09 2.21 2 4.69 0.06 1 0.50 0.11 2
Switzerland 8.00 0.00 3 4.38 0.00 4 0.25 0.00 10
UK 3.25 2.89 11 1.96 0.16 14 0.17 0.10 12
US  1.92 0.19 15 0.07 0.00 15
* rankings based on mean scores; sources: Compston (1994; 1995a; 1995b); Siaroff (1999); Iversen (1999: 56; 
83-86)
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Siaroff (1999) developed an alternative index of corporatism: integration of the 
economy. This index, labelled as interest group system, is used by Lijphart (1999) 
as one of the indicators of consensus democracy (see Chapter 2). Integration of 
the economy is defi ned as ‘a long-term cooperative pattern of shared economic 
management involving the social partners’ (Siaroff 1999: 189). This index is 
measured by eight variables divided in three categories. Indicators of social 
partnership are strike volume, nature and goals of trade unions and legal and state 
support for unions and union power. Coordination of industry-level is measured by 
the nature of the economic ties of companies and the extent of co-determination in 
the workplace. Overall national policy-making patterns are operationalised by the 
nature of national wage setting, extent of exchange in industrial relations and the 
nature of public-private interaction. The advantage of Siaroff’s index is that it seems 
encompassing, but this measurement is also crude and variation through time is 
limited.
 Another new measurement is Iversen’s centralisation index (1999). This index 
focuses on two essential elements: the level of bargaining and the degree of 
enforceability4. As a centralisation index, this measure is quite accurate. However, 
for a corporatism measure, it is too narrowly focused on the centralisation of wage 
bargaining. Kenworthy (2001: 72) argues that Iversen’s measure ‘does not take 
into account the share of the workforce covered by wage bargaining at each level’. 
Iversen’s index does not follow from an encompassing defi nition of corporatism.
 Compston (1994; 1995a; 1995b) developed an index of union participation in 
economic policy-making. According to Compston (1994: 124) union participation 
means
‘discussions at national level (…) between government and trade union offi cials about 
the formation of government policies relating to employment, prices, growth and trade’.
Scores are given on a ten-point scale for thirteen countries. Compston’s measure of 
union participation cannot be used for our purposes because it is confi ned to union 
participation only. Therefore it is remotely related to the much more encompassing 
concept of corporatism.
 Traxler, Blaschke & Kittel (2001) developed a measure of centralisation of wage 
bargaining based on behaviour. Kenworthy (2001: 74) fi nds that the weakness of 
this measure is its heavy reliance on subjective judgement rather than on objective 
measurement. Kenworthy (2001) operationalised an index of coordination, but he 
states
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‘that this variable is not a measure of wage coordination per se’ but ‘a hypothesis or 
prediction about the degree of coordination that is likely to be generated’. [original 
italics] Kenworthy (2001: 79)  
Another reason why Kenworthy’s index can not be used is that it lacks data for fi ve 
of the twenty countries analysed in this study5.
 International comparisons between the degree of corporatism have the 
advantage that they can be used to systematically analyse national conditions 
which facilitate the existence of macro-corporatist arrangements and to compare 
performance associated with corporatism at national level (Williamson 1989: 150). 
Special attention is given to the construction and the results of these different 
corporatism scales. Different measurements of corporatism can lead to divergent 
conclusions about the effects of the degree of corporatism.
 Several critical remarks can be made with respect to empirical studies on the 
relation between corporatism and socio-economic policy-making. First of all, a clear 
conceptualisation of corporatism is often lacking. As shown before, many different 
operationalisations have been used to compare the degree in which corporatism 
is a strong element within a polity. As most operationalisations emphasise diffe rent 
features, for example the scope and the level of collective bargaining, the degree 
of cooperation between trade unions and employers’ organisations measured by 
the number of strikes, the level of union membership and the degree to which 
an authoritarian incomes policy is absent. Because of the divergence of the 
operationalisations a comparison of the empirical relations with decision-making 
and macro-economic performance is diffi cult. Second, most scales are static. In 
measurements based on expert judgements, an estimate for a longer period, in most 
cases several decades, was made. These judgements resulted in crude scores on 
a limited ordinal scale, not having more than 3 to 5 intervals. If more sophisticated 
indicators are used, the resulting score is based on an average of these indicators. 
Of course, it is reasonable to assume that such institutional arrange ments will not 
change overnight. However, the disadvantage is that this kind of measurements 
cannot be used to measure developments through time. Therefore they can only be 
used for a cross-national comparison of institutional contexts. They do not reveal 
historical developments and related institutional change. This reinforces the idea 
that corporatism should be measured by means of two dimensions and over time, 
namely centralisation and coordination.
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3.4 Defi nition and measurement of corporatism
For a clear operationalisation of corporatism it is necessary to take a defi nition as a 
point of departure. Of course this defi nition has to be consistent with the conceptual 
framework of Chapter 1 and the defi nition of consensus democracy of Chapter 2. 
The most essential part of corporatism can be captured as follows.
Defi nition: Corporatism is an institutional arrangement facilitating socio-economic 
policy concertation among organised interests not represented in the political 
arena and in which the actors – i.e. trade unions and employers’ organisations 
– agree upon socio-economic issues in a decision-making style which is based on 
cooperation and fi nding consensus in order to avoid confl ict.
This defi nition has to be interpreted in the context of socio-economic problem-solving 
in capitalist democracies. First of all, it applies solely to democratically governed 
countries. Institutional arrangements are not imposed by an authoritarian regime, 
but the result of voluntary cooperation between the actors involved. Secondly, both 
formal and informal institutions are important in this defi nition. Formal institutions 
are decision rules that can be enforced independently for every actor. Informal 
institutions are practices that exist to regulate the behaviour of all actors involved 
and which can work within the formal rules resulting in the desired outcome. These 
informal institutions can be seen as an institutional equilibrium which could not 
have existed if only the formal rules were in use.
 How can the criticism and the analytical view of corporatism developed so far be 
translated into operational terms for comparative research? The level of collective 
bargaining and the organisation of interest groups are important structural features 
of corporatism. Centralised and coordinated wage bargaining indicate the existence 
of an institutional structure in which socio-economic actors participate. The 
organisation of interest groups expresses the extent to which these interest groups 
are encompassing. Olson (1982) argued that small interest groups have a tendency 
to rent-seeking, i.e. purporting their own short term interest at the expense of the 
general public. The interests of large encompassing groups coincide largely with 
the public interest. This is a crucial difference between corporatism and pluralism. 
In contrast to corporatism, pluralism means that small interest groups are mainly 
focused on their own interest and are unwilling to cooperate with other groups. 
This undermines the public interest. Corporatist institutions allows for cooperation 
and consensus by means of centralisation and coordination of interest group 
behaviour.
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 The role of the government is explicitly not taken in this index of corporatism. The 
focus here is on the relation between social actors, i.e. trade unions and employers’ 
organisations. More often than not government is the connection between political 
decision-making and policy concertation between organised interests. From our 
argument (see Chapter 1) we feel that conceptually it is necessary to separate 
empirically the role of ‘politics’ from the process of bargaining between capital and 
labour. Therefore the defi nitions and measurements of consensus democracy and 
corporatism should avoid an overlap. Yet, in the case analysis in Chapters 7 to 10 
the focus will be on the relation between government and interest groups as actors 
within their institutional confi guration and thus the role of the government in socio-
economic policy-making will be assessed.
 The level and scope of collective bargaining can be measured by centralisation 
and coordination of wage bargaining. The organisation of interest groups as peak 
organisations can be measured by trade union density and the coverage rate of 
collective bargaining. No complete data are available for all countries and for each 
year between 1965 and 1998. To solve this, scores are measured for four periods: 
1965-74, 1975-84, 1985-92 and 1993-98 (hence it is semi-dynamic).  Sources 
can be found at the bottom of Table 3.4. Sometimes several sources are used to 
minimise missing scores. Scores for all periods can be found in Table C.4 (Appendix 
C) and the mean scores for the period 1965-98 can be found in Table 3.4.
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Table 3.4 Index of corporatism (mean scores 1965-98)
Country Centralisation Coordination Union density Coverage rate Corporatism
Australia 2.00 1.75 41.4 84.0 0.14
Austria 2.44 3.00 51.5 98.0 1.36
Belgium 2.31 2.25 51.2 90.0 0.64
Canada 1.13 1.00 35.1 37.0 -1.81
Denmark 2.19 2.50 72.7 69.0 0.74
Finland 2.25 2.19 72.1 95.0 1.01
France 1.75 1.69 13.8 89.3 -0.59
Germany 2.13 3.00 34.0 91.0 0.65
Greece 2.00 2.00 30.3 90.0 0.06
Ireland 3.00 1.75 51.0 50.0 0.37
Italy 1.81 1.63 41.1 83.8 -0.22
Netherlands 2.00 2.25 30.7 76.0 -0.08
New Zealand 1.63 1.25 41.0 58.0 -0.68
Norway 2.25 2.63 55.9 74.8 0.63
Portugal 2.00 1.92 38.0 73.3 -0.04
Spain 2.08 2.00 14.9 76.7 -0.37
Sweden 2.56 2.44 81.9 86.8 1.39
Switzerland 2.13 2.44 28.8 52.3 -0.32
UK 1.69 1.19 40.8 58.5 -0.75
US 1.13 1.00 20.0 22.0 -2.24
Mean 2.02 1.99 42.3 72.8
Sources: Centralisation (3 = centralised, 2 = intermediate, 1 = decentralised): OECD (1997); Calmfors 
& Driffi ll (1988); IPD (1996); Coordination (3 = coordinated, 2 = intermediate, 1 = un-coordinated): 
OECD Employment Outlook, (1991: 97-134; 1994: 167-191; 1997: 71); Calmfors & Driffi ll (1988); 
IPD (1996); Union density (percentage of labour force member of trade union): Ebbinghaus & 
Visser (2000); Coverage rate (percentage of labour force covered by collective agreement): OECD 
(1997); Golden, Wallerstein & Lange (1998); Traxler, Blaschke & Kittel (2001). Corporatism index: 
standardised scores of the sum of centralisation, coordination, union density and coverage rate.
Centralisation measures the level of wage bargaining (national or central, 
intermediate or sectoral, and decentralised or fi rm-level) and ‘coordination refers to 
the extent to which the different levels are integrated’ (OECD 1994: 171). Coordination 
measures union and employer coordination (OECD 1997: 70). Centralisation of 
wage bargaining focuses on the level, whereas coordination focuses on the degree 
of consensus between the collective bargaining partners. Centralisation measures 
the vertical cooperation between actors and coordination measures the horizontal 
coordination between actors.
 Trade union density and coverage rate of collective bargaining are indicators of 
the strength of the trade unions. Not only union membership is taken into account, 
but the coverage rate of wage bargaining as well. Coverage rate measures the level 
of union involvement in collective bargaining. Golden, Wallerstein & Lange (1999: 
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202) argue that ‘union coverage is a more accurate measure of the extent to which 
unions affect wage levels in the economy than is the rate of union membership’. 
Unfortunately, no similar data for employers’ organisations are available. Otherwise 
the organisation rate of employers would have been included as well. Nevertheless, 
the nature of collective bargaining can be measured by these two indicators. For 
almost every country the coverage rate is at least as high as the trade union 
density.
 The index of corporatism is measured as the sum of centralisation of wage 
bargaining, coordination of wage bargaining, union density and collective coverage 
rate6. Figure 3.2 shows the ranking of the countries by the mean scores of the index 
of corporatism.
Figure 3.2 Boxplots of scores of the index of corporatism (1965-98)
Source: Table 3.4; For explanation of a boxplot see Appendix C, Figure C1, page 235.
Country labels: at = Austria, au = Australia, be = Belgium, ca = Canada, ch = Switzerland, de = 
Germany, dk = Denmark, es = Spain, fi  = Finland, fr = France, gr = Greece, ir = Ireland, it = Italy, nl = 
the Netherlands, no = Norway, nz = New Zealand, pt = Portugal, se = Sweden, uk = United Kingdom 
and us = United States.
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Finland, Austria and Sweden have the highest scores on corporatism. Canada and 
the US score lowest on this corporatism index. The four countries that are analysed 
in Chapters 7 to 10 are dispersed over this corporatist versus pluralist scale. Sweden 
scores highest on corporatism, while New Zealand is among the least corporatist 
countries. Portugal and the Netherlands are located near the centre of this scale.
 The placement of some of the set of twenty countries deviates from rankings 
by some other authors. Switzerland and the Netherlands particularly score lower 
on this index of corporatism than in some other studies (see Figure 3.1). The main 
reason for these lower scores is that this corporatism index measures bipartite 
industrial relations rather than tripartite constellations. The role of the government 
was not incorporated in this index. This new index also measures the extent to 
which trade unions are encompassing. Another important element of this new 
index is that is does not explicitly measure the interaction with the government. In 
this study a clear distinction is made between political decision-making to which 
the concept of consensus democracy is applied and policy concertation among 
organised interests. The role of the government is examined in the context of 
consensus democracy. Adding the government to the measurement of corporatism 
would lead to confusion between both concepts.
 Table C.4 (Appendix C) contains the mean scores for all four periods and the 
standard deviations of all countries. Table C.4 shows the variation over time within 
the cases. Germany, Belgium and Greece score highest on stability whereas New 
Zealand and France score highest on variation.
 The effect of corporatism cannot be analysed without taking the working of 
parliamentary democracy into account. So, another improvement made in this study 
is that the linkages between corporatism and consensus democracy are analysed. 
Both can be seen as institu tional arrangements characterised by consensual 
behaviour (Keman & Pennings 1995). The linkages between these concepts will be 
further elaborated in Chapter 4.
 
3.5 Conclusions
In this chapter the focus was on policy concertation among organised interests. 
Corporatism can be considered a special institutional arrangement regarding 
socio-economic policy-making between employers’ organisations and trade unions. 
In contrast to pluralism, interest groups have special access to the process of 
policy-formation and implementation. Corporatist institutions are characterised by 
cooperation and consensus rather than by confl ict. The central hypothesis that will 
be in Chapter 5 tested is that corporatism has a positive impact on socio-economic 
performance. Many studies already tried to answer this question before. However, 
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there is large disagreement about the way to measure the degree of corporatism 
and consequently these studies did not lead to a unanimous conclusion. In this 
study the degree of corporatism is measured in a semi-dynamic way. The role of the 
government is not part of the corporatism measure used in this study. This allows 
for examination of the relation between corporatism and consensus democracy. 
This is the purpose of the next chapter.
Notes
1 In this study the term corporatism will be used as the equivalent of neo-corporatism, since the scope 
of analysis is limited to Western democracies at the end of the twentieth century.
2 For the historical roots of corporatism see Winkler (1976); Wiarda (1997: Chapter 2) and Williamson 
(1989).
3 These corporatism scales give no scores for Spain, Portugal and Greece.
4 The index of centralisation (C) is sum of the weights accorded of each bargaining level j (w
j
) and the 
shares of workers covered by union i at level j (p
ij
) using the formula:
 
C =∑ w
j 
p
ij
2 (Iversen 1999).
5 Kenworthy (2001) gives no data for Greece, Ireland, New Zealand, Portugal and Spain.
6 Standardised scores are used.
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4 LINKAGES BETWEEN CONSENSUS DEMOCRACY
 AND CORPORATISM 
4.1 Introduction
Consensus democracy and corporatism, the independent variables in this study, are 
extensively discussed in Chapters 2 and 3. Operationalisations of both consensus 
democracy and corporatism, are presented that are both more dynamic and more 
valid than other existing measurements. This chapter examines the linkages between 
the institutions of consensus democracy and corporatism. Do these variables have 
a lot in common or do they have to be considered as something different? In our 
view, consensus democracy and corporatism are institutional arrangements that 
have different underlying concepts and meanings. Both arrangements have in 
common that they adjust the working of formal rules and that they were originally 
formulated as alternatives to dominant conceptual models, respectively majoritarian 
democracy and pluralism. Consociational democracy proved that political stability 
is possible in a heterogeneous society. Corporatism was developed to understand 
how interest groups cooperate in formulating socio-economic policy in Western 
political economies.
 Both institutional arrangements are considered to be conducive to cooperation 
and consensus. Majoritarian systems of decision-making and policy-making 
concentrate power in the hands of a majority. Consensual and corporatist institutional 
arrangements enlarge the possibilities for minorities to infl uence political decision-
making and policy-making process. In other words, more actors have access to the 
input side of decision-making. This chapter analyses the similarities and differences 
of these institutional arrangements. Several contextual variables are investigated 
as well as the way they may affect consensus democracy and corporatism; it is 
necessary to see how the conceptual ideas and related operationalisation of this 
study stand up to reality.
 The main conclusion of this chapter is that consensus democracy and corporatism 
share the same underlying mechanism of enlarging input access to minority groups. 
And the presence of institutional characteristics of these arrangements can coincide 
in several countries. Nevertheless, we contend that consensus democracy and 
corporatism are different types of institutional arrangements, with different actors 
operating in different decision-making arenas and thus – so it is expected – will 
differ in terms of impact on performance.
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4.2 Conceptual model 
Figure 1.2 in Chapter 1 shows the conceptual model of the relationship between 
actors, institutional arrangements and policy and performance. Figure 4.1 elaborates 
on this model. The main relations between consensus democracy and corporatism 
are outlined in the conceptual model below. 
Figure 4.1 Model of political decision-making and policy concertation among 
organised interests
On the input side of this model, voters, parties, politicians and governments can 
be found in the system of political decision-making. The concept that describes 
institutional relations between these actors is the institutional arrangement of 
consensus democracy. On the bottom left, we fi nd trade unions and employers’ 
organisations in the political-economic arena. Relations between these actors are 
considered to take place in a different arena. The institutions in this model concern 
the institutional arrangements of corporatism. Each type of institution is expected 
to infl uence the way the actors’ actions are transformed to policy outputs and socio-
economic performance.
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 There are differences between the models of consensus democracy and 
corporatism on a conceptual level and there is overlap. One connection between 
consensus democracy and corporatism is that both allow for input of various interest 
groups in decision-making, policy formation and implementation. The arena of 
decision-making may differ, but both institutional models share the incorporation and 
involvement of a broad range of actors. This contrasts with majoritarian democracy, 
where the access for organised interests is limited. Consensus democracy and 
corporatism can function complementary. While some groups may not succeed in 
gaining infl uence in the political decision-making arena, they may have access to 
the policy-making process through interest mediation and vice versa.
 The most obvious similarity between consensus democracy and corporatism is 
the style of decision-making that is used. Both models are based on consensus 
and cooperation. In this study, consensus and confl ict are distinguished as the 
extremes of a scale. Although actors are prepared to look beyond their own short-
term interests and put the public interest fi rst, they feel no urge to cooperate and try 
to dominate by gaining a strong position or even a majority. Consensus democracy 
and corporatism are found on the consensus side of these scales, while majoritarian 
democracy and pluralism are seen as their counterparts.
 Corporatism and consensus democracy also deviate in their range and impact. 
The ultimate goal of political decision-making, which is the area of consensus 
democracy, is making decisions that can affect every aspect of human life. 
The scope of corporatism is limited to social and socio-economic issues, most 
important of which is the regulation of wages and working conditions. In addition 
agreements can be made about related issues like early retirement schemes or 
childcare. Corporatist agreements are always limited to issues that deal with work 
and income and that might be relevant for workers and employers. In the end, all 
issues, including those arranged by unions and employers’ organisations, can be 
overruled by political decision-making.
4.3 Linkages between consensus democracy and corporatism
The issue at hand is whether or not specifi c types of institutional arrangements 
in political systems are refl ected in political-economic systems and vice versa. 
Lehmbruch (1979a; 1979b) was one of the fi rst to point at the possible relation 
between consociational democracy and corporatism as a system of socio-economic 
decision-ma king based on consensus-building. This connection between corporatism 
and consensual politics is not solely built on theoretical arguments. In one of the 
fi rst empirical studies with respect to this relationship, Keman (1984) concluded 
that the occurrence of both types of institutional arrangements is conducive to a 
more successful socio-economic policy.
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‘Our analysis has demonstrated that if the interaction between political and extra-political 
phenome na is shaped by a consensual political structure and practices on the one hand, and 
by a corporatist mode of interest-intermediation and confl ict-regulation on the other, successful 
management and a more reasonable economic performance are more likely to be achieved.’
[italics in original] (Keman 1984: 166)
In a comparative study of 18 OECD countries, Lijphart & Crepaz (1991) found 
a strong relationship between corporatism and consensus democracy. They 
conclude that consensus democracy is an important independent or explanatory 
variable of corporatism and ‘that corporatism can be thought of as a component 
of a more broadly defi ned concept of consensus democracy’ (Lijphart & Crepaz 
1991: 245). Keman & Pennings (1995: 273-274) ‘agree that consensus democracy 
and corporatism may well have something in common’. However, they think that 
what consensus democracy and corporatism have in common can be derived from 
a crucial feature underlying both concepts, namely collective decision-making 
by means of compromise and cooperation between the relevant actors involved. 
They make a distinc tion between the role of consensus democracy (a mode of 
institutionalisation of political actors by referring to aspects of parliamentary 
democracy) and corporatist interest intermediation (the incorporation of societal 
actors typically by means of non-parliamentary consultation in order to avoid 
zero-sum outcomes of policy formation). Keman & Pennings’ (1995: 279) object 
therefore to Lijphart & Crepaz’s suggestion (1991) to add corporatism to the 
characteristics of consensus democracy precisely because it concerns two arenas 
of (potential) confl ict and different types of institutionalised decision-making. The 
idea that both consensus democracy and corporatism are driven by the concept 
of consensus-building is an acceptable one, although it does not imply that they 
operate in a similar fashion and thereby have the same effect on the decisions made 
(Keman & Pennings 1995: 274). On the contrary: each combination of institutional 
arrangements in terms of consensus democracy and corporatism will have its own 
confi guration and dynamics regarding policy-making.
 Several authors argue that corporatism and consensus democracy are 
interrelated (Lehmbruch 1979a; Lijphart & Crepaz 1991). Lijphart (1999) even 
considers corporatism to be one of the characteristics of consensus democracy. The 
relationship between consensus democracy and corporatism can be analysed in 
two ways. The conceptual linkages can be examined and the empirical connection 
can be determined by means of a comparative study of democratic political systems, 
as shown in Chapters 2 and 3.
 The main problem in comparing consensus democracy with corporatism is that both 
have been defi ned in many different ways. Both share a reference to an institutional 
framework that facilitates cooperation and consensus1. The fundamental difference 
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between consensus democracy and corporatism is the decision-making arena in 
which they are considered to be relevant. Corporatism is an institutional framework 
that applies to the manner in which social partners operate in wage bargaining and 
how they are involved in socio-economic policy-making. Consensus democracy is 
directly relevant to political decision-making within the democratic polity. The different 
actors and different arenas to which corporatism and consensus democracy apply 
can be illustrated in the conceptual model of Figure 4.1 as discussed in Section 
4.2.
 Corporatism can be characterised by how workers are organised in trade union 
confederations, how employers are organised and what type of wage bargaining is 
used. Consensus democracy is characterised by a proportional electoral system, 
a multiparty system and more often than not oversized coalitions. Defi nitions 
and operationalisations are discussed in Chapter 2 and 3. Figure 4.2 shows the 
positions of twenty countries in a two-dimensional space, using the mean scores 
(of the period between 1965 and 1998) on the index of corporatism and consensus 
democracy as the coordinates.
Figure 4.2 Consensus democracy and corporatism in twenty countries (1965-98)
Based on own calculations (see Table 2.7 and Table 3.4)
Country labels see Table 2.7.
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Figure 4.2 depicts a medium relationship between both institutional models. The 
Pearson correlation coeffi cient is 0.54 (see Table C.4 in Appendix C). This may 
seem high, but the explained variation is still below 30%. All four quadrants are fi lled 
with at least three cases. However, there are no very strong cases of corporatism 
without consensus democracy and vice versa. Corporatism is not likely to occur in 
a strongly majoritarian democracy. Finland and Belgium have the highest degree of 
both consensus democracy and corporatism. Canada and the US are the clearest 
cases of majoritarian democracy and pluralism.
 The positions in Figure 4.2 are based on the average of the scores in the entire 
period (between 1965 and 1998). However, the scores on both institutional 
arrangements were measured for several periods. This means that their connection 
may show variation through time. Tables C.3 and C.4 (in Appendix C) give the 
means on the scores in four time periods.
 The correlation coeffi cients show an increase through time. The connection is 
lowest between 1975 and 1984 (Pearson’s r is 0.41) and highest between 1993 
and 1998 (Pearson’s r is 0.64). In general, the correlation for this set of countries is 
medium-level. Based on these results it means that institutional change is apparent, 
is directed towards a certain convergence and trends towards positive interrelation 
between consensus democracy and corporatism. In other words: institutional 
arrangements are not static but develop through time and the empirical relationship 
between corporatism and consensus democracy did become stronger over time.
 From Figure 4.2, four groups of countries can be distinguished. The fi rst group 
- in the bottom left quadrant of the fi gure - is formed by four genuinely majoritarian 
and pluralist countries: Canada, New Zealand, the UK and the US. In the upper 
right quadrant of the fi gure, we fi nd a second group of fi ve countries that are more 
dispersed, but mainly placed in the corporatism-consensus democracy quadrant: 
Denmark, Finland, Sweden, Austria and Belgium. The third group is made up of 
three countries that fall into the consensus democracy category and score around 
zero on the corporatism index: Italy, the Netherlands and Switzerland. The fourth 
group consists of the remaining countries that are located near the centre: France, 
Australia, Spain, Portugal, Greece, Ireland, Norway and Germany. These countries 
are non-corporatist and non-consensual. These countries are not genuinely pluralist 
and majoritarian either.
 Table 4.2 gives the sum of the average scores of consensus democracy and 
corporatism between 1965 and 1998. Four groups can be distinguished. The fi rst 
group (with scores lower than –2.0) consists of majoritarian and pluralist countries. 
The second group (with scores between –2.0 and 0) are non-corporatist and 
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non-consensus countries. The third group (with scores between 0 and +1.0) are 
countries which are either consensus or corporatist. The fourth group (with scores 
higher than +1.0) are the consensus and corporatist countries.
 According to Table 4.1, countries do not fi t in the same groups as distinguished on 
the basis of Figure 4.2. Switzerland falls in the consensus and corporatist cluster. 
Norway and Germany fall into the consensus or corporatist cluster.
Table 4.1 Four categories of consensus democracy and corporatism
consensus and corporatist
 (4)
non-corporatist and non-consensus
(2)
Finland 2.39 Ireland -0.05
Switzerland 1.71 Portugal -0.12
Belgium 1.68 Australia -0.13
Austria 1.62 Greece -0.37
Sweden 1.57 Spain -0.81
Denmark 1.27 France -1.10
consensus or corporatist majoritarian and pluralist
(3) (1)
Netherlands 0.76 New Zealand -2.03
Germany 0.65 UK -2.13
Norway 0.53 Canada -3.06
Italy 0.43 US -3.21
Source: own calculations based on Table 2.7 and Table 3.4.
For graphical presentation of comparative patterns of socio-economic performance, 
a new variable is composed of the combined presence of consensus democracy and 
corporatism by assigning ordinal scores from 4 (both consensus and corporatist) 
to 1 (majoritarian and pluralist). The categories in between receive ordinal scores 
of 3 (consensus or corporatist) and 2 (non-corporatist and non-consensus). The 
distinction between these latter categories is that countries in the ‘consensus 
or corporatist’ category have at least consensual or corporatist institutional 
arrangements, while corporatism and consensus democracy are not present for the 
non-corporatist and non-consensus group of countries. Four countries belong to the 
‘consensus or corporatist’ category. The Netherlands and Italy share characteristics 
of consensus democracy and Germany and Norway are corporatist to a certain 
extent.
 The countries in each of the four categories share several common characteristics 
from to some extent different families of nations (see also Castles 1993). The 
majoritarian and pluralist category is made up of the UK and three former British 
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colonies. They share, for example, some common cultural and historical background. 
Four of the six non-corporatist and non-consensus countries are southern European 
countries. Greece, Spain and Portugal have experienced a transition to democracy 
in the 1970s. Ireland has had a comparatively low level of GDP per capita as have 
Portugal and Greece. Australia has apparently little in common with the other 
countries in this cluster and appears to be an outlier. Countries in the consensus 
or corporatist category have a large welfare state. Three of these countries are 
continental and have (had) a dominant Christian Democratic party. The consensus 
and corporatist category consists of Northern European countries and Belgium, 
Austria and Switzerland.
 Another way of looking at the empirical relationship between both models is to 
examine the relation between both indexes and their underlying indicators. These 
correlation coeffi cients2 can be found in Table 4.2.
Table 4.2 Correlations between indicators and indexes of consensus 
democracy and corporatism (1965-98)
Consensus Corporatism Coeffi cient
democracy used
Effective number of 
parliamentary parties
 0.87**  0.41 R
Disproportionality -0.59** -0.48* R
Electoral system -0.73** -0.67** Rho
Type of government  0.61**  0.28 Rho
Dominance government  0.48* -0.09 R
Centralisation bargaining  0.62**  0.87** Rho
Coordination bargaining  0.68**  0.80** Rho
Trade union density  0.32  0.70** R
Coverage rate  0.41  0.77** R
Number of cases 20   20
* Signifi cant at 5% level ** signifi cant at 1% level
R: Pearson’s r; Rho: Spearman’s Rho
Source: own calculations based on Table 2.7 and Table 3.4.
The fi ve indicators of consensus democracy are medium to strongly related to the 
index of consensus democracy3. These correlation coeffi cients are printed in bold. Of 
course, it is no surprise that the index of consensus democracy is highly correlated 
to the indicators on which it is based. These indicators are lesser related to the 
index of corporatism, except for the electoral system. More proportional electoral 
systems coincide with higher levels of corporatism. The indicators of corporatism 
have a weak to medium relation with consensus democracy.
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 These results lead to the conclusion that the features of the consensus model of 
democracy are not very strongly connected to corporatism and vice versa, which 
indicates the absence of highly overlapping indices. This set of countries for this 
period gives no empirical evidence of a strong relation between both models. Added 
to the fact that both models are based on different concepts, it can be concluded 
that a possible coincidence of consensus democracy and corporatism is no reason 
to assume a systematic overlapping connection.
4.4 Contextual variables
This section discusses several contextual variables that can infl uence the working 
of the institutional arrangements of consensus democracy and corporatism. This is 
relevant for at least two reasons. First of all, these institutional arrangements do not 
stand on their own, but are also connected to other factors. Second, the impact of 
institutional arrangements on socio-economic policy-making and performance may 
be infl uenced systematically by these contextual variables. An additional reason 
to look at the relationship with contextual variables is to examine whether or not 
consensus democracy and corporatism share the same background.
 Table 4.3 presents the means of several contextual variables over the four 
categories of the linkage between consensus democracy and corporatism. One 
group of contextual variables consists of political factors. These political factors 
can be understood in several ways. One meaning of the term political can be the 
positions of parties and governments in ideological terms. There is a possible 
connection between corporatism, leftist political parties and governments dominated 
by leftwing parties (Schmidt 1982; Cameron 1984). Leftist parties and organisations 
can make different policy choices and for example give more priority to employment 
than to price stability. Social democratic parties are traditionally part of a broader 
labour movement, in which trade unions also play an important role. Mobilising the 
working class was necessary to transform capitalist economy in a classless society. 
Social democratic parties participated in elections and in cabinets. At the same time 
trade unions tried to improve the working and living conditions of the working class. 
The participation of these leftwing parties and organisations can be considered a 
‘democratic class struggle’ (Korpi 1983). In Scandinavian countries this resulted 
in cooperation between social democratic governments and trade unions. In fact, 
the scope shifted from an overthrow to an adjustment of the capitalist economic 
system. Social democrats became part of the ruling class in politics and trade unions 
started to cooperate with employers’ organisations. Hence, through corporatism 
class confl ict changed into a consensus-oriented model of policy-making. 
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 The relationship between social democrats and trade unions is obvious. To some 
extent there is also overlap between Christian Democratic ideology and harmonic 
industrial relations. Christian Democrats reject class confl ict and corporatist 
institutional arrangement can serve as an alternative. Corporatism can be seen as 
the result of the politics of mediation, which is an important strategy of Christian 
Democracy (van Kersbergen 1999). The relationship between left-wing parties 
and governments and corporatism is not exclusive however. Christian Democratic 
parties and governments dominated by conservative centre parties may have 
contributed to corporatist institutions as well.
 In my view, there is no compelling argument that left-wing or right-wing parties 
and governments are connected to either consensus or majoritarian democracy. 
Parties are more dispersed from left-wing to right-wing in a consensus democracy. 
In a majoritarian political system parties have a tendency to move to the policy 
position of the median voter (Downs 1957).
 The relationship between consensus democracy and federalism is discussed 
in Chapter 2. Lijphart (1999) assumes that federal institutions contribute to the 
counter-majoritarian working of a political system. However, by adding other factors, 
such as central bank independence and corporatism to the same dimension, 
Lijphart obscures his own model. In his 1984 book, Lijphart made a clear distinction 
between executive-legislative features and federal-unitary features. In 1999, this 
second dimension became a virtual garbage can of several very distinct variables. 
As argued in Chapter 2, federal institutions function as veto points, which moderate 
the dominant role of a ruling party. But these federal institutions do not necessarily 
contribute to more cooperation and consensus in a political system. The American 
and German political systems are examples of the kind of federalism that can 
lead to inertia and conservative policy-making, i.e. a high probability of rejecting 
changes of the status quo, because of the veto power possessed by several actors 
(see Scharpf 1988).
 A factor that recently received attention in political science is the role of the central 
banks. It is argued that the interaction of central banks and political-economic 
institutions plays a role in the success of national macro-economic policy (Iversen 
1999; Franzese & Hall 2000). Lijphart (1999) argues that the role of the central 
bank is part of consensus democracy, because of its relative autonomous power. 
In a majoritarian democracy, government seeks total control of macro-economic 
management, including monetary policy. It is questionable whether or not 
independent central banks really belong to consensual institutional arrangements 
(see Busch 2002). Independent central banks function as additional veto points that 
limit the power of the central government. But this does not necessarily increase 
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the consensual character of institutions. In Tables 4.3 and C.5 (Appendix C), central 
bank independence (CBI) is calculated as the mean of the z-score of the indexes 
of Franzese & Hall (2000) and Busch (1993: 60). The central banks of Germany, 
Switzerland and Austria score highest on independence, while the central banks of 
New Zealand, Portugal and Spain score lowest, as averages over the period 1965-
98.
 Other factors that are possibly related to the institutional arrangements of consensus 
democracy and corporatism are the size of a country and the openness of the 
economy. Katzenstein (1985) argued that small countries with an open economy 
are more vulnerable to changes on the world market. For this reason, these small 
countries protect themselves by national corporatist institutions. Examples of small 
countries with an open economy are Sweden and the Netherlands. Both countries 
strongly depend on export and import and have large multinationals. A relationship 
between consensus democracy and size of a country is not obvious. Finally 
there can be an infl uence of internationalisation of politics and economy. Although 
internationalisation does not affect all countries the same way, international political 
and economic cooperation have gained importance over the past decades. The 
impact of internationalisation on corporatism can be two-fold. On the one hand, 
political and economic cooperation can limit the scope of national institutional 
arrangements and national macro-economic policy. Because of this, national 
corporatism can lose its importance (see also Traxler, Blaschke & Kittel 2001). 
On the other hand, internationalisation can force national actors to prevent the 
loss of macro-economic steering at national level. This might explain the return of 
social pacts in European countries since the mid 1990s (Rhodes 1998). Some have 
therefore argued that national political systems have not lost their sovereignty and 
autonomy to act (Milward 2000; van Kersbergen, Lieshout & Lock 1999) and thus 
consensus democracy and corporatism remain relevant.
 The mean scores on several contextual variables in four categories are reported 
in Table 4.3 for the period 1965-98. The averages in four time periods are shown in 
Table C.5 (see Appendix C).
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Table 4.3 Contextual variables (mean per category 1965-98)
Cluster 1 2 3 4
Cabinet composition (from right to left)        1.64  2.4         2.51       2.87
Left parties in government (%)  16      35 36 48
Work days lost due to strike    8344   2174    3116 299
Number of industrial disputes    1196   1456 838 249
Central bank independence       -0.09      -0.69          0.19        0.37
Imports + exports as % of GDP  45.3     54.3       68.6   75
Openness of the economy   11.4       8.3       11.6      10.8
European union (1=member; 0=non)      0.19        0.58         0.75         0.35
Number of cases 4 6 4 6
Conscorp clusters: (1) majoritarian and pluralist (2) non-consensus and non-corporatist (3) corporatist 
or consensus (4) corporatist and consensus.
Sources: cabinet composition from (1) rightwing to (5) social democratic (Schmidt (1996: 160); 
Comparative Political Data Set); left parties in government (Comparative Political Data Set 2000); 
central bank independence: higher and positive scores indicate more independence (Franzese & Hall 
2000; Busch 1993: 60); imports and exports (OECD, Economic Outlook, various years); openness: a 
composite index that measures, among other indicators, legal restrictions on exchange and capital fl ows 
(Comparative Political Data Set 2000); proportion of agriculture/industry/service employment (OECD 
Labour Force Statistics 2000).
Table 4.3 shows that corporatist countries and consensus democracies have 
more social democratic governments and more leftist voters. This cluster is also 
characterised by a substantially lower number of strikes and less work days 
lost due to strikes. Central banks appear to be more independent in consensus 
democracies and corporatist countries, which have more import and export and a 
more open economy.
 An interesting result from the average scores over the four clusters is that not all 
contextual variables, such as central bank independence, have a linear relation to 
the institutional variables. For this reason it is necessary to look at both the mean 
scores and the correlation coeffi cients, which are given in Table 4.4.
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Table 4.4 Correlations between institutional and contextual variables (based 
on averages 1965-98)
Correlations consensus corporatism
democracy
Pearson’s r
Left parties in government (%)  0.22  0.74**
% left votes  0.18  0.68**
Work days lost due to strike -0.35 -0.69**
Number of industrial disputes -0.33** -0.51*
Central bank independence  0.32 -0.00
Imports + exports as % of GDP  0.41*  0.44
Cabinet composition (from right to left)  0.23  0.75**
Spearman’s Rho
Openness of the economy  0.10 -0.21
European union (1=member; 0=non)  0.23  0.15
** signifi cant at the 1% level Number of cases 20
* signifi cant at the 5% level 
Sources: cabinet composition from (1) rightwing to (5) social democratic (Schmidt (1996: 160); 
Comparative Political Data Set); left parties in government/ % of left votes /work days lost due to strike 
/number of industrial disputes (Comparative Political Data Set 2000); central bank independence: higher 
and positive scores indicate more independence (Franzese & Hall 2000; Busch 1993: 60); imports 
and exports (OECD, Economic Outlook, various years); openness: a composite index that measures, 
among other indicators, legal restrictions on exchange and capital fl ows (Comparative Political Data 
Set 2000).
Table 4.4 presents the correlation coeffi cients between consensus democracy and 
corporatism on the one hand and several previously discussed contextual variables 
on the other hand. The results of Table 4.4 show that consensus democracy has 
no signifi cant relation and corporatism a signifi cantly positive relation with leftist 
governments and left votes. These results indicate that mobilisation of the working 
class in the democratic class struggle plays coincides with corporatism and 
consensus democracy.
 Table 4.4 indicates a weakly negative relation between consensus democracy, 
working days lost and the number of industrial disputes. Corporatism is medium 
negatively related to working days lost and the number of industrial disputes. 
This indicates that both institutional arrangements are weakly connected to more 
peaceful industrial relations. How to interpret these results remains a problem. Do 
peaceful industrial relations facilitate corporatist institutional arrangements or are 
they an effect of corporatism?
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 Consensus democracy is weakly positive, but not signifi cantly related to 
independent central banks. Corporatism is not connected to central bank 
independence at all. This is interesting because Iversen (1999) argues that the 
success of monetary policy depends on interaction between corporatism and 
central banks. The analysis presented in Table 4.4 does not confi rm such a 
connection. Table 4.3, however, indicates that the relationship between central 
bank independence and institutional arrangements is not entirely linear. Central 
banks are more independent in corporatist countries and consensus democracies 
and less so in the non-consensus and non-corporatist cluster.
 Both consensus democracy and corporatism are related to countries with a 
more open economy in terms of the import and export share of the GDP. This 
fi ts Katzenstein’s argument (1985) that small open economies use corporatism 
as a strategy to cope with international competition. If another measurement of 
openness of the economy is used, a composite index developed by Armingeon, 
Beyeler & Menegale (2000), the relationship is much weaker.
 Internationalisation was operationalised by the openness of the economy in 
two different ways; by measuring the import and export share of the GDP and 
by a composite index that measures, among other indicators, legal restrictions 
on exchange and capital fl ows (Armingeon, Beyeler & Menegale 2000). Another 
manifestation of international cooperation is the membership of international 
organisations, such as the European Union. There is no relation between consensus 
democracies and EU membership. Table 4.3 shows a non-linear relationship. EU 
countries seem almost absent among pluralist and majoritarian countries and are 
dominant in the consensus or corporatist cluster.
 The relationships between these contextual variables and consensus democracy 
are not always the same as in the case of corporatism. Corporatism is for example 
stronger connected to leftist governments and the share of leftist votes. This 
confi rms the conclusion that consensus democracy and corporatism are different 
types of institutional arrangements. Both institutional arrangements are connected 
to different contextual variables.
4.5 Conclusions
This chapter discusses linkages between consensus democracy and corporatism. 
Two ways are used to analyse the linkages between these institutional arrangements: 
looking at the conceptual differences and similarities, and the empirical connections 
between the indexes and the underlying indicators.
 The correlations between the indexes of consensus democracy and corporatism 
indicate a weak to medium relationship. This relationship becomes slightly stronger 
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through time. The group of twenty countries has been divided in several subgroups. 
On one extreme we fi nd countries where a combination of majoritarian democracy 
and pluralism is found, on the other extreme we fi nd several countries belonging to 
consensus democracy and corporatism. The remaining countries belong to either of 
the types. They share a mixed proportion of characteristics of consensus democracy 
and corporatism. When looking at the development of these indexes through time, 
it seems that both institutional arrangements have their own dynamics. They do not 
necessarily develop in the same direction through time.
 The indexes are based on different indicators. When looking at the correlations 
between all indicators and indexes, the differences are obvious. The indicators of 
consensus democracy have a weak to medium relation to the index of corporatism 
and vice versa. In this chapter the indexes of consensus democracy and corporatism 
are related to several contextual variables. These analyses clearly show that the 
relationship with these contextual variables is not the same for each variable. 
In other words, consensus democracy and corporatism are not systematically 
connected to the same external factors. The fi ndings in this chapter confi rm the 
conclusions of Lane & Ersson (2000: 244) that both sets of institutions have to be 
clearly distinguished.
 Conceptually the models of corporatism and consensus democracy may share 
some underlying characteristics, yet they are not the same. Consensus democracy 
and corporatism may coincide in some cases, but both institutions have their 
own dynamics. Comparing consensus democracy and corporatism leads to the 
conclusion that these institutional arrangements can and should be separated from 
each other on a conceptual level. The empirical analytical review demonstrates 
that they appear differently across time and place and are differently related to 
context.
Notes
1 For a defi nition of cooperation and consensus see Chapter 1, page 6-7.
2 Spearman’s Rho is used for ordinal variables.
3 Note that the signs of disproportionality and electoral system are negative as expected. Consensus 
democracies are less disproportional and have a more proportional electoral system.
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5 THE IMPACT OF CONSENSUS DEMOCRACY AND 
CORPORATISM ON SOCIO-ECONOMIC POLICY-MAKING AND 
PERFORMANCE
5.1 Introduction
Central issue is the impact of consensus democracy and corporatism on socio-
economic policy-making and performance analysed comparatively. Indexes of 
consensus democracy and corporatism, developed in Chapters 2 and 3, are used 
to examine the effects of these institutions on socio-economic policy-making in 
Western democracies since the 1960s. Do these institutional arrangements have a 
better performance as suggested by several authors (Crepaz 1992; Lijphart 1999)? 
Lijphart (1999: 274) concludes that:
‘consensus democracies have a better performance record than majoritarian 
democracies, especially with regard to the control of infl ation but also, albeit much more 
weakly, with regard to most of the other macroeconomic performance variables’.
Yet others suggest that the positive impact of corporatism on socio-economic 
performance has declined (Therborn 1987) or is the effect of corporatism more 
complex and dependent on conditions (Flanagan 1999)? Is the positive effect 
of consensus democracy on performance overestimated (Anderson 2001)? The 
answer to these questions will not be a straightforward confi rmation or rejection. 
The patterns found in this chapter are in fact more complex and we can observe 
variations through time.
 Chapter 4 discussed the linkages between corporatism and consensus 
democracy. Yet, the specifi c purpose of this research lies not merely in their 
relationship per se but in the way the interactions between the arenas have shaped 
socio-economic policy across time and systems. The institutional context and 
institutional change are linked to the behaviour of the actors. And this process is 
related to the resulting socio-economic policy.
5.2 Institutions and performance
The research on the effect of corporatism on socio-economic performance has 
been extensive (see e.g. Schmidt 1982; Keman 1984; Keman, Woldendorp & Braun 
1985; Therborn 1987; Crepaz 1992; Woldendorp 1997; Flanagan 1999; Wilensky 
2002). The general hypothesis is that corporatist institutional arrangements 
allow governments to develop more effective socio-economic policies. Stable 
corporatist institutions presuppose successful political exchange of moderate 
wage demands against moderate price policies, which contributes to a lower rate 
of unemployment.
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‘Consensus democracy matters’ hypothesis
Lijphart (1999) and Crepaz (1998) disagree with what they call ‘the conventional 
wisdom’ that governments in majoritarian democracies are more effective – i.e. that 
policy implemented in these political systems have a stronger effect – and have a 
higher performance. Lijphart (1999) believes that consensus democracies are not 
outperformed by majoritarian democracies and Crepaz (1998) contends consensus 
democracy to contribute to more effi cient and responsive decision-making. A 
crucial characteristic of consensus democracy is the proportional electoral system. 
Proportionality leads to a better representation of the interests of the people. This 
is in contrast with majoritarian systems that neglect the interests of considerable 
minority groups. This leads to the ‘consensus democracy matters’ hypothesis.
 The positive effect of consensus democracy on performance is contested by 
Anderson (2001). He believes that the positive effect of consensus democracy is 
limited and that the effect that Lijphart found in his analysis is mainly caused by 
corporatism and central bank independence, two factors that are part of Lijphart’s 
measurement of consensus democracy. As already argued in Chapters 2 and 4, 
the operationalisation of consensus democracy by Lijphart (1999) is too broad. 
Corporatism and central bank independence are something different from the 
institutional arrangements of consensus democracy and cannot be used as 
indicators of consensus democracy. Moreover, the primary goal of consensual 
institutional arrangements is to prevent deep-seated societal confl icts and secure 
a stable democracy. The contribution to a better socio-economic performance can 
be seen as a goal of any type of (democratic) government, be it consensus or 
majoritarian democracy.
‘Corporatism matters’ hypothesis
While the institutional arrangements of consensus democracy are primarily related 
to the stability of the political system, the institutions of corporatism deal explicitly 
with socio-economic policy-making. The impact of corporatism has been debated 
for several decades. The fi rst studies on this subject found a positive impact of 
corporatist institutions on performance (Schmidt 1982; Cameron 1984). A positive 
effect which became questionable in later years (Therborn 1987; Flanagan 1999).
 Early studies were positive about the impact of corporatism on performance. 
Schmitter (1981) fi nds that societal corporatism contributes to lower unruliness (a 
combined index of collective protest, internal war and strike volume) in the period 
of the 1960s until the early 1970s. Cameron (1984) fi nds that corporatism and leftist 
government rule contribute to lower infl ation and lower unemployment. Castles 
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(1987: 386) reports ‘a negative association between neocorporatist bargaining and 
infl ation in the crisis of the 1970s (1974-79)’, but ‘there is no signifi cant relationship 
of a similar kind in either the 1960s (1960-73) or in the 1980s (1980-84)’ and  ‘there 
is a consistent […] relationship between neocorporatism and unemployment in all 
periods.’
 Since the late 1980s the positive socio-economic effects of corporatism has been 
doubted. Therborn (1987: 259) stated that ‘there is little evidence that corporatism 
matters as a determinant of economic outcomes’. Corporatism did matter in the 
past, but nowadays it has little explanatory and prescriptive power.
 Crepaz (1992) tested the hypothesis that the impact of corporatist arrangements 
declined during the 1980s. Crepaz (1992: 161) concluded that corporatism 
continued to matter, even in the 1980s (see also Keman 1993). Countries with 
corporatist institutions managed to keep infl ation and unemployment rates low. 
Crepaz concluded that corporatism had not lost its capacity for policy guidance. 
An active corporatist position can be seen in contrast with a more passive role of 
the government in a more liberal ideology. Crepaz’ empirical fi ndings suggest that, 
both in the 1970s and the 1980s, corporatism had a positive infl uence on both 
unemployment and infl ation. Yet this does not mean that corporatism promotes 
economic growth in general. Corporatism had no signifi cant impact on economic 
growth during any period (Crepaz 1992: 161). Hence, corporatism is mitigating 
confl ict and constraining wages and infl ation, but does not produce economic 
wealth per se.
 Woldendorp (1997) evaluated the positive connection between corporatism 
as a form of public policy formation, and macroeconomic performance for eight 
small West European countries between 1970 and 1990. Based on a comparative 
analysis of the macroeconomic performance (measured by economic growth, 
infl ation rate, unemployment rate, budget surplus or defi cit, public debt and trade 
balance) Woldendorp concluded that countries with a strong system of corporatism 
did not show a higher performance. Woldendorp (1997: 70) concluded therefore that 
corporatism does account for certain types of policy formation and implementation 
across these countries, but is not directly related to a better macroeconomic 
performance.1
 Disagreement about the effect of corporatism on socio-economic performance 
continues to exist. One of the problems is that the many empirical studies that 
were done to this relationship are diffi cult to compare, because all of them use 
different operationalisations of both the dependent variable, performance, and the 
independent variable, degree of corporatism.
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 A crucial problem lies in the extent to which levels and changes of the dependent 
variable are due to corporatist institutional arrangements, or to other possible factors. 
For this reason, other independent variables are also included in the analyses as 
control variables. These sophistications lead to better fi tting models, but the results 
of the analysis become largely dependent on various different conditions and are 
consequently more diffi cult to interpret. On top of that, it makes a comparison of the 
different empirical studies even more diffi cult.
 Other factors that can affect the role of institutions are the size of a country and 
the openness of the economy. Katzenstein (1985) showed that a group of small 
countries developed a neo-corporatist strategy to maintain their position on the 
world market. At the same time these small countries depended heavily on foreign 
trade and they had almost no power to affect world market developments. The only 
remaining possibility was to adjust both domestic production and relations between 
workers and employers to secure their position on the world market. Katzenstein 
explained the superior socio-economic performance of these small countries by 
the corporatist institutions they developed to overcome the negative effects of the 
world market developments. Opposed to this optimistic conclusion is Olson’s thesis 
on institutional sclerosis. Olson (1982) argued that distributional coalitions are 
only serving their own short-term interests as opposed to the collective interests. 
This will lead to a sub-optimal outcome of the prisoners’ dilemma. The individual 
interests of the actors cannot be combined with the fulfi lment of the most optimal 
collective interest. Olson states that only large and encompassing organisations 
serve collective interests. But according to Olson the formation of such large 
organisations is very diffi cult.
 The institutional arrangements of corporatism do not have a direct effect on 
performance, but there are intermediating mechanisms. Interest groups and 
government make a package deal about wage moderation and social policy. Wage 
moderation leads to lower production costs, which stimulate exports and creates 
jobs. As a consequence, unemployment decreases. Flanagan (1999) warns against 
overestimating the effect of corporatism. The effect of corporatism is constrained 
by the time dimension (Flanagan 1999). Corporatism might have mattered in the 
past, but the positive effect on performance has declined. Perhaps corporatism 
is positively related to performance in certain time periods. This positive effect is 
not very strong and sustainable. Moreover, the effect of corporatism is likely to 
be constrained by international developments, such as international political and 
economic cooperation and international fl ows of trade and capital. The national 
capacity for macro-economic steering by the state has eroded.
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 Calmfors & Driffi ll (1988) argue that the relation between the centralisation of 
wage bargaining and the level of unemployment is hump-shaped. The bargaining 
modes at the extremes, i.e. centralised and decentralised, have lower levels of 
unemployment than wage bargaining at the sector level, which is in between. 
Unions and fi rms at the sector level can try to externalise the negative effects of 
wage drift to other fi rms. This is much more diffi cult at macro and fi rm level. If fi rms 
and workers are well organised at macro level, they are aware of this threat and are 
more prepared to cooperate.
 Unger & van Waarden (1999) conclude that ‘interest associations are not 
necessarily detrimental to economic performance and growth’. Alvarez, Garrett 
and Lange (1991) fi nd that densely and centrally organised labour movements 
combined with leftist governments can promote economic growth and reduce 
infl ation and unemployment. Beck & Katz (1993) confi rm the positive effect on 
economic growth, but question the reducing effect of infl ation and unemployment, 
due to incorrect estimates of the standard errors. Compston (1997: 146) fi nds that 
‘union participation in economic policy making was consistently associated with 
lower unemployment in the 13 West European countries covered during the period 
1972 to 1993’. Kittel (2001) fi nds that ‘countries with uncoordinated labour markets 
respond less fl exibly to external shocks than those that rely on pattern setting or, 
to a somewhat lesser degree, on peak-level coordination’. Armingeon (2002) fi nds 
that consensus democracy does not perform worse than majoritarian democracy 
and corporatism is associated with lower unemployment and infl ation.
 An infl uential empirical study was done by Calmfors & Driffi ll (1988: 47) who 
question 
‘the conventional belief that centralisation of wage bargaining is always preferable to 
decentralisation from the point of view of macroeconomic performance. […] 
Intermediate systems (such as, for instance in, Belgium and the Netherlands, and 
maybe also in Germany!) with bargaining at the industry level are likely to contribute 
the least to wage restraint.’ 
OECD Employment Outlook 1997 reports the opposite, namely that ‘there seems 
to be little robust evidence for either a U-shaped relation between the structure 
of collective bargaining and employment or a hump-shaped relation with the 
unemployment rate’ (OECD 1997: 82). 
 Other recent studies are ambiguous about the positive impact. Hicks & 
Kenworthy (1998) conclude that neocorporatist institutions reduce infl ation, but limit 
the effective economic growth. Kenworthy (2000: 34) concludes that corporatism 
appears to be conducive to low unemployment, but that there is no evidence of a 
link between corporatism and real wage moderation.
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 Most of the recent studies indicate that the impact of corporatism depends 
on other conditions. Swank & Martin (2001) stress the importance of employers’ 
organisations. They conclude that ‘where employers are centralised, cohesive 
and economically coordinated, social welfare effort is greater’ (Swank & Martin 
2001: 914). Garrett & Way (1999) argue that the macroeconomic consequences of 
corporatism are affected by the role of public sector unions. Garrett & Way (1999: 
412) demonstrate that ‘…so long as public sector unions are not too strong […] 
corporatist institutions continue to promote both price stability and low rates of 
unemployment’.
 In some recent studies the role of the central bank has been linked to corporatism. 
Franzese & Hall (2000) and Iversen (1999) argue that the impact of the central 
bank independence is dependent on the scope and level of wage bargaining. An 
independent central bank gives a higher priority to price stability than political actors 
do. Higher independence of central banks can therefore contribute to better socio-
economic performance. Independent central banks only manage to keep infl ation 
low when collective bargaining systems are able to moderate wage demands. This 
is expressed in the expectation that centralised wage bargaining has a positive 
impact on performance, if accommodated by the monetary regime. Several authors 
(Iversen 1999; Franzese & Hall 2000; Traxler, Blaschke & Kittel 2001) argue that 
the interaction of central bank independence and wage bargaining has an impact on 
socio-economic performance. Centralised and coordinated wage bargaining lead 
under central bank independence to lower infl ation rates and lower unemployment 
than decentralised and uncoordinated wage bargaining.
 As already explained, Lijphart (1999) links consensus democracy to more 
independent central banks. Central bank independence is lower in majoritarian 
democracies where government controls fi scal and monetary policy entirely. It 
is doubtful that central bank independence can be seen as part of consensual 
institutions.
 During the 1970s and 1980s, the neo-corporatist literature was very optimistic 
about the positive impact of neo-corporatist institutions on performance (Schmidt 
1982; Cameron 1984). In past decades, some authors became sceptical about this 
relationship (Therborn 1987; Calmfors & Driffi ll 1988; Flanagan 1999). Nowadays 
a simple one-to-one causal relationship between corporatism and performance 
is ruled out. The positive impact of corporatism may depend on other factors, 
such as consensus democracy, openness of the economy and central bank 
independence.
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5.3 Theoretical framework and hypotheses
Socio-economic policy can be seen as the result or outcome of the decision-making 
process. Political and economic actors, such as political parties, governments, 
trade unions and employers’ organisations, shape socio-economic policy. A 
distinction must be made between policy outputs and performance. Policy outputs 
refl ect the actual implementation of political decisions. This output is shaped by 
actual policy choices. Examples of policy output are the level of welfare spending 
or of expenditures on labour market policy. Performance measures the actual 
achievement and the societal effects of policy. Unemployment rates and economic 
growth are indicators of socio-economic performance. Political and economic 
actors try to decrease the unemployment levels by developing specifi c types of 
labour market policy. However, the focus of this study is not to explain performance 
levels as such, but the extent to which political-institutional arrangements infl uence 
performance. Central in this analysis is therefore the extent to which institutional 
arrangements matter.
 What is the importance of institutions for socio-economic policy-making? It has 
been argued that the room to manoeuvre for the political and economic actors in 
shaping socio-economic policy is constrained by institutions (March & Olsen 1989; 
Steinmo, Thelen & Longstreth 1992; Weaver & Rockman 1993; Keman, Paloheimo 
& Whiteley 1987). This fi rst line of argument in explaining the relationship between 
institutions and socio-economic policy-making perceives institutions as exogenous 
factors that shape and limit the policy choices available for the political actors. 
In this fi rst approach, institutions explain levels and changes of performance. A 
second way of understanding this relationship is to incorporate the actors’ capacity 
to create or change institutions. Institutional arrangements can help to generate a 
setting in which political and economic actors can come to agreements that would 
otherwise have been impossible. Corporatism, for example, has been instrumental 
in small countries, which are largely dependent on their international trade, as a 
strategy to improve or secure their position on the world market (Woldendorp 1995; 
Katzenstein 1985). In this second approach, performance can lead to institutional 
change. In times of crisis, actors realise the urgency to change socio-economic 
policy. As a result, these actors try to adjust the existing institutions or to develop 
additional institutions (see Visser & Hemerijck 1997).
 Corporatist institutional arrangements are conducive to agreements between 
social partners and government on wage moderation, labour market policy and 
working conditions. The main advantage of consensual wage bargaining is that trade 
unions and employers’ organisations can agree on a package deal of measures that 
account for long term interests and are broader than only agreements on the level 
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of the wages. In corporatist countries social partners develop a socio-economic 
policy that is in accordance with the national interests rather than a situation in 
which interest groups are only interested in their short-term benefi ts.
 In this study, institutions are considered to be the intermediates between actors’ 
preferences and the outcomes of the process. This means that the institutional context 
is supposed to determine the output of the decision making process. Institutions are 
considered to infl uence outcomes which even may well infl uence actors to change 
or create institutional arrangements in order to adjust outputs. Several hypotheses 
about the relation between institutional arrangements are tested. First, corporatist 
institutions allow agreements between unions and employers’ organisations on 
wage moderation. This will have positive effects on infl ation and unemployment. 
The impact on economic growth is not necessarily very strong. Corporatism can 
contribute to consolidation of economic growth, but does not lead to a comparative 
advantage over non-corporatist countries per se. The highest priorities of trade 
unions are employment and social protection for their members. Macro-level 
economic growth is a positive spill over. Second, small countries frequently use 
corporatism as a strategy to safeguard their position on the world market. By 
contrast, large countries will have more diffi culties with developing corporatist 
institutions (Katzenstein 1985; Olson 1982). Third, the members of interest groups 
become increasingly diffuse. Trade unions were traditionally strongly supported by 
male blue-collar industry sector workers. This strength of this group has weakened 
with increasing service sector employment and increasing labour participation of 
women and immigrants.
 Decision-making in consensus democracy may seem slow and ineffi cient; the 
choices made are based on a solid majority, without neglecting the interests of 
minorities in society. Of course, it is not always possible to make unanimous decisions, 
but the most important function of the institutions of consensus democracy is that 
relevant groups have the opportunity to express their voice. The resulting outcome 
may be not the most preferred, but at least they will agree about the procedure that 
is used. Hence, the main advantage is that decisions made carry a much stronger 
support. For this reason, Crepaz (1996) argues that policy-making in consensus 
democracies is more effi cient and more responsive. It is more effi cient because 
fewer actors will try to obstruct it and it is more responsive to voters’ preferences, 
because more actors are involved. Therefore, according to Crepaz consensus 
democracies have better performance than majoritarian democracies.
 The welfare state literature has studied development and possible retrenchment 
of welfare states and looked for explanations in historical and demographic fi elds. 
Later, political variables, such as the political colour of governments and the strength 
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of social democratic and Christian Democratic parties were taken into account as 
well (Esping-Andersen 1990; van Kersbergen 1995). Institutional arrangements 
can have consequences for the policy choices that are made regarding the tasks 
and size of the welfare state. Since corporatist institutions rely on how interest 
groups are involved in socio-economic policy-making, it can be expected that a 
greater involvement of these groups will have a strong impact on the creation and 
expansion of the welfare state and eventually on the reform of the system of welfare 
and care.
 Crepaz (1998) argues that parliamentary systems with proportional representation 
are more successful in representing the diffuse interests of the general public. In 
these systems political parties are stronger and capable of developing an extensive 
political programme, while in presidential systems with single member districts, such 
as the United States, parties are weak and legislators are pressured by lobbies. The 
majoritarian political system enables government to make radical policy changes. 
These changes can be totally reversed when a new government is installed. In a 
consensus democracy, policy is the result of a long process of compromising. Once 
actors have agreed on such a policy, it has a strong support and is quite diffi cult 
to change and to reform certain given citizens’ rights, especially social rights. 
Therefore, it can be expected that welfare state provisions are more extensive 
in countries with a consensual political system. In a majoritarian democracy it is 
possible for a political party to gain political power and to implement an extreme 
policy programme. However, in the race between the two main parties to gain a 
majority vote, their programme is adjusted to please the median voter. In other 
words, the Downsian behaviour of political parties in a majoritarian system will 
decrease differences between available policy proposals.  The policy most likely to 
be chosen is found near the political centre2.
 Corporatist institutional arrangements allow interest groups better access to the 
decision-making process. In these systems, the demands of labour organisations 
for an extensive system of welfare provisions have a higher chance to be honoured 
by government and parliament. Government and legislators are more pressured 
by interest groups. Moreover, when unions are able to make agreements with 
employers’ organisations, the other political players are more willing to accept these 
agreements as a basis for their decision-making, because support of the main 
actors in the fi eld becomes a given. It can be argued that corporatism facilitates the 
development of a welfare state. What is the impact on welfare state reform? Two 
opposite effects are possible. On the one hand, established socio-economic policy 
is diffi cult to change. Once workers have gained certain social rights, they will not 
be given up easily (Pierson 1994; 2001; Kuhnle 2000). On the other hand, when 
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both unions and employers organisations agree on a reform, it becomes easier for 
the political actors to make this decision (Ebbinghaus & Hassel 2000). The 1980s 
saw a decline of the infl uence of unions on national level. Moreover unemployment 
increased rapidly. Unions were prepared to make agreements with employers’ 
organisations and government on wage moderation and welfare state reform. In 
return, trade unions were back at the negotiating-table, where they could regain 
infl uence, and hope for economic recovery, including more employment, which 
consequently would strengthen their position among the workforce. Corporatism 
is expected to coincide with higher welfare states until the mid1990s. Corporatist 
institutions have contributed to welfare retrenchment or moderation of welfare state 
growth in some countries in the 1990s.
 Table 5.1 gives an overview of the hypothesised effects of corporatism and 
consensus democracy on socio-economic performance. The institutions of 
consensus democracy are expected to neither have a positive nor a negative 
impact on performance. Institutions of consensus democracy play a role for political 
stability, but not for socio-economic policy, with the exception of social policy. Since 
more parties are involved in coalition government and minority groups have better 
access to the political arena, consensus democracy is expected to lead to higher 
social expenditures. Corporatism is expected to have no positive or negative 
effects on GDP per capita and economic growth, but it is expected to be related 
to socio-economic performance dealing with work, wages and prices. Because 
of coordinated and centralisation of groups action in a corporatist institutional 
setting, general interests are served better than in pluralist countries. In corporatist 
countries employers’ organisation and trade unions are able to make agreements 
about wage moderation and stimulation of employment. Therefore, corporatism is 
expected to contribute to lower infl ation rates and unemployment rates. Corporatism 
favours better access to decision-making and policy-making to many small groups 
than pluralism. In corporatist countries these groups have more and more effi cient 
channels to claim the development of social policy. Thus, corporatism is expected 
to be associated with higher social expenditures.
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Table 5.1 Hypotheses of the impact of institutions on performance
Type of performance
Consensus
Democracy
Corporatism Indicator used
GDP per capita Neutral Neutral
GDP per capita (in constant US 
Dollars) OECD
Economic growth Neutral Neutral
growth of real GDP (% change from 
previous year)
Unemployment Neutral Lower
standardised unemployment rate 
OECD
Infl ation Neutral Lower
consumer price index (% change 
from previous year)
Misery index Neutral Lower unemployment plus infl ation
Performance index Neutral Higher
economic growth minus infl ation 
minus unemployment
Social expenditures Higher Higher
total social security benefi t 
expenditure as % of GDP
Table 5.1 shows that effects of consensus democracy and corporatism on 
performance are not the same. Consensus democracy only makes a difference for 
social expenditures, while corporatism also matters for unemployment and infl ation. 
As a result corporatism also has an impact on the misery index and the combined 
performance index.
 GDP per capita expresses the wealth of the population in a country. Economic 
growth measures the degree to which the economy is expanding. Unemployment 
measures the degree to which workers are able to fi nd a job. Low infl ation rates 
indicate price stability, which means that people’s purchasing power does not 
decline. Misery index expresses the mix of unemployment and infl ation and a high 
degree of misery indicates a greater distance of the Phillips curve. The performance 
index combines economic growth, unemployment and infl ation. Social expenditures 
show how much comparatively is spent to social policy.
5.4 Empirical fi ndings
The impact of institutional arrangements on several socio-economic indicators 
is examined for twenty Western advanced capitalist democracies between 1965 
and 1998. First, a general overview is given by reporting mean scores on several 
performance indicators. Second, the mean scores of four clusters, as discussed 
in Chapter 4, are presented in graphs, Third, bivariate correlation coeffi cients are 
presented. Fourth, several multivariate regression models are tested, in which the 
effects on socio-economic performance are controlled for contextual factors.
 Tables C.6 through C.12 in Appendix C present the average scores on several 
performance indicators in several time periods. Tables C.6 and C.7 show average 
levels of GDP per capita and economic growth. Tables C.8 and C.9 show average 
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unemployment levels and infl ation rates between 1965 and 1998 for twenty countries. 
A fi rst inspection of Table C.6 and C.7 shows that most countries experienced their 
strongest growth between 1965 and 1974, later growth was smaller. Switzerland, 
Norway and the US are the three richest countries. Portugal, Greece and Spain are 
the countries with the lowest GDP per capita. Portugal and Ireland have the highest 
growth rates, by means of the average annual growth. It seems that Portugal and 
Ireland are catching up. New Zealand, Switzerland, the UK and Sweden are the 
countries with the lowest economic growth.
 Table C.8 and C.9 show an overall increase of unemployment rates, whereas 
infl ation decreased. The highest unemployment rates can be found in Spain 
and Ireland. Switzerland, Austria and Norway are the countries with the lowest 
unemployment rates. The highest infl ation is found in Portugal, Spain and Greece, 
which restored democracy in the 1970s (see Table C.9). The high infl ation rates 
can be connected to the political and economic transitions that took place in these 
countries. Germany, Switzerland, Austria and the Netherlands have the lowest 
infl ation rates.
 In Tables C.6 to C.12 means are given for four clusters, which were discussed in 
Chapter 4 (Table 4.1): (4) consensus and corporatist, (3) consensus or corporatist, 
(2) non-corporatist and non-consensus democratic and (1) majoritarian and pluralist 
countries. The mean scores for these categories in four time periods are visualised 
in Figure 5.1.
Figure 5.1 Socio-economic indicators per category
Sources: GDP per capita (in constant us dollars) from Comparative Political Data Set (Armingeon, 
Beyeler & Menegale 2000).
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fi gure 5.1 continued
Sources: Economic growth (annual change of real GDP) from Comparative Political Data Set (Armingeon, 
Beyeler & Menegale 2000); standardised unemployment and infl ation (consumer price index) OECD 
Economic Outlook, various years.
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The fi rst graph in Figure 5.1 shows that clusters 4 and 3 (i.e. countries with both 
consensus democracy and corporatism or with one of these) have the highest levels 
of GDP per capita. Cluster 2 (non-corporatist and non-consensus) has the highest 
economic growth. Cluster 2 also has the highest levels of both unemployment and 
infl ation. The countries in cluster 4 have lower levels of both unemployment and 
infl ation than the other groups. From Figure 5.1 it can be concluded that cluster 
2 performs worst in terms of GDP per capita, unemployment and infl ation, but is 
doing best in average economic growth. This last result might be an indication 
that this group of countries is catching up. Countries in cluster 4 perform better on 
unemployment, infl ation and GDP per capita, but have lower levels of economic 
growth than the other groups. In general, this means that the combination of 
consensus democracy and corporatism (cluster 4) leads to a performance that is 
better than for cluster 2 and at least equally good as or even better than cluster 1 
(majoritarian and pluralist).
 Instead of taking some separate indicators of performance, a composite index 
of performance can be constructed. A frequently used one is the misery index – or 
Okun index - which is the sum of the levels of infl ation and unemployment. Table 
C.10 (Appendix C) presents the scores for this misery index for twenty countries. 
The highest scores on the misery index can be found in Spain, Portugal and 
Greece. Other countries with high scores on the misery index are Ireland and Italy. 
Best performers according to this index are Switzerland, Austria and Germany. 
However, in some countries the misery index has changed considerably.
Figure 5.2 Performance index by category
Sources: Comparative Political Data Set (Armingeon, Beyeler & Menegale 2000); OECD Economic 
Outlook, various years; own calculations.
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 An alternative measure of performance takes the level of economic growth 
into account as well. Performance can be calculated as economic growth minus 
infl ation minus unemployment3. Standardised scores of this performance index are 
presented in Table C.11 (Appendix C) and Figure 5.2. According to the performance 
index Spain, Greece and Italy perform worst, while Austria, Norway and Switzerland 
perform best.
 If we look at the means of both indexes for the four categories, it confi rms the 
picture that the combined model of corporatism and consensus democracy has a 
slightly better performance than the others, but this advantage disappeared in the 
1990s. The worst performance is found in the non-corporatist and non-consensus 
democratic category.
 The graphs in Figure 5.1 and 5.2 do not only indicate the cross-national patterns, 
but show the dynamic dimension as well. GDP per capita increases in all four 
categories and the differences between the clusters are increasing as well. This 
indicates a diverging pattern in terms of GDP per capita. Economic growth was 
highest in all four categories in the fi rst period, 1965-74. After the fi rst oil shock 
of 1974 economic growth declined. In the periods after 1974 average growth for 
these categories stabilised between 2 and 3% a year. Unemployment increased 
in all clusters, although differences in growth of unemployment can be seen for 
these categories. Unemployment increased strongest for the non-corporatist and 
non-consensus democratic cluster, while the other clusters stabilised around an 
unemployment rate of 8% in the last period. An interesting result is that unemployment 
in the consensus and corporatist cluster increased later than in the other clusters. 
This shows why studies published in the 1980s were still positive about the impact 
of corporatism on unemployment. This positive effect of corporatism disappeared 
in the 1990s. Infl ation shows an interesting pattern of rise and decline. Infl ation 
was highest for all categories between 1975 and 1984, with a record for the non-
corporatist and non-consensus democratic category of 15%. After this period, 
infl ation decreased for all categories. Combined with rising unemployment rates, in 
the same period 1975-84, these countries coped with a serious stagfl ation crisis.
 Although Figures 5.1 and 5.2 give a general overview of the cross-national and 
diachronic patterns, it is only a rough indication of the empirical relationship between 
institutional variables and several macro-economic variables. Table 5.2 shows 
bivariate correlation coeffi cients between institutional variables and performance 
indicators. Again these results are rough, but they are helpful in comparing them 
with results found in other studies and in looking at developments through time.
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Table 5.2 Correlation coeffi cients between institutional and socio-economic 
variables
Correlations Economic growth
1965-74 1975-84 1985-92 1993-98 1965-98
consensus democracy 0.12 -0.25 -0.12 -0.28 -0.26
corporatism -0.02 -0.12 -0.03 -0.17 -0.06
GDP per capita
1965-74 1975-84 1985-92 1993-98 1965-98
consensus democracy -0.06 0.35 0.47** 0.44* 0.45**
corporatism -0.25 -0.03 0.05 0.21 0.11
Unemployment rate
1965-74 1975-84 1985-92 1993-98 1965-98
consensus democracy -0.36 -0.20 -0.39* -0.11 -0.33
corporatism -0.43* -0.35 -0.20 0.13 -0.28
social expenditures
1965-74 1975-84 1985-92 1993-98 1965-98
consensus democracy 0.27 0.33 0.41* 0.48** 0.37
corporatism 0.52* 0.49* 0.54** 0.72** 0.55**
Infl ation
1965-74 1975-84 1985-92 1993-98 1965-98
consensus democracy -0.01 -0.36 -0.25 -0.15 -0.31
corporatism 0.11 -0.04 -0.03 0.01 -0.05
Misery index
1965-74 1975-84 1985-92 1993-98 1965-98
consensus democracy -0.30 -0.36 -0.45** -0.15 -0.39*
corporatism -0.30 -0.19 -0.16 0.12 -0.20
Performance index
1965-74 1975-84 1985-92 1993-98 1965-98
consensus democracy 0.27 0.30 0.36 -0.05 0.31
corporatism 0.18 0.17 0.09 -0.17 0.18
Signifi cance * 10% ** 5%
Correlation coeffi cients are calculated over averages for each country for each period; number of cases 
is 20, except for 1965-74, n = 17 (Greece, Spain and Portugal are excluded). 
Sources: Economic growth (annual change of real GDP) and GDP per capita in constant US Dollars 
(Comparative Political Data Set, provided by Armingeon, Beyeler & Menegale 2000); unemployment: 
standardized unemployment rates; Infl ation: consumer price index (OECD Economic outlook, various 
years).
Misery index = unemployment + infl ation (own calculations)
Performance index = economic growth – unemployment - infl ation (own calculations)
In general, the correlation coeffi cients between the institutional variables and 
economic variables in Table 5.2 are weak, with the exception of social expenditures. 
Corporatism has a signifi cant positive effect on social expenditures, that increases 
through time. Consensus democracy also has an increasing positive effect, but not 
as strong.
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 The other correlations are much weaker and only signifi cant in a few cases. 
Corporatism is very weakly to not related to the levels of the GDP per capita and 
economic growth. Both consensus democracy and corporatism have a slight 
lowering impact on unemployment levels, but this effect disappeared in the 1990s. 
Consensus democracy has a slight lowering effect on infl ation rates, while there is 
almost no relationship between corporatism and infl ation. The impact of consensus 
democracy on GDP per capita, infl ation, misery index and performance index is 
stronger than that of corporatism. For these performance indicators, the combined 
effect of corporatism and consensus democracy is slightly stronger than the impact 
of the separate indicators. The fact that Lijphart (1999) includes corporatism as 
an indicator of consensus democracy explains his optimism about the relationship 
he found. It seems that Anderson (2001) is right in his critique on Lijphart that his 
index of consensus democracy is not accurate because it contains factors that do 
not belong to the institutional arrangements of consensus democracy. The indexes 
used in this chapter are clearer and enable an analysis of the different institutions 
of corporatism and consensus democracy without mixing them. This means that 
not only on theoretical grounds consensus democracy and corporatism must be 
separated (as discussed in Chapter 4), empirically these institutions seem to have 
different effects on socio-economic performance.
 The conclusion from the bivariate correlations is that the impact of the institutional 
variables on some macro-economic performance indicators generally is hardly 
signifi cant. Corporatism and consensus democracy have a modest lowering effect 
on unemployment and infl ation rates and have a weak positive relation to GDP per 
capita and economic growth, which is not constant through time. The lowering effect 
of corporatism on unemployment clearly declined through time. Corporatism and to a 
lesser extent consensus democracy seem to matter for social policy. These institutions 
are related to more social expenditures as a percentage of GDP.
 Compared with other results, such as Schmidt (1982); Crepaz (1992; 1998); 
Lijphart (1999) the results of Table 5.2 are considerably weaker. This can have 
several reasons. These studies did not analyse exactly the same countries for 
the same time periods. Moreover, in Table 5.2 several time periods are analysed 
separately. These results indicate that, for example, corporatism had an impact on 
unemployment and infl ation in the past, but this effect disappeared altogether.
  After the presentation of mean scores and bivariate correlations, several 
models will be tested in multivariate regressions. The multivariate models measure 
the extent to which there is a combined effect of corporatism and consensus 
democracy and these effects can be controlled for other factors. The main goal of 
empirical testing is to fi nd the impact of institutions, not the level and changes of the 
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performance indicators as such. Finding the best fi tting model is balancing between 
a model that is parsimonious on the one hand and a model containing all relevant 
factors on the other hand. Tables 5.3 to 5.8 present several models of the impact 
of institutions on performance. These models are calculated for twenty countries 
and the averages for three time periods (1975-84, 1985-92 and 1993-98). The fi rst 
period, 1965-74, is not included in the analysis, because there are no scores for 
the institutional models in this period for Greece, Spain and Portugal are available. 
Using three time periods increases the number of cases to 60 instead of 20, but it 
does not lead to serious problems of autocorrelation, because of the limited time 
span. A second problem that may occur is multicollinearity, which means that the 
independent variables are highly correlated.4
 With three periods and twenty countries there is variation through time and 
across countries. The time component is very limited, and the models are not really 
pooled time series. Using annual scores between 1975 and 1998, increases the 
number of time points, but lead to replication of some of the variables, in particular 
the corporatism scores which are measured for the periods 1975-84, 1985-92 
and 1993-98. Therefore, variation over three time periods and twenty countries is 
examined.
 To examine if variation over time or across nations is highest, an ANOVA5 is 
calculated for each of the performance indicators. Variation over time is greater 
than variation across nations for infl ation (consumer price index) and GDP per 
capita (in constant US Dollars). Variation across nations is greater than over time 
for unemployment, economic growth (annual change of real GDP), misery index 
(unemployment and infl ation), performance index and social expenditures. This 
means that the time dimension is dominant for infl ation and GDP per capita and 
that differences between countries are most important for the other performance 
indicators. 
 For each performance indicator, several regression models are tested. The 
fi rst model presented includes the institutional variables and contextual variables 
that yield signifi cant coeffi cients. The other models are one or more parsimonious 
models and a model with only institutional variables. The fi rst analysed performance 
indicator is infl ation, which is shown in Table 5.3.
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Table 5.3 Regression models of the impact on infl ation (Consumer price 
index)
model 1 model 2 model 3
b (s.e.) beta b (s.e.) beta b (s.e.) beta
consensus democracy -0.533 (0.409) -0.103 -1.489 (0.780) -0.287*
corporatism -0.656 (0.410) -0.128  0.671 (0.769)  0.131 -0.947 (0.346) -0.185**
openness of the economy -1.970 (0.156) -0.864*** -2.007 (0.154) -0.880***
Adjusted R2 0.74 0.06 0.74
degrees of freedom 56 57 57
Dependent variable: infl ation (consumer price index)
b: unstandardised coeffi cients; s.e.: standard errors of b; beta: standardised coeffi cients
signifi cance (two-tailed) ***p< 0.001 ** p<0.01 * p<0.1
number of cases is 60 (20 countries and 3 time periods: 1975-84, 1985-92 and 1993-98)
Sources: consensus democracy Table 2.7; corporatism Table 3.4; Openness economy: index for the 
fi nancial openness of an economy6 (Comparative Political Data Set, provided by Armingeon, Beyeler & 
Menegale 2000)
In Table 5.3 three models are tested that can have an impact on infl ation, measured by 
the consumer price index. The fi rst model takes consensus democracy, corporatism 
and openness of the economy (measured by an additive index of restrictions on 
payments and receipts of goods and invisibles, restrictions on payments and 
receipts of capital and legal international agreements that constrain a nation’s ability 
to restrict exchange and capital fl ows (Armingeon, Beyeler & Menegale 2000)) as 
independent variables. For this model, there is no strong impact of institutions. 
Openness of the economy is signifi cantly related to lower infl ation rates. Although 
the impact of corporatism is not signifi cant, in this model corporatism together with 
openness lowers signifi cantly the infl ation level. This seems in line with arguments 
made by Katzenstein (1985) that small open countries use corporatism as a 
strategy to cope with international competition. When openness of the economy is 
removed, as in model 2, the explained variance, as expressed by R2, is very low 
and consensus democracy has a signifi cantly but very small lowering impact on 
infl ation. When consensus democracy is omitted, as in model 3, corporatism and 
openness of the economy together have a mitigating impact on infl ation.
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Table 5.4 Regression models of the impact on unemployment
model 1 model 2 model 3
b (s.e.) beta b (s.e.) beta b (s.e.) beta
consensus democracy -0.242 (0.549) -0.060 -0.814 (0.612) -0.202
corporatism -0.745 (0.524) -0.188 -0.008 (0.604) -0.002
central bank independence -1.191 (0.470) -0.295* -1.246 (0.444) -0.308***
EU membership  3.390 (0.883)  0.497***  3.636 (0.881)  0.453***
Adjusted R2 0.32 0.01 0.29
degrees of freedom 55 57 57
Dependent variable: unemployment rate.
b: unstandardised coeffi cients; s.e.: standard errors of b; beta: standardised coeffi cients
signifi cance (two-tailed) ***p< 0.001 ** p<0.01 * p<0.1
number of cases is 60 (20 countries and 3 time periods: 1975-84, 1985-92 and 1993-98)
Sources: consensus democracy Table 2.7; corporatism Table 3.4; Central bank Independence: sum of 
the z-scores of central bank independence of Franzese & Hall (2000: 198) and Busch (1993: 60)7.
Table 5.4 presents three regression models on unemployment. Institutions have 
no signifi cant impact. In the fi rst model, central bank independence has a lowering 
effect on unemployment, while EU countries have higher unemployment rates. 
When the institutional variables are removed, as in model 3, the effect of the control 
variables remains the same. This means that both consensus democracy and 
corporatism have no impact on unemployment. This result holds when controlled 
for other factors and only these institutions are examined. Institutions do not seem 
to matter with regard to unemployment. The signs of the coeffi cient are in the 
expected direction, negative, but they are very weak and not signifi cant.
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Table 5.5 Regression models of the impact on misery index
model 1 model 2 model 3
b (s.e.) beta b (s.e.) beta b (s.e.) beta
consensus democracy -0.068 (0.516) -0.011 -2.303 (0.894) -0.377*
corporatism -0.737(0.587) -0.122  0.663 (0.882) -0.110
central bank independence -1.013 (0.480) -0.165* -1.009 (0.466) -0.165*
work days lost (log)  2.283 (0,523)  0.363***  2.716 (0.428)  0.432***
EU membership  4.173 (0.891)  0.343***  3.627 (0.828)  0.298***
openness of the economy -1.636 (0.218) -0.609*** -1.510 (0.204) -0.562***
Adjusted R2 0.76 0.08 0.76
degrees of freedom 53 57 55
Dependent variable: misery index (unemployment and infl ation).
b: unstandardised coeffi cients; s.e.: standard errors of b; beta: standardised coeffi cients
signifi cance (two-tailed) ***p< 0.001 ** p<0.01 * p<0.1
number of cases is 60 (20 countries and 3 time periods: 1975-84, 1985-92 and 1993-98)
Sources: consensus democracy Table 2.7; corporatism Table 3.4; Central bank independence: sum of 
the z-scores of central bank independence of Franzese & Hall (2000: 198) and Busch (1993: 60); log 
of work days lost due to strike Comparative Political Data Set (2000); openness economy: index for the 
fi nancial openness of an economy (Comparative Political Data Set, provided by Armingeon, Beyeler & 
Menegale 2000). 
Table 5.5 shows regression models of the misery index, which is the combination 
of infl ation and unemployment. Consensus democracy has a lowering effect on the 
misery index in model 2, but when control variables are added this effect disappears 
as in model 1. Central bank independence has a very weak, signifi cant lowering 
effect on the misery index. Open economies are associated with a lower degree 
of misery and (the logarithm of) the number of work days lost due to strike and EU 
membership is associated with a higher degree of misery. Again, institutions are not 
actually related to the misery index. This is in line with the fi nding that institutions 
are not related with unemployment.
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Table 5.6 Regression models of the impact on performance
model 1 model 2 model 3
b (s.e.) beta b (s.e.) beta b (s.e.) beta
consensus democracy  0.014 (0.103)  0.018  0.181 (0.116)  0.238
corporatism  0.115 (0.101)  0.154 -0.088 (0.114) -0.118
central bank independence  0.237 (0.099)  0.311*  0.258 (0.093)  0.337**
EU membership -0.601 (0.179) -0.396*** -0.527 (0171) -0.348**
openness of the economy  0.115 (0.044)  0.343*  0.097 (0.042)  0.289*
Adjusted R2 0.33 0.04 0.33
degrees of freedom 54 57 56
Dependent variable: performance index (economic growth minus unemployment minus infl ation).
b: unstandardised coeffi cients; s.e.: standard errors of b; beta: standardised coeffi cients
signifi cance (two-tailed) ***p< 0.001 ** p<0.01 * p<0.1
number of cases is 60 (20 countries and 3 time periods: 1975-84, 1985-92 and 1993-98)
Sources: consensus democracy Table 2.7; corporatism Table 3.4; Central bank independence: sum 
of the z-scores of central bank independence of Franzese & Hall (2000: 198) and Busch (1993: 60); 
openness economy: index for the fi nancial openness of an economy (Comparative Political Data Set, 
provided by Armingeon, Beyeler & Menegale 2000).
Table 5.6 shows no signifi cant impact of institutions on the overall performance 
index. Central bank independence is related to better socio-economic performance. 
According to the fi rst and third model independent central banks and open 
economies have higher performance and EU members have lower performance 
levels, but the effects are not strong.
 The positive conclusions of Lijphart (1999) and Crepaz (1996) about the 
impact of consensus democracy are not refl ected in the fi ndings presented 
here. It becomes clear that one of the indicators that are part of Lijphart’s 
operationalisation of consensus democracy, central bank independence, has a 
stronger effect than the index of consensus democracy. This means that using a 
broad operationalisation as done by Lijphart (1999), that includes variables such 
as central bank independence, leads to conclusions that overestimate the positive 
effect of consensus democracy.
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Table 5.7 Regression models GDP per capita (in 1000 constant US Dollars)
model 1 model 2 model 3
b (s.e.) beta b (s.e.) beta b (s.e.) beta
consensus democracy  1.618 (0.726)  0.200*  3.146 (1.179)  0.390**
corporatism  1.539 (0.708)  0.193* -1.077 (1.163) -0.135
industrial employment -0.891 (0.132) -0.557*** -0.785 (0.150) -0.491***
central bank independence  2.731 (0.757)  0.337***  3.144 (0.832)  0.388***
openness of the economy  1.412 (0.310)  0.398***  1.290 (0.358)  0.363***
Adjusted R2 0.70 0.08 0.60
degrees of freedom 54 57 56
b: unstandardised coeffi cients; s.e.: standard errors of b; beta: standardised coeffi cients
signifi cance (two-tailed) ***p< 0.001 ** p<0.01 * p<0.1
number of cases is 60 (20 countries and 3 time periods: 1975-84, 1985-92 and 1993-98)
Sources: consensus democracy Table 2.7; corporatism Table 3.4; industrial employment: employment 
in industry as % of total employment(OECD Labour Force Statistics 2000); Central bank independence: 
sum of the z-scores of central bank independence of Franzese & Hall (2000: 198) and Busch (1993: 60); 
openness economy: index for the fi nancial openness of an economy (Comparative Political Data Set, 
provided by Armingeon, Beyeler & Menegale 2000).
Consensus democracy is associated with higher GDP per capita and this effect is 
smaller when controlled for other factors. The impact of corporatism on GDP per 
capita is very small. Openness of the economy and central bank independence 
are much more important. Industrial employment is associated with lower GDP 
per capita. Countries with relatively more industrial employment did not develop 
economically as strong as those countries with a larger service sector.
Table 5.8 Regression models of the impact on social expenditures
model 1 model 2 model 3
b (s.e.) beta b (s.e.) beta b (s.e.) beta
consensus democracy  0.838 (0.613)  0.130 0.969 (0.831) 0.150
corporatism  3.128 (0.641)  0.492*** 2.950 (0.820) 0.464***  3.650 (0.518)  0.574***
federalism -2.208 (0.630) -0.309*** -1.947 (0.604) -0.272**
openness of the economy  1.801 (0.230)  0.635***  1.833 (0.230)  0.646***
Adjusted R2 0.66 0.29 0.66
degrees of freedom 55 57 56
Dependent variable: social expenditures (as % of GDP).
b: unstandardised coeffi cients; s.e.: standard errors of b; beta: standardised coeffi cients
signifi cance (two-tailed) ***p< 0.001 ** p<0.01 * p<0.1
number of cases is 60 (20 countries and 3 time periods: 1975-84, 1985-92 and 1993-98)
Sources: consensus democracy Table 2.7; corporatism Table 3.4; federalism 1=unitary, 3=federal (Lane 
& Ersson 1994a; own estimations added); openness economy: index for the fi nancial openness of an 
economy (Comparative Political Data Set, provided by Armingeon, Beyeler & Menegale 2000).
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 Table 5.8 shows the impact on social expenditures (as % of GDP). This is the 
fi rst and only performance indicator that shows a signifi cant positive impact of 
corporatism that lasts if control variables are added. Corporatist countries have 
a larger welfare state. This effect is controlled for federalism and open economy. 
In federal countries, central government is less dominant and there can be more 
competition between states to moderate taxes. This contributes to smaller welfare 
states in federal countries (Pierson 1995). Open economies have a larger welfare 
state. Open economies are more vulnerable to international factors and can 
therefore develop a stronger welfare state to protect workers against unexpected 
risks. Moreover, as shown in Table 5.7, countries with open economies are richer 
and this can make it easier for these countries to develop larger welfare states.
5.5 Conclusions
This chapter has examined several hypotheses of the impact of institutions on 
socio-economic performance. GDP per capita is somewhat higher in consensus 
democracies and the effect of corporatism is smaller. Non-corporatist and non-
consensus democratic countries have more economic growth (see Figure 5.1). 
Corporatism and consensus democracy do not contribute to more economic 
growth (see Table 5.2). There is also ample ground that corporatism and consensus 
democracy contribute to lower infl ation and lower unemployment. There is a weak 
lowering effect of these institutions, but this effect disappeared in the 1990s (see 
Figure 5.1, Table 5.2). Tables 5.3 and 5.4 show that contextual variables are 
more important than the institutional variables. Consensus democracy had a 
lowering effect on misery, but this effect disappeared in the 1990s (Table 5.2) and 
when controlled for other factors (Table 5.5). The hypothesis that corporatism is 
associated with higher social expenditures is confi rmed, but there is no such effect 
of consensus democracy.
 Lijphart (1999) and Crepaz (1996) predict a positive effect of consensus 
democracy on performance. Their positive effect is not confi rmed by the analyses 
of this chapter. Central bank independence, one of the indicators of consensus 
democracy in Lijphart’s operationalisation, seems to have a positive effect on several 
performance indicators (see Tables 5.4 to 5.7). The impact of consensus democracy 
on these indicators is lower and not signifi cant. The conclusions drawn by Lijphart 
(1999) and Crepaz (1996) are incorrect, since they use a broad operationalisation 
of consensus democracy that includes variables that have an effect on their own, 
such as corporatism and central bank independence. Consensus democracy is 
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related to lower unemployment, but this impact is not signifi cant (see Table 5.4). 
Consensus democracy is connected with lower misery, but this effect disappears 
when controlled for other factors (see Table 5.5).
 Several authors, such as Schmidt (1982) and Cameron (1984) among others, 
found a positive effect of corporatism on performance. Corporatism may have 
had a positive effect in the past, but this cannot be confi rmed for the 1990s. The 
lowering effect of corporatism on unemployment has become weaker (see Table 
5.2). This indicates that the effect of corporatist institutions has become smaller 
and corporatism has become less important. This confi rms the argument made by 
Therborn (1987) and Flanagan (1999) that the impact of corporatism has declined. 
The graphs in Figure 5.1 show that countries in the between categories performed 
worse than the countries at the extremes. This confi rms in part Calmfors & Driffi ll’s 
hypothesis (1988) of a hump-shaped relation.
 Based on this chapter, it can be concluded that neither corporatism nor consensus 
democracy has a strong positive effect on socio-economic performance. In several 
occasions these institutions do matter if other factors are added and sometimes 
only control variables have a signifi cant effect. There is one exception: corporatism 
has a positive effect on social expenditures, which lasts when control variables 
are omitted. This confi rms the idea that national corporatist institutions contribute 
to larger welfare states to protect against the negative impacts of economic 
globalisation.
 The effects of consensus democracy and corporatism on performance disappear 
when controlled for other factors, except for infl ation and social expenditures. 
Corporatism contributes to lower infl ation in open economies. In non-federal 
countries and open economies, corporatism is associated with higher social 
expenditures. In all other models examined here, the effect of institutions disappears 
when other factors are taken into account. This does not mean that in these other 
cases institutions are totally irrelevant. Institutions of consensus democracy and 
corporatism do not signifi cantly lead to worse performance.
 Overall, consensus democracy and corporatism do not directly matter. There 
is a logic to differences in welfare states. The hypotheses that were formulated in 
Table 5.1 were largely confi rmed. The neutral effects were indeed found, indicating 
that the institutions of consensus democracy and corporatism do not lead to worse 
socio-economic performance. The positive effects of corporatism that were found 
were weak, except for social expenditures, which remained positive without other 
factors taking into account. Corporatism and consensus democracy seem to have 
an indirect effect on policy performance. Stronger claims can not be confi rmed on 
the basis of this analysis.
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Notes
1 The results are possibly affected by the methodology used by Woldendorp (1997), for he only 
compares countries with a considerable level of neo-corporatism. He did not include countries with a 
lower degree of corporatism in his analysis.
2 Note that the median voter is not necessarily located in the political centre. This depends on the 
distribution of the policy positions of the voters. In a homogeneous electorate with normally distributed 
preferences, the median voter is located near the centre. 
3 Standardised scores are used.
4 Multicollinearity is tested by examining the Variance Infl ation Factor (VIF). In none of the regressions 
reported here, tolerance is below 0.45. Tolerance = 1/VIF. For critical values of tolerance see Pennings, 
Keman & Kleinnijenhuis (1999: 199-200).
5 Analysis of Variance (see Pennings, Keman & Kleinnijenhuis 1999: 141-144).
6 This index is measured by restrictions on payments and receipts of goods and invisibles, restrictions 
on payments and receipts of capital and legal international agreements that constrain a nation’s ability 
to restrict exchange and capital fl ows (Armingeon, Beyeler & Menegale 2000).
7 For the CBI index, scores from two different authors are used.
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6 SELECTION OF THE CASES
6.1 Introduction
Chapter 5 has discussed the impact of institutional arrangements on socio-economic 
policy-making for twenty democracies. The main fi nding has been that consensus 
democracy and corporatism do not strongly contribute to better performance. 
Corporatism has some positive effects and is related to more generous social policy. 
Consensus democracy is not related to better performance and has no impact 
on social expenditures. While the direct effects of corporatism and consensus 
democracy on performance are rather weak, they are not related to worse socio-
economic performance than pluralism and majoritarianism.
 The obvious caveat for comparative analysis is that the indicators used measure 
mainly formal institutions. To unravel the underlying institutional mechanisms, 
including informal institutions, and the role of actors, four cases are analysed 
in more detail. In Chapters 4 and 5 we found and examined four clusters of 
countries. From each of these one case is selected. The critical case method is 
suggested by Castles (1988: 217-219) for comparative public policy analysis. 
This method focuses on ‘the identifi cation of cases critical for theory construction 
and/or hypothesis testing’ (p. 217). Four cases are examined in more detail: the 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Portugal and Sweden. The advantage of case analysis 
is that more specifi c information can be used. Our goal is a systematic analysis of 
cases that are exemplary for the clustered fi ndings in the comparative analysis of 
the complete set of countries.
 Most other studies to the impact of institutions on performance are either done 
by quantitative comparison or by means of a few single case studies. The main 
disadvantage is that the analysis is either at a macro level, thus aggregated or in 
detail without reference to general benchmarks. This study combines comparison of 
twenty democracies and four case analyses. The results found by both approaches 
can be compared and confronted. This research design adds to new insights in 
understanding the linkages between the role of actors and institutional development 
in making policy choices and performance. 
 This chapter allows stepping from cross-national and cross-time quantitative 
comparisons to cross-time case analysis. Critical cases analysis helps further to 
address the research question: what is the relation between consensus democracy 
and corporatism and what is their impact on performance? Recall the theoretical 
framework in Chapter 1. Therefore, it is necessary to focus on the relation between 
actors and preferences within their institutional context. Analysing cases makes it 
possible to go beyond the general conclusions drawn in Chapters 4 and 5.
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 The selection is based on the four different clusters that were found characterising 
the combined presence of consensus democracy and corporatism. From each 
cluster one case is selected. These cases can reveal how the relation between 
actors and institutions affects performance in each of these clusters in a different 
way. These cases give the opportunity to elaborate on the relation between actors 
and institutions as put forward in Chapter 1, i.e. how the actors, preferences and 
the rules are operational in each system.
6.2 Comparative patterns
Chapter 5 has analysed the impact of consensus democracy and corporatism on 
socio-economic performance by means of quantitative statistical comparisons. 
These fi ndings are used for further case analysis. Some results were in accordance 
with the formulated hypotheses, while others were not.
Unemployment
Unemployment increased in all of the four clusters through time. Growth of 
unemployment was highest in the non-corporatist and non-consensus cluster 
of countries, while the cluster of consensual democracies and corporatist 
countries remained among the lowest. Bivariate correlation coeffi cients show that 
unemployment is slightly lower in consensus democracies and corporatist countries. 
In multivariate regressions there is no signifi cant effect of consensus democracy 
and corporatism on unemployment. EU membership has an increasing effect on 
unemployment and central bank independence leads to lower unemployment. This 
effect is corroborated by other studies (Iversen 1999; Franzese & Hall 2000)
Infl ation
The late 1970s and early 1980s showed a peak of infl ation rates. After 1984, 
infl ation rates decreased drastically. In all these periods, infl ation remained highest 
in the non-corporatist and non-consensus cluster and lowest in the consensus and 
corporatism cluster. Consensus democracy and corporatism have only a very weak 
lowering effect on infl ation. Lower infl ation can be found more in open economies.
GDP per capita/economic growth
All four clusters show an increase of GDP per capita (in constant Dollars), with the 
cluster of consensual and corporatist countries having highest increase of GDP 
per capita and lowest increase in the non-corporatist and non-consensus cluster. 
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Economic growth (annual change of real GDP) was highest in the non-corporatist 
and non-consensus cluster and lowest in the consensus and corporatist cluster. 
Economic growth peaked for all clusters in the period of 1965-1974.
 On the basis of bivariate correlations, consensus democracy is moderately 
connected to higher levels of GDP per capita after 1975, while no effect of 
corporatism is found. Consensus democracy and corporatism are not related to 
higher economic growth and consensus democracy has a moderate positive effect 
on GDP per capita.
Misery/Performance-index
Corporatism is associated with a lower degree of the misery index, but this effect 
disappears when controlled for other factors. Consensus democracies and 
corporatist countries are, not signifi cantly, positive related with the performance 
index until the 1990s. After around 1992, these positive effects disappeared. In all 
four clusters performance peaked in the fi rst (1965-74) and last period (1993-98). 
In between, consensus democracies and corporatist countries outperformed the 
other clusters. Multivariate regression shows no signifi cant impact of consensus 
democracy and corporatism on the performance index.
Social expenditures
Corporatism and to lesser extent consensus democracy are related to higher social 
expenditures and this effect increased over time. The positive effect of corporatism 
on social expenditures remains when controlled for other factors.
So far we can conclude that:
1) consensus democracy and corporatism do not function as confi gurations that 
can fully and directly account for levels and changes of performance. Elements of 
these institutions do matter in several cases, but not the entire concept of either 
consensus democracy or corporatism and not at the same time. The case analysis 
is carried out to fi nd out which specifi c institutional elements, including informal 
ones, are relevant for socio-economic policy and performance;
2) consensus democracy and corporatism have become less related through time 
to socio-economic performance. The case analysis must shed light on how and to 
what extent actors changed their strategies and infl uenced the working of formal 
and informal institutions;
3) performances differ across clusters, so the ‘critical case method’ can be used as 
a helpful  analytical tool.
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In what way do institutions matter?
Corporatist scholars assume that cooperation and consensus between trade unions 
and employers’ organisations may well lead to wage moderation as a trade-off for 
keeping social security rights. Wage moderation is expected to keep production 
costs low on the international market. This should lead to the creation of jobs and 
to employment. This stimulates economic growth and combined with low infl ation, 
caused by wage moderation, socio-economic performance can expected to be 
better in corporatist countries. On the cross-national level this appeared not to be 
true, how is it at the case level?
 The benefi t of consensus democracy is said to be a broadly supported 
government and absence of strong opposition undermining the political system. 
As a consequence macroeconomic policy can be more successful. The question 
arises whether the institutions of consensus democracy can be related to socio-
economic performance. Consensual institutions are primarily developed to secure 
the political system and possibly lead to better political performance.
 The case analysis focuses on mechanisms how corporatism and consensus 
democracy contribute to a different and possibly better socio-economic performance. 
The questions addressed in the analysis are: under what conditions do consensus 
corporatism and corporatism contribute to better performance and when do they 
not? In other words: when does it help and when does it not? If institutions are 
changed and adapted, what is the role of the actors in this process? In short, how 
can we link actors, preferences, institutions and performance?
 The theoretical framework of Chapter 1 (Section 1.6) is used as a guideline to 
analyse the four cases. It focuses on two phases, two levels and two arenas of 
socio-economic problem-solving. The two phases express the two sides of the link 
between actors, institutions and preferences. The two levels refer to the relations 
among voters, workers and fi rms at the lower level and among parties, governments 
and interest groups at the higher level. The two arenas are consensus democracy 
and corporatism.
 The four countries are analysed as comparative cases and not as case studies 
in the traditional sense. Not the cases are our central focus, but the extent to which 
the theoretical arguments and empirical fi ndings from the cross-national and cluster 
analysis can be confi rmed or rejected when focusing on the actors’ behaviour and 
adjustment of formal and informal institutions. Section 6.3 explains which four cases 
are selected.
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6.3 The method of selection
When examining the independent variables - consensus democracy and corporatism 
- four categories can be distinguished, as illustrated in Table 4.1 (in Chapter 4). 
The fi rst cluster consists of majoritarian and pluralist countries. The second cluster 
is a non-corporatist and non-consensus group of countries that do not belong to 
either the consensus vis-à-vis majoritarian democracies or to corporatism vis-à-vis 
pluralism. The third cluster consists of countries that belongs either to consensus 
democracy or corporatism. The fourth cluster consists of countries characterised by 
both consensus democracy and corporatism.
 Table 6.1 shows the changes in the misery index and performance indexes as 
discussed in Chapter 5. The fi rst number is the difference between the levels in 
the period 1975-84 and the period 1965-74. The second number is the difference 
between the levels of the period 1985-92 and period 1975-84 and the third between 
the period 1993-98 and the period 1985-92. Table 6.1 shows only the four selected 
cases. For other countries, see Table C.13 (Appendix C).
Table 6.1 Changes in misery and performance index 
change misery index change performance index
 Period
65-74/ 
75-84
75-84/ 
85-92
85-92/ 
93-98
65-74/ 
75-84
75-84/ 
85-92
85-92/ 
93-98
4) consensus and corporatist
Sweden 4.68 -3.22 2.24 -0.95 0.26 -0.07
Mean of cluster 4.95 -3.79 1.25 -1.09 0.40 -0.07
3) consensus or corporatist
Netherlands 5.13 -4.09 -0.34 -1.31 0.72 0.03
Mean of cluster 7.81 -2.16 -0.99 -1.43 0.30 -0.11
2) non-corporatist and non-consensus
Portugal 18.77 -12.06 -7.51 -2.91 1.60 0.33
Mean of cluster 11.27 -4.40 -3.03 -1.78 0.60 0.41
1) majoritarian and pluralist
New Zealand 9.24 -0.96 -5.62 -1.65 -0.12 1.26
Mean of cluster 8.34 -3.82 -3.51 -1.25 0.32 0.67
Sources: Tables C.10 & C.11 (Appendix C), own calculations.
Other countries see Table C.13 (Appendix C)
Between period 1 (1965-74) and 2 (1975-84) in the consensus and corporatist 
cluster the misery index increased less of all clusters and performance decreased 
less. Between period 2 (1975-84) and 3 (1985-92) the non-corporatist and non-
consensus democratic cluster saw strongest decrease of the misery index. Between 
period 3 (1985-92) and 4 (1993-98), the majoritarian and pluralist cluster showed 
the strongest increase of the performance index.
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 These four clusters show different institutional patterns with different effects on 
performance. One country is selected from each institutional cluster. The next step 
is determining which country to select from each cluster. Countries must have by 
and large the same development in misery and performance as the other countries 
in the cluster. The fi nal argument to select a country from a cluster is institutional 
change.
 Sweden has the smallest deviation from the general pattern within cluster 4. 
Sweden is an interesting case, because it served as a (neo-) corporatist model 
until the 1980s, before this model changed in the 1990s. Sweden is selected 
because of its change in corporatist institutions. Performance in the Netherlands 
resembles the average development in cluster 3. The Netherlands has shown the 
opposite pattern from that of Sweden. During the 1990s the performance of the 
Netherlands improved and there has been a debate whether or not the Netherlands 
was a miracle or model (Visser & Hemerijk 1997; Delsen 2000). Therefore, the 
Netherlands is selected for a further analysis. From cluster 2, Portugal (and also 
Ireland) have about the same changes as the cluster-average. Portugal is selected 
because of its obvious institutional change of the transition towards democracy 
in the 1970s and the consolidation of democracy during the 1980s. New Zealand 
resembles average development in cluster 1. New Zealand is interesting for its 
institutional change. The electoral system has changed from fi rst-past-the-post to 
mixed member proportional system. Hence, it has developed from the most ‘typical’ 
Westminster-model to a less majoritarian type of parliamentary democracy.
6.4 The four selected cases
Looking at these four cases, they have similarities as well as differences. First of 
all, these countries are comparatively small in terms of number of inhabitants. New 
Zealand is the smallest country, with 3.8 million inhabitants. The Netherlands is 
largest with 15.7 million inhabitants. Sweden, with 8.9 million, and Portugal, with 
10 million, are in between. In addition, given their size, they are dependent on the 
world market.
 Sweden has the highest scores on consensus democracy and corporatism, 
whereas New Zealand belonged most typically to majoritarian democracy and 
pluralism. Institutions in Sweden have been most stable. Portugal and New 
Zealand have experienced considerable institutional change. Formal institutions 
changed in the Netherlands in the system of corporatism, while change of Dutch 
consensus democracy was most apparent in the informal rules. It has moved away 
from consociationalism.
125
Selection of the cases
 For a long time, these countries lacked a strong independent central bank. The 
Netherlands and Sweden have medium independent central banks, while central 
bank independence in New Zealand and Portugal rank among the lowest of all twenty 
countries. Autonomy of New Zealand’s central bank increased by the Reserve Bank 
Act of 1989 (Kelsey 1995: 5). Since 1999 Portugal and the Netherlands participate 
in the Economic Monetary Union, while Sweden, although being an EU-member, did 
not join the EMU. New Zealand is obviously not a member of both organisations.
 These four countries are interesting because of institutional developments that 
took place. By the end of the 1960s, consensus democracy was declared dead in 
the Netherlands, because of changes in the political landscape and the increasing 
polarisation. After an initial decline of consensus democracy in the 1970s, it turned 
out later that many traditions and informal rules had survived. Not only consensus 
democracy, but also corporatism had changed. In the 1970s relations between 
social partners and government appeared to have worsened. In the beginning 
of the 1980s, the impact of the economic crisis was so strong, that these actors 
were willing to make agreements about wage moderation, the so-called social pact 
of Wassenaar (1982). Whether this can be considered a turning point in Dutch 
industrial relations is discussed in Chapter 7.
 Sweden has a long tradition of corporatism combined with a social democratic 
dominance in party government. Both factors lost their importance during the late 
1980s and 1990s. The social democratic party lost government control in 1991 and 
thus the system of social partnership lost its prominent position. Sweden and the 
Netherlands make an interesting comparison since they both have a large welfare 
state, yet both countries travelled different routes to achieve the same result (Social 
democratic and Christian Democratic). Moreover, their industrial relations went 
through a contrasting development. Sweden changed its type of corporatism, while 
the Netherlands embraced a renewed cooperation between social partners and 
government. Finally, these countries are used as contrasting cases with regard to 
their socio-economic performance during the 1980s.  For a long time the Swedish 
model of corporatism kept unemployment at a low level, while in the Netherlands 
the Dutch disease caused a combination of high unemployment, high welfare 
levels and high public debts. This appears to have been reversed in the 1990s, 
with worsening performance in Sweden and a ‘miracle’ of low unemployment in the 
Netherlands.
 During its transition to democracy, Portugal has tried to fi nd a way to cope with 
the relation between executive power and parliament and the way in which interest 
groups are involved in the political process. In the early years of the Salazar-
regime in the 1930s attempts were made to develop a corporatist structure. But this 
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structure was vertical and top-down. After the Second World War, the importance of 
these structures declined. Although Salazar’s successor Caetano tried to revitalise 
the corporatist structures, these have never been fully implemented (Magone 
1997:111). In the fi rst period after the 1974 revolution, the workers and employers 
were too far apart to be able to start a dialogue. From the mid-1980s, the fi rst neo-
corporatist structures were developed. Joining the EU has contributed signifi cantly 
to the socio-economic development of Portugal.
 New Zealand always represented the majoritarian-pluralist group of countries, 
but has some interesting deviating features. In the 1980s a radical neo-liberal 
policy was implemented and in the 1990s New Zealand’s welfare state underwent 
considerable reforms. The change of the electoral system was a second remarkable 
development. In the 1990s, the disproportional electoral system of single member 
districts was replaced by the mixed member proportional system. In many respects, 
New Zealand underwent political, institutional and policy changes. For this reason, 
New Zealand completes this set of four interesting cases, which have experienced 
institutional change in one way or another.
6.5 Conclusions
This chapter explains how four cases are selected for examination in more detail. 
They all belong to one category and they all experience change.The fi rst case 
analysis is the Netherlands, which has a strong tradition of consensus democracy 
and has some characteristics of corporatism. New Zealand is examined as a 
representative of the majoritarian and pluralist countries. Sweden has been strongly 
corporatist and has characteristics of consensus democracy. Portugal is taken as a 
representative from the cluster that does not belong to either side of the consensus 
versus majoritaritarian democracy and corporatism versus pluralism spectrum.
 The case analysis contains the following elements. First of all, the institutional 
framework as well as institutional change is described. Second, the relevant actors 
and their preferences are analysed as well as their behaviour in the institutional 
context. Third, these interrelations are discussed with regard to changes in 
performance. The main ingredients in the analysis are how preferences drive actor’s 
behaviour in changing institutions and performance and how – as a consequence 
– this affects their preference and power. In other words: how do actors cope with 
socio-economic problems and how do they manage to solve them. The framework of 
two phases of socio-economic problem-solving helps us to explain how institutions 
are shaped by actors to develop policies that contribute to better performance and 
how performance changes actors’ strategies to change institutions, either formal or 
informal.
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7 THE NETHERLANDS. FROM DISEASE TO MIRACLE?
7.1 Introduction
The Netherlands experienced some signifi cant changes both on the dependent 
(the institutional structure) and the independent variables (socio-economic 
performance) of this study. First, the Netherlands changed from a strong pillarised 
political structure with consociational devices to overarch societal cleavages to a 
more polarised political system. Second, the Netherlands had corporatist institutions 
that declined through time. After World War II, the Socio-Economic Council1 and the 
Foundation of Labour2 and several other formal institutions were called into being to 
organise relations between labour, capital and government. This formal system of 
consultation lost its importance gradually during the 1960s and 1970s. In the 1990s 
the Kok government limited the legal status of the Socio-Economic Council (Koole & 
Daalder 2002: 36; van Waarden 2002: 58-59). The 1982 pact of Wassenaar is seen 
as the cause for a revival of (neo-) corporatism in the Netherlands. This chapter 
argues that the increase of the importance of corporatism in the Netherlands since 
1982 is limited. Third, labour market and social policy drastically changed from 
the welfare without work situation of the 1980s to a combination of high labour 
participation, low unemployment and cutbacks in the welfare system in the 1990s3. 
The Netherlands showed a remarkable socio-economic improvement. This chapter 
argues that socio-economic recovery in the Netherlands is remarkable, but cannot 
be explained solely by the institutions of consensus democracy and corporatism.
 The Dutch case helps to understand how actors deal with existing formal rules, 
how these rules are adjusted and how additional informal rules are created in order 
to secure political stability. There is a distinction between the rules for use and the 
rules in use (Ostrom 1990). The formal rules determine how decisions are made. 
Actors have the opportunity to adjust these rules or to construct additional informal 
rules that change how formal rules transform individual preferences into collective 
decisions (see Chapter 1). In the Netherlands both the rules for use and the rules 
in use have changed.
 Since the 1960s, the consensual character of the Dutch system seemed to 
have declined. Mair (1994: 121) concludes that ‘the Netherlands no longer enjoys 
the status of a highly consensual democracy’. The second area of interest is the 
development of corporatism. After the introduction of strong corporatist institutions 
in a formal sense after World War II, the degree of corporatism declined in the 
1970s, but corporatist institutions did not disappear. This chapter analyses to what 
extent the rules of corporatism and consensus democracy have contributed to 
reform of the Dutch welfare state and the socio-economic success of the 1990s by 
focusing on the central actors.
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 The past decades, developments in the Dutch political economy received much 
attention (see Keman & Woldendorp 1985; Therborn 1986; Braun 1989; Hemerijck 
1994; Woldendorp 1995; Visser & Hemerijck 1997; Delsen 2000; Hemerijck, Unger 
& Visser 2000; Becker 2003). Therborn (1986) states there was a Dutch disease 
in the late 1970s and the 1980s. The Netherlands experienced a long period of 
welfare without work, indicating a large and generous welfare state combined with 
high levels of labour force inactivity. Although the number of people dependent on 
social benefi ts increased, the need to cut the welfare state was limited, because the 
increasing costs of social security were covered by natural gas benefi ts and economic 
growth (Hemerijck, Unger & Visser 2000: 213). In the 1990s the Netherlands saw 
strong economic growth, growth of employment of which a substantial part part-time 
employment, mainly among women, and a reduction of unemployment. Visser & 
Hemerijck (1997) raised the question whether a miracle had occurred. They argue 
that three policy changes explain recovery of the Dutch economy in the 1990s: wage 
moderation, reform of the welfare state and an active labour market policy. Despite 
the question whether or not there was anything miraculous about the changes, the 
signifi cance of the institutional and policy changes are undisputed. How did this 
Dutch metamorphosis come about?
7.2 Political system
The Dutch political-institutional structure can adequately be described in terms of 
consensus democracy and corporatism as used in this study. The pillarised structure 
of organisational life was restored after World War II. Although social democrats and 
others attempted to renew the Dutch party system, the denominational differences 
between parties continued to exist. During the post-war period attempts were made 
to restructure the system of policy concertation among organised interests. Formal 
consultation councils were founded to advise the Dutch government on socio-
economic issues. Until 1970 the Dutch government employed a restrictive income 
policy. Government, trade unions and employers’ organisations tried to prevent 
a return of the pre-war economic crisis by an active policy of wage moderation 
and planned economy. The combination of consociational devices and corporatist 
institutions existed until 1970 under the domination of Christian Democratic 
parties.
 During the 1960s both institutional patterns changed. In the 1960s coordinated 
wage moderation still existed, but became increasingly diffi cult to maintain, because 
of shortness of supply of labour due to large economic growth. Combined with 
the low workers’ organisation rate, wage pressure contributed to the disintegration 
of the corporatist system. Consociational institutional devices came under 
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pressure by the disappearing of traditional cleavages in society and the demand 
for democratisation and reform of the political system by new social movements. 
Consociational institutional practices, which were focused on overarching political, 
economic and social differences, were persistent. While the traditional divisions in 
society were fading away, institutions at the elite level appeared diffi cult to change. 
In the 1970s political parties on the left, such as the PvdA and Democrats 1966, tried 
to alter these institutions, but in coalition formation they still needed confessional 
parties of the political centre. Only in 1994 the confessional parties, since 1977 
fused in the Christian Democratic party CDA, were no longer part of the coalition 
government (see Table 7.2). The new, so-called ‘purple’ coalition4 wanted to reform 
the role of interest groups. The role of formal consultation platforms was strongly 
limited. Competition of actors and the negotiation system changed dramatically. 
The next sections show how consensus democracy and corporatism gradually lost 
importance in the Netherlands and discuss to what extent the 1990s saw a revival 
of corporatism.
 Following pluralist theory, the Netherlands as a political entity could not have 
existed (Dahl 1966). Between 1920 and 1970, Dutch society was strongly divided 
in social pillars. Along with that division the political parties represented the major 
subgroups – Catholics, Protestants, Social Democrats and Liberals. Divisions 
in society were refl ected in the political system that became potentially unstable 
and was likely to disintegrate by political confl icts. The fact that the Dutch political 
system was stable can be explained by a specifi c set of institutional arrangements, 
which were the rules in use. Lijphart (1968) proved that the pluralist thesis that 
a heterogeneous society cannot be combined with a stable political system was 
wrong. He showed how stability in Dutch politics could sustain.
 The pacifi cation of Dutch politics in 1917 was the start of the period of political 
accommodation that lasted until approximately 19675. Dutch accommodation can 
be understood as a transformation from confrontation to problem solving (Keman 
1999). From this perspective, a zero sum game changed into a positive sum game. 
New actors entered the arena. The rules of the game were adjusted to solve the 
game. Proportional redistribution was used as a leading principle. In order for these 
new rules to be applied party elites had to be unchallenged and in control of their 
own pillar. Apart from agreements made about several issues, the electoral system 
was also reformed. The move towards a proportional electoral system, which was 
consistent with the proportional redistribution principle, had its refl ection on the 
institutional setting. The Dutch case of accommodation shows that both rules in use 
and rules for use may change if and when preferences are revealed and recognised 
by all.
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 What were the rules in use? Society was strongly divided at mass level. Most 
people stayed within the confi nes of their own pillar. Pillars were ‘closed shops’ 
directed by their elites. Most people had only superfi cial contact with people who 
belonged to other pillars. People mostly voted for the political party of their own 
pillar. Opposed to the everyday life situation there were very frequent contacts at 
elite level. Constrained by institutional arrangements, political leaders had found a 
way to govern the country and to cooperate with each other, namely by segregation 
at the ‘bottom’ and conferences at the ‘top’ (Lijphart 1968). This was an elitist style 
of political decision-making. At mass level there was little infl uence. As a result, 
the pacifi cation led to a passive political structure based on divide et empira made 
possible by a shared rule of proportional distribution and ‘live and let live’. The 
stability of democracy was guaranteed by the elites’ behaviour, while the role of 
voters was limited. They were expected to vote according to cleavage lines and not 
to participate actively.
Table 7.1 Rules of Dutch politics
1917-67
Lijphart (1968)
1967-77
Daalder (1974)
1977-
Van Praag (1998)
Politics as business
Exposure of ‘establishment 
ideology’; critical view of society
Politics as business
Agreement to disagree Confl ict Agreement to disagree
Summit diplomacy Self-determination at the base Selective summit diplomacy
Proportionality Polarisation to win a majority Proportionality
Depoliticisation Politicisation Symbolic politicisation
Secrecy Open government Selective openness
The government’s right to 
govern with little inference 
from parliament
Critique of dominance of cabinet 
over parliament and the infl uence 
of bureaucrats
Coalition parties dominate 
opposition in parliament
Only shifts in government 
after elections
Prime Minister is selected by 
the largest coalition party
Sources: Andeweg & Irwin (2002: 41, Table 2.2); Lijphart (1968); Daalder (1974); Van Praag (1998).
During the accommodation, the political elites developed several informal rules on 
how to cooperate with one another (see Table 7.1). Lijphart (1968) reconstructed 
these rules of pacifi cation (Andeweg & Irwin 1993: 36). Business was the pivot of 
Dutch governance, not ideology. Politics was considered something to be taken 
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care of by professionals without emphasising ideological differences. Confl ict 
was to be avoided as much as possible. There was an agreement to disagree 
about certain ideological principles without attempting to convince other groups. 
Differences were to be respected. Most diffi cult and urgent political issues were 
resolved by summit diplomacy between elites. As a consequence people at mass 
level were neither involved in nor informed by the principle of secrecy between 
elites. Proportionality was used as a rule of redistribution for political power as well 
as public spending among the pillarised segments of society. There was a tendency 
to depoliticise ideology and disputed issues. Political problems were not discussed 
on a fundamental level but considered as technical issues. Finally, the government 
took the right to govern without parliamentary interference. Since governments are 
constrained by policy agreements and supported by a majority in parliament, it is 
very diffi cult for opposition parties to infl uence and adjust proposals from either 
government or coalition parties (Daalder 1987). This means that to some extent 
a ruling government operates in a majoritarian system fashion, because de facto 
coalition governments are more powerful than parliament is. High loyalty of the 
members of parliament of the governing parties to the policy agreement secures 
the coalition government of a majority support and thereby no opposition from the 
coalition parties. There was no constant coalition of parties with a majority vote in 
parliament, but until the 1994 Christian Democrats were the pivot players. The new 
coalition that was formed after an election did not necessarily have to be the same 
as before and was not solely based on the election result.6
 These additional informal rules were needed to prevent a deadlock in decision-
making. These informal rules seem to fi t the elitist character of the Dutch political 
system. When it gets tough, decisions are taken behind closed doors between the 
elites of the major political parties.
When the role of denominations declined during the 1960 and 1970s, 
consociationalism as a model started to fade. Although the urgency to overarch 
social, cultural and political cleavages had decreased substantially, the elites 
maintained to play a dominant role. More importantly, the rules for the politics of 
accommodation remained effective although some of them were adjusted (see 
Table 7.1).
 Between 1967 and 1977 parties on the left tried to create a majority in parliament 
to surpass the pivotal power of the confessional parties. The left did however never 
win a majority and the leftwing Den Uyl government (1973-77) still needed support 
from the confessional parties. For a short period the informal rules of the politics 
accommodation seemed to be replaced by rules that limited government dominance 
and increased the role for parliament and the participation of voters. After 1977 
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most of the old rules reappeared (see Table 7.1). The period between 1967 and 
1977 can be considered just a temporary change. After 1977, the political elites 
tried to act as much as possible the same as during the politics of accommodation. 
While at mass level voters and society changed, at elite level the political system 
hardly changed. The result was a system of depoliticised elitism.
 In Democracies in pluralist societies Lijphart (1977) formulated four basic 
principles of consociational democracy: executive power sharing or grand 
coalition, a high degree of autonomy for the segments, proportionality and minority 
veto. These principles were Lijphart’s guideline in constructing indicators for the 
consensus model of democracy (Lijphart 1984; 1999). Figure 7.1 shows the scores 
on the index of consensus democracy based on 5 indicators in the Netherlands 
between 1965 and 1998, as discussed in Chapter 2.
Figure 7.1 Development of index of consensus democracy through time, 1965-98
The index of consensus democracy in Figure 7.1 shows two peaks, one around 
the mid 1970s and one in 1982. The degree of consensus democracy increased 
slightly in the 1990s. The peaks in Figure 7.1 are mainly due to a high effective 
number of parties in the 1970s – until the creation of CDA - and the grand coalition 
in 1981. Both the Den Uyl government and Van Agt II government (see Table 7.2) 
cannot be labelled as consensual, because large ideological differences caused 
many internal confl icts. This shows that consensual institutions do not necessarily 
lead to consensus and cooperation between the actors. The lack of consensus and 
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cooperation in these governments can be seen as the reason of the reappearance 
of some of the old rules of the politics of accommodation after 1977. Attempts of left 
parties to reform the formal and informal rules of Dutch politics have failed.
 
Table 7.2 Coalition governments  in the Netherlands (1965-98)
Period Prime minister Parties Type of government  Parliamentary    
      support
1965-66 Cals KVP, PvdA, ARP surplus  71%
1966-67 Zijlstra KVP, ARP caretaker  42%
1967-71 De Jong KVP, ARP, CHU, VVD minimal winning  57%
1971-72 Biesheuvel I KVP, ARP, CHU, VVD, DS70 minimal winning  55%
1972-73 Biesheuvel II KVP, ARP, CHU, VVD caretaker  49%
1973-77 Den Uyl PvdA, KVP, ARP, D66, PPR surplus  65%
1977-81 Van Agt I CDA*, VVD minimal winning  51%
1981-82 Van Agt II CDA, PvdA, D66 surplus  73%  
1982-82 Van Agt III CDA, D66 caretaker  41%
1982-86 Lubbers I CDA, VVD minimal winning  54%
1986-89 Lubbers II CDA, VVD minimal winning  54%
1989-94 Lubbers III CDA, PvdA minimal winning  69%
1994-98 Kok I PvdA, VVD, D66 minimal winning  61%
1998-02 Kok II PvdA, VVD, D66 surplus  65%
Source: Woldendorp, Keman & Budge (2000).
Parliamentary support: proportion of seats in parliament occupied by the coalition parties.
 * CDA emerged from KVP, ARP, CHU
Since the 1960s the Dutch political landscape has changed. Public opinion 
changed, such as secularisation and class-consciousness, and subsequently 
voting behaviour changed. Dutch voters did not necessarily vote for the same party 
at every election. Higher voter volatility led to shifts between the traditional parties 
and enabled new political parties to gain seats in Dutch parliament. Three of them 
even have succeeded in participating in a government: DS707, PPR8 and D669 (see 
Table 7.2). Table 7.2 shows that most coalitions since 1965 were minimal winning. 
This indicates that grand coalitions lost importance since the 1960s. Altogether, 
changes in voting patterns and the shift towards minimal winning coalitions 
supported by a small majority, contributed to institutional change different from pure 
consensus democracy. Consensus democracy lost importance due to polarisation 
in politics and the rules in use changed. The Dutch political landscape has at least 
two dimensions: left versus right – which deal with socio-economic issues - and 
progressive versus conservative – concerning social norms and values - (Pennings 
& Keman 2003: 54). Dutch politics remains highly fragmented. When parties move 
on these ideological scales, rivalling parties are able to win votes. While Dutch 
134
The institutional dynamics of consensus and confl ict
politics is highly competitive in the seeking for votes, parties have to cooperate to 
form coalitions. The electoral arena is not always congruent with competition for 
coalition formation.
7.3 Organised interests
This section discusses the institutional structure of the interaction of interest groups. 
How do unions and employers’ organisations cooperate? The Dutch system of 
industrial relations is characterised by a weak organisational strength of workers 
and the presence of formal consultation and advisory bodies, although these have 
become less important through time.
 Dutch unions are weakly organised. The percentage of union members of the 
total workforce declined from around 40% in the 1960s to less than 30% in the 
1990s (Ebbinghaus & Visser 2000). The collective coverage rate, however, is 
rather high. Around 80% of the workforce is employed in a company or sector with 
a collective agreement. On top of the low union density comes the fact that unions 
are divided. The three federations are FNV, CNV, Unie-MHP (Ebbinghaus & Visser 
2000). The socialist NVV and Catholic NKV have merged in FNV, which now is the 
largest federation. The Protestant CNV is the second largest federation. Unie-MHP 
is the union of specialised and white-collar employees.
 Organisation rate among employers is much higher than among workers. 
Moreover employers’ organisations are more homogeneous and are not rooted in 
pillarised structures.  Almost all companies with over 100 employees are member of 
one of the employers’ associations (Visser 1998: 299). Employers’ associations are 
represented by the VNO-NCW, MKB (small business) and LTO (farmers). These 
organisations are divided functionally and not according to ideology or religion.
 After World War II, two important institutions were formed to facilitate talks 
between social partners and government about socio-economic issues: the Socio-
Economic Council and the Council of Labour (Delsen 2000: 14). The Foundation 
of Labour (STAR) was formed by unions and employers’ organisations. The Socio-
Economic Council (SER) is a permanent tripartite organisation which advises the 
government. For a long time the government was obliged to ask the SER advise 
about important socio-economic issues. Because of these formal institutions, 
social partners and government meet frequently. It has contributed to consensual 
and cooperative patterns of behaviour. Since the 1990s both councils have lost 
importance. The government is no longer obliged to consult with the SER, since 
1996.
 Collective agreements apply to union members and non-members alike. This 
takes away the workers’ incentive to join a trade union. The Ministry of Social Affairs 
and Employment is allowed to declare a collective agreement binding or not for an 
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entire sector. The last decade saw an increase of sector or fi rm level collective 
agreements. Moreover, sector or fi rm level collective agreements have become the 
starting point for further employee negotiations. Figure 7.2 shows the development 
of corporatism in the Netherlands during four time periods.
Figure 7.2 Development of corporatism in the Netherlands (1965-98)
In the fi rst period, 1965-74, corporatism was at its strongest in the Netherlands. 
Between 1975 and 1992, workers were less well-organised. Cooperation on the 
national level often failed. In these periods, there were few agreements made 
between unions and employers’ organisations. Consultation lost importance and 
wage bargaining was decentralised. This changed towards the1990s. Both unions 
and employers’ organisations realised that change was needed. Employers gave 
up resistance against reduction of working hours (Hemerijck, Unger & Visser 2000: 
221). Since 1989 PvdA participated in government and the unions were not able 
to obstruct reforms of social security. In the 1990s, formal consultation became 
weaker, such as the SER, and government dominated the socio-economic arena. 
Nevertheless, government involved interest groups in policy formation on an informal 
basis. Since formal structure became powerless, it was almost the only way for 
these groups to infl uence socio-economic policy-making by the government.
 Consensus democracy and corporatism show similar trends through time. Both 
types of institutions played an important role during the late 1960s and early 1970s, 
both their importance was reduced in the late 1970s and mid1980s. In the 1990s the 
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political arena, by means of the government, dominated the socio-economic arena. 
Formal corporatist structures became weaker, while interest groups remained their 
infl uence through informal intermediation.
7.4 Socio-economic policy and performance in the Netherlands
The argument that the institutions of corporatism and consensus democracy 
contribute to economic success is discussed in Chapter 5. There is no doubt that 
economic recovery in the Netherlands in the 1990s was remarkable. The crucial 
question is how did this happen and how does it relate to consensus democracy 
and corporatism.
Dutch disease
Since the 1970s economic growth declined and unemployment increased. 
Expenditures on social welfare had grown enormously. The economic situation has 
been characterised as a Dutch disease: revenues from natural gas were used to 
pay the increasing costs of social security (Andeweg & Irwin 2002: 186). The result 
was a combination of a large welfare state and low labour participation. 
 
Figure 7.3 Development of unemployment and infl ation rates in the Netherlands
Unemployment in the Netherlands saw an increase until 1982 and a decrease from 
1982 until 1992. In the early 1990s there was a small rise of unemployment, but 
during the last years unemployment dropped sharply to around 3%. The economic 
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deterioration of the 1970s – partly caused by two global oil crises - is clearly 
refl ected in the rise of unemployment. From 1982 on, offi cial unemployment fi gures 
decreased.
The Dutch miracle
Increasing unemployment in the late 1970s, early 1980s made it clear to political 
actors and interest groups that institutional and policy changes were in dire need. 
Leftist parties were excluded from government participation and the centre-right 
government was marked by inertia. In 1982, strong government pressure forced 
trade unions and employers’ organisations to sign an agreement about working 
time reduction and wage moderation.
 The pact of Wassenaar that was signed in 1982 agreed on ‘the suspension of 
price compensation in order to facilitate negotiations over job redistribution and 
working hours reduction’ (Visser & Hemerijck 1997: 101). Later early retirement 
schemes were introduced to stimulate exit of older workers. This agreement 
contributed to a decline of labour’s share in the national income from 74.2% in the 
1970s to 65.8% in the 1990s (Hemerijck, Unger & Visser 2000: 185, table 5.4). 
The miracle-story explains policy change by agreements between the government, 
trade unions and employers’ organisations. By consulting interest groups, the 
government found support for wage moderation, reform of the welfare state and 
the implementation of active labour market policy. As a result, wage costs relatively 
decreased, social expenditures decreased and labour participation increased.
From disease to miracle?
Is there a miracle and how can the miracle be explained? Some critical comments 
can be made about this (at fi rst glance) remarkable recovery. First of all, 
unemployment rates are extremely sensitive to the defi nition of who is unemployed. 
In the Netherlands, the defi nition of unemployment was often adjusted. The 
current defi nition of unemployment includes those people who are registered at 
the employment and social benefi t agency (CWI), who are looking for a job, are 
immediately available for a job of at least 12 hours a week and have no job of less 
than 12 hours a week (CBS 2003: 2). This defi nition excludes several groups that 
are not participating at the labour market, but among which are people who actually 
would like to have a job or are even actively looking for one. Until the age of 21, 
no one is counted as unemployed. Young people are either studying or working 
or they participate in an employment programme. People, working less than 12 
hours a week, but who are actively seeking work for more than 12 hours are not 
counted either. Those who are not entitled to receive unemployment benefi ts, but 
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are actively seeking work are not counted. A large group that is not counted as 
unemployed are those receiving disability benefi ts.10 Registered unemployment11 is 
much lower than the broad unemployment, which includes those who are entitled 
on social benefi ts (see Figure 7.4). Registered unemployment decreased to 3.2% 
in 1999, while broad unemployment was still 19.1%, almost as high as twenty years 
before.
Figure 7.4 Registered and broad unemployment for selected years
Source: SCP (2000: 284, table 9.3).
There is still an enormous amount of inactive people in the Netherlands even though 
unemployment seemingly decreased. More than 900 thousand people are receiving 
a disability benefi t. Many former workers were entitled to these disability benefi ts, 
which were higher than unemployment benefi ts. This means that the actual number 
of unemployed people in the Netherlands is underestimated (Hemerijck 1994: 25). 
The fact that the number of unemployed people probably exceeds offi cial fi gures 
leaves the increase of employment undisputed. It must be added, however, that 
a large part of this increase of employment was realised in part-time jobs. Most 
of the part-time jobs are occupied by women. The fl exibilisation of labour and the 
increase of part-time jobs stimulated the entrance of women in the labour market. 
Total labour participation rate, which was comparatively low in the Netherlands, 
increased.
139
The Netherlands
 The pattern of the Dutch infl ation rate seems opposite to that of unemployment. 
Infl ation made a free fall that lasted from the 1970s until the end of the 1980s. The 
1990s saw an increase of infl ation (see Figure 7.3).
 To what extent are institutional variables accountable for these developments? 
How does the Netherlands perform compared to other countries? To visualise 
this, the mean scores on unemployment and infl ation of nineteen countries are 
calculated. Figure 7.5 shows the difference between these means and the levels 
of unemployment and infl ation in the Netherlands (in percent points). A zero score 
means that the level in the Netherlands is equal to the mean, positive scores 
indicate above average levels and negative scores indicate below average levels.
Figure 7.5 Difference between the levels in the Netherlands and the means for 
nineteen countries
This fi gure shows that the unemployment rates in the Netherlands fl uctuated around 
average until 1980. During the early 1980s the unemployment rate was comparable 
to that of other countries. Since the late 1980s the offi cial unemployment rate in the 
Netherlands has decreased to below average. Infl ation was about the same as 
average – apart from some positive and negative peaks - until the early 1970s. 
From the mid1970s until 1990, infl ation was below average. Especially from 1977 to 
1990 infl ation was considerably lower than in other countries. In the 1990s infl ation 
increased to an average level. Figure 7.5 demonstrates that the Netherlands 
performed worse in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Since the early 1970s either 
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infl ation or unemployment was lower than average, but never both simultaneously. 
Hence, all actors shared the idea that low infl ation and unemployment was good, 
as long as it is not at the expense of welfare.
7.5 Actors, institutions and socio-economic performance
Both institutions and performance in the Netherlands have changed. The importance 
of consensus democracy in the Netherlands declined, but most of the informal 
rules did not disappear. The structure of Dutch corporatism changed several 
times; formal and informal consultation and social pacts have changed, but did not 
disappear entirely (Hemerijck 1994). The Netherlands experienced a deep socio-
economic crisis that was successfully reversed. The period of successful socio-
economic policy is not marked by a higher degree of corporatism and consensus 
democracy. Actors did not achieve better performance through institutional change. 
The opposite causal relation seems more plausible. Changing socio-economic 
conditions changed preferences and power positions of actor and forced actors 
to adjust institutions. There is no pattern of increasing importance of consensus 
democracy and corporatism that has turned the Dutch disease into a miracle.
Actors
The Dutch party system is tri-polar, consisting of Christian Democrats, social 
democrats and liberals. Coalition governments consist of two or three parties 
representing these ideologies, in several cases other parties were added. The 
PvdA was traditionally connected to workers and trade unions, but the party lost 
a part of its traditional voters. In the neo-liberal 1980s the PvdA did not succeed 
in gaining coalition power and it became isolated. According to Kitschelt (1999: 
338) this made ‘the PvdA abandon its leftist course in favour of centrist appeals’. 
Like other European social democratic parties in the 1990s the PvdA adjusted its 
political programme by weakening its socialist roots. The new ideological road 
with neo-liberal infl uences is also known as the third way (Green-Pedersen & van 
Kersbergen 2002).
 CDA and its three predecessor parties also lost much of its traditional support. 
To attract voters CDA was created on the basis of a Christian Democratic ideology 
that ‘has been open both to different denominations and to secular infl uences’ (Van 
Kersbergen 1999: 352). By adopting a strategy of politics of the centre CDA was 
able to attract non-religious voters. Conservative liberal VVD grew strongly and 
were in every coalition since 1977, except for the Lubbers-Kok government (1989-
1994).
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 FNV and CNV, already comparatively weak unions, lost many members through 
time. There are several reasons for this decline. First, there is no direct advantage 
for being a union member in the Netherlands since many collective agreements 
are also effective for non-members12. Second, in the 1980s the registered number 
of unemployed increased to about 10%. Third, there is general trend of decline 
of the traditional division of labour; workers became more fl exible and switched 
more easily from one sector to another. For this reason employees could no longer 
identify with a certain group and as a result solidarity between workers declined. 
Fourth, the number of blue-collar workers declined and most employment was 
found in the service sector. Workers in the service sector are less likely to join a 
union. Fifth, the number of part-time and temporary jobs increased sharply.
 Employers’ organisations have always been well-organised. Since the 1980s 
employers have stressed that the proportion of wage costs must decrease and the 
proportion of profi t increase. For this reason fi rms supported wage moderation and 
cuts in social security contribution. Wage fl exibility, reduction of working week (pact 
of Wassenaar) and early retirement schemes were not only used for job growth, 
but many fi rms replaced jobs by machines and computers. This also helped to 
decrease the wage costs as proportion of total costs. In the 1980s, conservative 
and neo-liberal governments were supportive to fi rms at the cost of workers.
Institutions
How must the consensual character of the Dutch political system and the system of 
industrial relations be assessed? As is shown in Chapters 2 and 3, the Netherlands 
is a consensus democracy from a comparative perspective, but not very strong 
on corporatism, i.e. taken as bi-partite rather than tri-partite. In the 1970s and 
1980s, centralisation and coordination of wage bargaining was moderate. The 
organisation of the work force in the Netherlands is rather weak. In the 1980s, 
employers’ organisations were stronger and the centre-right government led by 
Lubbers pushed an agreement between workers and employers’ organisations. 
Trade unions could choose between withdrawing from negotiations or trying to stay 
involved. Because unions were relatively weak, they had no other option than to 
continue to participate in consultation, even if the platform was almost powerless. 
In the early 1980s for instance, public sector unions tried to prevent a 3% decrease 
of nominal salaries. There was a period of strikes by civil servants, however with 
very little success. The government, in this case also operating as employer, could 
easily ignore the demands of the public sector unions (Hemerijck, Unger & Visser 
2000: 216). This illustrates that industrial relations in the Netherlands cannot be 
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characterised by a nation-wide coordination of socio-economic policy where unions 
and employers are equal partners. The political tradition of consensus building 
gives interest groups access and input to decision-making and policy-making. This 
does not mean that they have a very strong input. Involvement of interest groups 
is rather instrumental and symbolic. There is still a hierarchy in which the political 
arena and the government are on top. The institutional structure of consultation 
and social pacts never disappeared, but in the 1980s its relevance appeared to 
decline.
 In the Netherlands the consensual character of the political system is linked to 
the system of industrial relations. The level of corporatism has changed through 
time, from highly institutionalised consultation in the post-war period to polarisation 
and confl ict in the late 1970s/ early 1980s and a moderate return of bi-partite 
consultation in the 1990s. Hemerijck (1994: 25-26) argues that in the late 1970s 
and early 1980s, neo-corporatism in the Netherlands failed to stimulate growth of 
employment. There was a polarisation between two coalitions of political actors 
and organised interests in the 1980s. On the one hand there was a coalition of 
confessional and neo-liberal political parties, the centre-right Lubbers government 
and employers. And on the other hand there was a neo-Keynesian coalition of 
trade unions and the PvdA. At that time, there was no national consensus on socio-
economic policy. This changed in the 1990s, when the major three political parties 
agreed largely that government budget must be in balance and they acknowledged 
the need of social security reform. Moreover, many public tasks were privatised, but 
the government remained the main director of economic policy.
 In the 1990s, ideological differences between the major parties were small. 
The political game had changed. There was not a political struggle about ideology, 
but parties operated carefully at the ideological dimensions to maximise electoral 
support.
7.6 Socio-economic problem-solving
The underlying hypothesis investigated in this study is that the institutions of 
consensus democracy and corporatism contribute to better socio-economic 
performance. In the Dutch case signifi cant improvement of performance was 
not caused by increasing consensus democracy and corporatism. There are 
contradicting viewpoints on the developments in the Netherlands. The miracle-
story wants us to believe that ‘the pact of Wassenaar’ was a breakpoint in Dutch 
industrial relations which paid off some fi fteen years later in high employment rates 
and some drastic welfare state reforms (Visser & Hemerijck 1997). The Wassenaar 
agreement was made in order to create more jobs. Three days before this pact was 
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made, the central government threatened to intervene in the wages. The question 
arises whether or not the social partners agreed voluntarily and out of their own 
interest. They probably realised that they had no other option than to comply with 
the government proposals. There was no corporatist strategy developed.  Moreover, 
wage moderation did not start in 1982, but before that, in the late 1970s (Delsen 
2000: 26). The ‘pact of Wassenaar’ was rather symbolic than a policy change. 
Becker (2003) argues that the Dutch miracle is a myth and that ‘wage restraint 
has not been the main cause of the impressive increase in employment in the 
Netherlands’ (Becker 2003: 173).
 The strategy of the purple coalition was not to increase, but to limit the formal 
infl uence of interest groups. Koole & Daalder (2002: 36) fi nd that ‘one of the goals 
of the purple coalition in 1994 was to reduce the infl uence of neo-corporatist 
arrangements’. Therefore it cannot be concluded that in the 1990s the government 
used a neo-corporatist strategy to stimulate economic growth and employment. 
The qualifi cation that is more adequate is that the government took over control at 
the cost of interest groups and this increasing power was used to implement a neo-
liberal policy and an active labour market policy. From a comparative perspective 
consultation of interest groups was still stronger than in other countries, but through 
time consultation became less present. Government plays an independent role 
and determines the rules of operation. There is no interaction between consensus 
democracy and corporatism as equally important arenas. Government, of the 
political arena, has dominated the socio-economic arena in which interest groups 
operate.
 To what extent did the institutions of consensus democracy and corporatism 
contribute to the Dutch miracle? During the worst economic period in the 
Netherlands – in the late 1970s and early 1980s – many aspects of the consensual 
traditions were on the decline. In both the 1980s and the 1990s, the main struggle 
of the government was to fi nd support for their attempts to improve socio-economic 
conditions by reforming the welfare state and cutting down on government 
expenditures. Until well into the 1990s unions strongly resisted a social security 
system reform. Since the PvdA participated in the governing coalition in 1989, the 
welfare state was reformed one step at a time. The participation of social democrats 
in this government removed potential resistance to some extent. This resembles 
the idea that  ‘only Nixon could go to China’ (Shepsle & Bonchek 1997: 395-397). 
Still, PvdA, like CDA, lost many members and voters in the early 1990s because of 
the reform of the welfare state.
 The purple coalition made a difference: no Christian Democrats in the centre with 
either liberals or social democrats, but a coalition of liberals and social democrats. 
Ideas were adopted from the third way, such as active labour market policy and 
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new public management. The purple coalition was a combination of left and right 
parties in government, which was unprecedented, and at the same time capital 
and labour were represented in the SER. Hence, another game could be played, 
because of the coalition of social democrats and liberals. The workers and social 
democratic voters were not able to obstruct reforms of public policy.
 The explaining factor of the policy change is not the cooperation and consensus 
between political actors and interest groups, but government dominance. Visser & 
Hemerijck (1997: 110) understand this as a shadow of hierarchy. Since the return of 
the PvdA to government, the degree of consensus and cooperation in Dutch politics 
that is responsible for policy change has been at an all-time high. The collapse 
of Christian Democratic hegemony was followed by a continuing empowering of 
the government at the cost of infl uence of workers’ and employers’ organisations. 
The real Dutch miracle apparently is the restoration of the political control of the 
government without a political legitimacy crisis. The Dutch case shows that a crisis 
can change both actors’ behaviour and institutional structure. But this does not 
necessarily lead to improved economic performance.
 How can this miraculous socio-economic performance be explained? Wage 
costs as share of total costs decreased by wage moderation and fl exible and part-
time jobs increased. This confi guration made it possible for the Netherlands to profi t 
from global economic growth in the 1990s. There was a large labour reserve of 
women and inactive people that were stimulated to work. These potential workers 
could immediately do the work that was needed by the economic growth. This lasted 
until a shortness of labour supply grew in the late 1990s. Wages increased again 
and there was discontent about welfare and social policy, particularly education 
and health care. A new economic crisis will show the capacity of the institutional 
structure to turn it in another miracle.
International context
The international dimension is relevant in explaining socio-economic development. 
Due to the openness of the Dutch economy international developments have a 
strong impact on domestic economic growth. And despite the high level of welfare 
provisions and a high tax burden, wage costs have to be internationally competitive. 
The 1970s oil crises demonstrated the vulnerability of the Dutch economy. Incomes 
policy had always been crucial in the attempts to stimulate demand and to increase 
employment. In the 1970s, Den Uyl’s centre-left government tried to stimulate 
economic growth by public investments and increasing purchasing power, whereas 
van Agt’s and Lubbers’ centre-right governments wanted to diminish the tax burden 
by cutting down on government expenditures. Notwithstanding these attempts, 
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public spending remained high until the 1990s. This can be explained by the 
incremental character of the policy-making process, the resistance against reform 
and by the fact that making drastic changes simply is politically dangerous (Braun 
1989). Parties proposing or implementing such a policy have the chance of losing 
many votes, as was clear in 1994 when CDA lost many votes.
 The international context has always been an important constraint of incomes 
policy. In the 1970s many attempts for national agreements failed but in 1982 a new 
accord was negotiated. The crisis clearly changed the actors’ behaviour along with 
their willingness to cooperate, although this did not result in an obvious signifi cant 
improvement. This is not necessarily problematic; it may even have fi tted the 
expectations of these actors. In fact, it is in part the nature of the game. Corporatist 
agreements are developed to receive benefi ts. In 1982, actors were – to some 
extent – prepared to look beyond their own short-term interest. At that moment it 
was unclear what the long-term pay-off was going to be. The seriousness of the 
economic crisis forced the weakened trade unions to accept wage moderation.
 
7.7 Conclusions
This chapter has analysed the Dutch political system and its industrial relations. In 
the 1990s, the Netherlands received international attention for its successful labour 
market policy and its welfare state reform. Combined with the Dutch tradition of a 
consensual political system, it has been argued that in the 1990s in the Netherlands 
a typical institutional framework of corporatism and consensus democracy allowed 
drastic policy reform. The performance indicators of the Netherlands in the late 
1990s are indeed remarkable. Unemployment dwindled to one of the lowest rates 
in Europe, growth rates were among the highest and infl ation was acceptably 
low for a long time. Visser & Hemerijck (1997) were right in qualifying the Dutch 
developments as remarkable. These developments were unique to one country 
at a given period in time. It is not a universal model that can be applied in other 
countries, as is the case with the 1970s Swedish model (Esping-Andersen 1985).
 The Dutch political system has often been characterised by its degree of 
consensus democracy and corporatism. Moreover, it has been suggested that 
there is a direct connection between the consultation economy and the open 
character of the political system. According to the measurement in this study, the 
degree of consensus democracy and corporatism is not as high as is often thought. 
Most characterisations of the Dutch political system are based on the period of 
the heydays of pillarisation and accommodation. But since the 1960s the political 
landscape has undergone serious changes. The Netherlands moved away from a 
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typical consociational model towards a more mainstream consensus democracy. 
And since the 1970s and 1980s were characterised by social and political confl icts 
and strikes, corporatism was certainly not that strong anymore.
 The consensual political system in the Netherlands prevented a legitimacy 
crisis. Despite a severe economic crisis in the 1980s, political and socio-economic 
actors remained to be involved in the decision-making and policy-making process. 
Due to the weakness of trade unions, central government was able to take over 
control over macro-economic management. Interest groups had no effective power 
or veto. The Dutch miracle was not based on voluntary cooperation of political and 
socio-economic actors. The consensual character of the political system masked 
the weakness of the interest groups.
 Increasing employment and economic growth in the 1990s can not be explained 
by an increasing importance of consensual and corporatist institutions. Other 
factors were more important, such as entrance of women to the labour market, 
fl exibilisation of contracts and social security reform. The ‘Dutch miracle story’ 
explains these changes by the consensual character of Dutch industrial relations. 
However, these policy changes were only possible by the weakened position of 
trade unions. They were powerless to obstruct these reforms. A next economic 
crisis must prove the resilience of Dutch political-economic institutions. It will be 
very diffi cult to keep employment high and the social security system at its current 
level.
Notes
1 Sociaal-Economische Raad (SER).
2 Stichting van de Arbeid (Star).
3 For recent data about the welfare state see Castles (2002).
4 This coalition was formed by social democrats PvdA, social liberals D66 and conservative liberals 
VVD and for the fi rst time without CDA.
5 In the elections of 1967 new political parties won several seats at the cost of the traditional parties 
(see Table B.2, Appendix B).
6 A striking feature of Dutch coalitions is the lack of causality between election results and government 
coalitions formed. In 1977, for instance, the PvdA was a clear winner, receiving most votes and being 
the largest party in parliament, but it did not manage to participate in the next government. The result 
is that voters have limited power to change government composition and its policy.
7 A conservative social democratic splinter of the Labour party.
8 Leftwing religious party.
9 Liberal democrats, strongly focused on institutional reform, such as introduction of referendums and 
election of the Prime Minister.
10 In 1998, more than 900 thousand people (almost 13% of the total labour force) received a disability 
benefi t WAO/WAZ (SCP 2000: 337, table 10.2).
11 This is not exactly the same as standardised unemployment by the defi nition of the OECD.
12 In 1994 coverage rate is 81% against a trade union density of 26%.
147
New Zealand
8 NEW ZEALAND: REVOLUTION AND EXPERIMENT
8.1 Introduction
New Zealand is selected as a case that originally belonged to the cluster of 
majoritarian and pluralist countries. During the late 1970s and the 1980s New 
Zealand experienced a long period of deteriorating socio-economic performance. 
New Zealand is an interesting case because of two institutional developments. First, 
the political system changed when in the 1996 the fi rst-past-the-post system (FPTP) 
was replaced by the mixed-member-proportional system (MMP), which increased 
the proportionality of the electoral system and the (effective) number of parties in 
parliament and introduced coalition governments. Second, wage bargaining was 
strongly decentralised since the 1980s.
 In 1984 New Zealand changed its socio-economic policy and in the 1990s the 
welfare state underwent drastic reforms. The reform of the welfare state in New 
Zealand was by comparative standards quite radical (Pierson 2001: 434). Until 
the 1980s, New Zealand had a highly regulated welfare state (Davidson 1989: 1-
2). New Zealand, like Australia, developed a welfare state before that of Western 
European countries. Castles (1985: 45) observes that ‘both Australia and New 
Zealand were social policy innovators in the early period and converged to become 
welfare state laggards in the most recent past’. In New Zealand the welfare state 
was restructured and socio-economic policy was changed considerably. In 1984 
the labour government implemented a neo-liberal socio-economic policy to reverse 
the problems caused by oil crises and the declining export to the UK due to the 
UK’s European Community membership of 1973. Remarkable from an ideological 
point of view, is that this change to a neo-liberal economic policy was induced by a 
labour government (Buchanan & Nicholls 2002: 20).
 Radical policy measures were possible in New Zealand because of the 
majoritarian system of democracy – an even more pronounced system than the UK 
had (Lijphart 1984). In the majoritarian type of democracy, one political party has 
strong control of the political arena and meets little opposition. Until the electoral 
reform of 1996, all governments had been single-party governments for the fi rst-
past-the-post electoral formula results in one governing party with a majority of 
seats in parliament. The majoritarian character of New Zealand’s political system 
gives voters a clear-cut choice. The party receiving the largest number of seats 
is capable of executing its political programme on its own. The electoral reform is 
highly remarkable, because usually most attempts to reform an electoral system 
fail (Nagel 1994). This chapter focuses on the shift away from majoritarianism, the 
changing structure of policy concertation among organised interests and the reform 
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of socio-economic policy in the 1980s and 1990s. This chapter aims to show that 
in New Zealand actors changed institutions in order to improve socio-economic 
performance. These changing institutions however did not lead to more successful 
socio-economic policy and better performance.
8.2 Political system and party government
Although known as majoritarian democracy New Zealand’s political system has 
also consensual characteristics. The Maori minority has a secured representation 
in parliament. And after a long time of allocating the seats in parliament by the 
fi rst-past-the-post system, it was decided by the 1993 referendum to replace this 
electoral formula by a more proportional one. The 1996 elections were the fi rst 
without the plurality rule of single seat constituencies; instead the mixed member 
proportional system – adopted from the German political system – was used. 
Hence, consensus democracy was enhanced.
 In many other respects New Zealand still has majoritarian elements from the 
UK. First of all, there is no written constitution in the form of a document like the US 
constitution that is protected by a Supreme Court. The New Zealand government 
is sovereign, meaning that it cannot be overruled by a constitution and a Supreme 
Court. This does not mean that New Zealand does not have constitutional laws or 
written down conventions (Mulgan 1994: 51). An important document, which plays 
a central function in New Zealand’s political system, is the 1840 Treaty of Waitangi. 
This treaty marks the founding of New Zealand as a British colony. This treaty was 
signed by Maori tribal chiefs who pledged allegiance to the British Crown. From that 
time, New Zealand was ruled by a Governor. In 1852 a House of Representatives 
was established to counterbalance the Governor’s power. In 1893 all adults, male 
and female, became eligible to vote. New Zealand was one of the fi rst countries in 
the world to introduce universal suffrage. In 1947 New Zealand became offi cially 
independent, although the Queen of England has remained head of state.
 In New Zealand constitutional political power is dispersed over the Sovereign, the 
Executive, the Legislature and the Judiciary (Mulgan 1994: 53). In reality however, 
more power is concentrated in the hands of the Prime Minister and his cabinet of 
ministers than is laid down legally. The executive consists of the ministers, who 
must be elected Members of Parliament. The Prime Minister – offi cially primus inter 
pares – is the political leader of the government and at the same time leader of the 
major political party in parliament. The position of the Prime Minister is very strong. 
She appoints the ministers of the cabinet and is leader of the party. There is no 
strong division between legislative and executive power, since all ministers are also 
members of parliament. The real dichotomy exists between the ruling party and 
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the opposition. A fi nal characteristic that Lijphart (1984) perceived as majoritarian 
is a unicameral parliament. The power of the House of Representatives is not 
counterbalanced by a second chamber or senate. The majoritarian character of 
New Zealand’s system can be summarised by a dominant Prime Minister who is 
political leader of the single government party in a unicameral parliament, where 
two parties hold most of the seats. Moreover, the New Zealand government is 
strongly centralised. Is New Zealand still such a strong case of the Westminster 
model of democracy, or has it moved more towards the consensus side of the 
spectrum? A major indication for this is the change to a more proportional electoral 
system.
 Electoral reform in 1996, where MMP replaced FPTP, changed the political 
institutions. Why has this system of MMP been implemented in New Zealand 
politics? Since the 1950s the number of absolute votes for the two main parties has 
been on the decline. Voter turnout declined in this period too (Vowles 1995: 97). 
In 1978, the National Party received 39.8 % of the votes, which translated into 51 
seats – 55.4% of the total number of seats, while Labour received only 40 seats 
– which is 43.5% - and 40.4% of the votes. The result of the 1978 election led to a 
discussion about electoral reform in New Zealand. In 1981 the Labour party again 
received more votes, but less seats than the National party. In the 1978 and 1981 
elections, the Social Credit Party received respectively 16.1 and 20.7 % of the 
votes and a mere 1 and 2 seats.
 In the early 1980s, the Labour party was frustrated because it remained in 
opposition, while being the party with the largest share of the popular vote. In the 
1984 political programme, the Labour party announced to investigate the need for 
electoral reform, when it would be in power. The main problem for electoral reform 
is that parties favouring reform are most usually in opposition and parties in power 
have in most instances no incentive to support electoral reform. Once the parties 
that in their original disposition support reform are in power, they have no interest 
anymore to stick to electoral reform. (Nagel 1994: 525) speaks of ‘a virtual iron law 
of political self-preservation’.
 Nevertheless, in 1984 Labour government appointed a Royal Commission on 
the Electoral System (RCES). The commission evaluated several electoral systems 
and recommended the introduction of the MMP. The commission instigated on 
organising a binding referendum after the 1987 elections. Labour Prime Minister 
Lange wanted to organise a referendum1, but most members of the Labour party 
actually wanted only modest electoral reforms (Nagel 1994: 526). Because of these 
internal disputes in the Labour Party no referendum was held (Boston et al 1996: 
20-21). The National Party advocated electoral reform to gain electoral support and 
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to illustrate the unwillingness of the Labour Party for electoral reform. Afraid of losing 
votes, Labour advocated electoral reform as well. The result was a chicken game2 
between the National Party and Labour. The two parties converged to support of 
electoral reform, while their actual preference was against reform (Ahmed 1999: 
14). In the case of New Zealand, it could have been electoral too costly for both 
parties not to support electoral reform.
 When after the 1990 elections, the National Party took over political power from 
the Labour party they did not give voters a binding choice between MMP en FPTP. 
To prevent electoral reform the leaders of the National Party decided to organise 
two referenda. They hoped that because of the complexity of the referenda voters 
would in the end prefer the status quo (Nagel 1994: 526).
 In September 1992 an indicative referendum was organised asking two 
questions to the voters: (1) ‘Do you want a change of the electoral system’ and (2) 
‘Which of the following alternative voting systems do you prefer: supplementary 
member system, single transferable vote, MMP or preferential voting system’. 
84.7% of the participating voters choose for a change to the voting system (Boston 
et al 1996: 21). The MMP received 70.5% of the votes over three other alternatives: 
supplementary member system, single transferable vote system and preferential 
voting system. Boston et al (1996: 22) argue that this landslide majority support for 
electoral reform can be explained by anti-government feelings among voters. They 
had undergone eight years of drastic policy reforms and welfare cuts, without seeing 
any improvement of the macro-economic performance. Nagel (1994: 527) believes 
that it would be too easy to conclude that New Zealanders voted for electoral 
reform because of economic discontent. Voters were more dissatisfi ed with the 
way politicians enacted economic liberalisation than with policy itself. Nevertheless 
Nagel (1994: 527) believes that the methods used by the politicians ‘fundamentally 
disturbed the political culture and drastically weakened New Zealanders’ confi dence 
in their country’s political institutions’. In the binding referendum held on November 
1993 a majority of 53.9% of the votes preferred the MMP to the FPTP3 (Boston et 
al 1996: 23).
 The House of Representatives is the key institution of democratic accountability 
since it is the only institution of the state whose members are directly chosen 
by the people (Mulgan 1994: 93). Since 1996, the House of Representative has 
been elected according to the MMP-rule. The voters cast two votes: one vote on 
a candidate in their constituency and one vote on the national party lists. The total 
number of seats in parliament was increased from 99 to 120. A total of 60 seats 
are allocated by the FPTP-rule, the other 60 seats are allocated by the MMP-rule. 
After electing a MP for their own constituency, a voter chooses a party form a list of 
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parties. A party only gets seats if it wins in at least one constituency or if it receives 
at least 5% of the votes4.
 What were the effects of the change of electoral rule in New Zealand on 
people’s voting behaviour and the composition of parliament? Figures B.3 and 
B.4 (in Appendix B) show the distribution of respectively votes and seats over the 
political parties. Figure B.3 shows that at least until the mid1970s the two main 
parties received about 90% of all votes. After this period, this proportion declined, 
with a 62% all-time low in 1996. It is clear that in the last ten years, the main parties 
have to share a large proportion of the votes with the small parties. This is not only 
a matter of a changing voters’ preference. The introduction of a more proportional 
electoral system made it rewarding to vote for smaller parties. A vote on a small 
party was no longer a lost vote. When the FPTP system was still in use, small 
parties - such as the Social Credit Party and the New Zealand Party – sometimes 
received many votes, but only for one or two elections. Voters realised that their 
electoral signals were not transformed into political power.
 Figure B.4 illustrates clearly the change of the party system. Until 1993 only 
two parties played a role in New Zealand’s parliament. In 1996 and 1999 the 
composition of parliament was much more diverse. Moving to the MMP system 
resulted without doubt in reducing the parliamentary power of the two main parties 
and a fundamental increase of the parliamentary presence of the small parties.
 An indicator of the fragmentation of the electoral and parliamentary distribution 
of votes and seats is the effective number of parties. Until 1996, there was a 
discrepancy between the electoral and the parliamentary number of parties. 
Since 1996 the difference between these indicators has become smaller and thus 
disproportionality decreased sharply.
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Table 8.1 Composition of governments in New Zealand (1963-99)
Period Prime Minister Type of government Parties
Parliamentary 
support
1963-66 Holyoake single party government NP 54%
1966-69 Holyoake single party government NP 52%
1969-72 Holyoake single party government NP 52%
1972-72 Marshall single party government NP 52%
1972-74 Kirk single party government Labour 63%
1974-75 Rowling single party government Labour 60%
1975-78 Muldoon single party government NP 60%
1978-81 Muldoon single party government NP 54%
1981-84 Muldoon single party minority government NP 49%
1984-87 Lange single party government Labour 59%
1987-89 Lange single party government Labour 61%
1989-90 Palmer single party government Labour 60%
1990-90 Moore single party government Labour 60%
1990-93 Bolger single party government NP 70%
1993-95 Bolger single party government NP 51%
1995-96 Bolger minimal winning NP ROC* 51%
1996-97 Bolger minimal winning NP NZ First 51%
1997-99 Shipley minimal winning NP NZ First 51%
Sources: Woldendorp, Keman & Budge (2000); Wood (1996); Mulgan (1994: 72)
* ROC is a breakaway faction of NP (Woldendorp, Keman & Budge 2000: 404).
Party government
Obviously, until 1996 all governments were single party governments. In all these 
cases the ruling political party had a majority of the seats in parliament, with the 
exception of the third Muldoon administration. Since then, coalitions were formed 
which moved the political system towards practices more typical for consensus 
democracy. From 1997 to 1999 the National Party formed a coalition with New 
Zealand First – a party with strong Maori orientation.
 What has the impact of all these institutional changes been on the degree of 
consensus democracy in New Zealand? Figure 8.1 shows the development of this 
index.
153
New Zealand
19971995199319911989198719851983198119791977197519731971196919671965
-.2
-.4
-.6
-.8
-1.0
-1.2
-1.4
-1.6
-1.8
-2.0
Figure 8.1 Degree of consensus democracy in New Zealand
The degree of consensus democracy was obviously quite low until 1996. There 
were small fl uctuations through time, but it remained the lowest of twenty 
democracies. As expected, after the electoral reform New Zealand moved towards 
the consensus side of the spectrum – or actually the centre of the majoritarian to 
consensus democracy scale. The adoption of the MMP system caused a dramatic 
effect in the institutional setting of New Zealand’s politics. However, it did not make 
New Zealand a full-fl edged consensus democracy. The main cause for this has 
been that coalitions have been minimal winning and the effective number of parties 
is still comparatively low. Nevertheless, because of the need to form coalitions, 
there was not a single party anymore controlling the political arena without taking 
into account other parties.
8.3 Organised interests
New Zealand – like Australia - has always had some elements of corporatism in 
terms of bi-partitism throughout history (Mulgan 1994: 196). Yet, until the reforms 
of the 1980s, wage bargaining was state regulated. An Arbitration Court, which not 
only passes judgement in individual disputes, had the power to regulate wages in 
order to infl uence the national economy (Mulgan 1994: 158-159). Employers and 
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unions could negotiate in court. It was the offi cial body where representatives of 
interest groups came together and had the opportunity to infl uence macro-economic 
policy. Figure 8.2 shows the scores of New Zealand on the index of corporatism.
Figure 8.2 Corporatism in New Zealand
Figure 8.2 clearly shows the decline of corporatism in New Zealand after 1984. 
Until that year, New Zealand had a legal platform that regulated industrial disputes 
between workers and employers. Wages and prices were government regulated. 
Interest groups had little access to governmental policy formulation. The farming 
sector in particular was protected by government regulation. Government 
involvement in agriculture and the national system of wage and prices were too 
strong to refer to it as corporatism; state-directed planning would be more accurate. 
The main advantage of corporatist institutions is the promotion of coordination 
between capital and labour. If employers and workers are able to settle their own 
industrial disputes to prevail national interest, it can form a sound basis for good 
socio-economic performance. The role of the New Zealand government was a 
dominant one. The central government steered the national economy heavily and 
in great detail. Social partners felt boxed in. New Zealand had manifested a unique 
combination of a majoritarian political system – which secured an unrivalled position 
of the central government – and a state led economy. There was involvement of the 
social partners, but there were few possibilities for these actors to act independently 
from the central government. According to the defi nition of corporatism used in this 
study (see Chapter 3), the degree of corporatism in New Zealand has always been 
generally low.
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 When the Labour Party came into power in 1984, the labour market was 
deregulated (Kelsey 1995: 173). Compulsory arbitration was abolished in 1984. In 
1987 the Labour Party introduced the Labour Relations Act. This law left registered 
unions their monopoly over categories of workers covered by their membership 
rules (Kelsey 1995: 175). Unions need to have a minimum of 1000 members. This 
led to a strong decrease of the number of unions, from more than 250 in 1985 to 
around 80 in the late 1990s (May et al. 2001: 319).
 New Zealand knows one peak organisation, the New Zealand Council of Trade 
Unions (CTU), which was formed in 1987 (Kelsey 1995: 176). Later the CTU merged 
with the Trade Union Federation (TUF), which was formed in 1993 (May et al. 2001: 
325). The Employment Contracts Act of 1991 abandoned compulsory unionism in 
favour of individual employment contracts (Kelsey 1995: 181). These government 
measures meant a strong decentralisation of wage bargaining from central and 
sector level to fi rm and individual worker level.
 The reforms that were induced by the Labour government in the 1980s meant 
a strong deregulation and decentralisation of labour relations. The trade unions 
lost a lot of their power and membership declined sharply. Union density declined 
from 43.5% in 1985 to less than 20% in the 1990s (May et al. 2001: 319) Protection 
of wages and employment was removed in favour of unrestricted free market 
negotiations. The labour market reforms were initiated by the Labour government 
and were continued by the National Party that came in power in 1990. Since 
the deregulations New Zealand certainly belongs to the uncoordinated market 
economies. Coordination and centralisation of wage bargaining had become very 
low and the trade union were organised weakly.
 The specifi c economic and institutional constellation of New Zealand explains 
the 1970s decline of socio-economic performance. Import and export were under 
total government control. There was no free international trade to optimise internal 
and external production. The government tried to protect the agriculture sector. The 
government imposed a wage freeze, prices and the currency rate were fi xed. There 
were no incentives for New Zealand fi rms to innovate the production process. New 
Zealand’s institutions produced a dominant government and a state directed type 
of wage bargaining. This led to a rigid economic structure with closed shops. This 
may be an explanation of the bad performance that New Zealand experienced for 
a long time and the remedies implemented by the government . The next section 
discusses the decline of New Zealand’s performance in the 1970s and the shock 
therapy to improve it in the 1980s in further detail. 
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8.4 Socio-economic performance in New Zealand
Most aspects of the New Zealand economy were under strong government 
control. This system could survive for a long time, because a large proportion of its 
export – mainly consisting of agricultural products – went to the United Kingdom 
on a preferential basis. In the 1980s the system came under pressure urging the 
government to a radical reform of economic and social policy. Exports to the UK 
declined drastically after the UK became more and more integrated in the European 
Market. This section discusses whether or not the government was successful 
in coping with the economic crisis by radical policy reform. Many nationalised 
companies were privatised and the welfare state was reformed drastically (see 
Schwartz 2000).
 Until 1984, governmental economic control was pervasive and rigid (Scott 1996: 
5). Wages, prices and interests were frozen. Exchange rates were controlled by the 
central bank and the government. Import was restricted to protect local production. 
Some steps toward liberalisation had already begun prior to 1982. The government 
was not able to negotiate an incomes policy with the trade unions. This had 
accelerated the infl ation rate to 15% by 1982 (Scott 1996: 5). Government’s freeze 
on prices and incomes did not solve economic problems. The government defi cit 
increased and the New Zealand currency devaluated.
 The newly elected 1984 Labour government started a series of radical policy 
reforms. Although the Labour party was traditionally social democratic, it initiated 
neo-liberal economic policy. Government tasks were privatised and the welfare state 
was reformed. In 1984 the condition of New Zealand’s economy was disastrous 
(Scott 1996). The price system was not working properly because of the state 
regulations and the system of subsidies and taxes. There was poor productivity 
and low innovation; free import and export was not possible. The labour market 
did not work effi ciently: workers were duly protected by law and real wages were 
high. The tax system contributed to avoidance. Production sectors were under 
strong government control. Several government-run enterprises failed because of 
mismanagement. Stabilisation policies were ineffective and worked out pro instead 
of anti-cyclical. This means that  a strong state cannot change a bad condition into 
a good one.
 The major changes that had to be made were the withdrawal of the government 
from activities that could be organised by the private sector and the opening up of 
the New Zealand economy to international competition. The government controlled 
many aspects of economic life and many tasks that were not necessarily public 
goods were previously provided by the government. These activities have been 
privatised since 1984. At the same time, the protection of the internal market against 
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foreign companies was weakened. The expectation was that in the long run, the 
private sector would profi t from a more independent role – without government 
intervention – and competition from the international economy.
  The rates of unemployment and infl ation as indicators of performance are 
shown in fi gure 8.3.
Figure 8.3 Unemployment and infl ation rates in New Zealand
Figure 8.3 shows that, until the mid 1980s, infl ation rates were very high. Only 
after that period, infl ation dropped below 10%. Unemployment developed in the 
opposite direction. In the early 1990s, unemployment increased to more than 10%, 
but decreased slightly in the mid 1990s. The pattern shows a trade off between 
unemployment and infl ation.
Figure 8.4 Economic growth in % in New Zealand
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Economic growth development has been very unstable. There were several periods 
of fast economic growth (e.g. the early 1970s and a peak in the 1980s) and several 
periods of negative growth  (e.g. the late 1970s and between 1987 and 1993). This 
shows that the radical policy measures since the 1980s did not result in a steady 
economic growth in the late 1980s and the 1990s.
8.5 Actors, institutions and socio-economic performance
This section discusses the interaction of actors and institutions and its impact on 
socio-economic performance. A majoritarian and non-corporatist country like New 
Zealand performed worse than many consensus democracies and corporatist 
countries, despite change of its institutions and the implementation of a radical 
socio-economic policy. In terms of consensus democracy and corporatism it moved 
in opposite directions. In the 1980s New Zealand wage bargaining was deregulated 
and decentralised and became less corporatist. In the 1990s a more proportional 
electoral system changed New Zealand from straight majoritarian towards more 
consensus democracy.
Actors
In 1984 the Labour party changed its ideology by adopting economic reform as 
promoted by the American president Reagan and British Prime Minister Thatcher. 
This was clearly a move from the traditional social democratic ideology to neo-
liberalism and monetarism, which became fashionable at that time. Why has the 
Labour Party been able to adopt such radical economic reform? Castles, Gerritsen 
& Vowles (1996) argue that after years of governance by the party on the right, 
policy challenge and transformation was a comparatively low risk strategy for the 
incoming Labour government. Nevertheless, the shift to neo-liberal policy alienated 
a part of the traditional Labour support. On the other hand, however, the Labour 
party shifted its ideological position towards that of its competitor, the National 
Party. This party was conservative and partly shared ideas that were introduced 
by the Labour Party in the 1980s. In ideological terms, the Labour Party moved 
towards the position of the National Party. A loss of voters on the left side of the 
political spectrum was for a short time compensated by winning votes from the 
National Party.
 The Labour party played a game at two different levels: in parliament and in 
the electoral arena. The fi rst priority of the Labour Party was to change socio-
economic policy and to restructure the welfare state. Selecting this ideology of 
socio-economic reform, it came in competition with the National Party. The Labour 
Party was successful in implementing such a radical policy shift and the party 
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gained credibility. The dilemma for each party during a severe economic crisis is 
to choose between credibility and electoral support. By implementing unpopular 
policy-programmes, on the one hand votes were lost, but on the other hand the 
Labour Party showed its capability to reform and to try to solve socio-economic 
problems.
 There was not only a loss of electoral support for specifi c parties; voters lost 
their faith in the political system as a whole and resulted in a structural decline 
in the people’s support for the political system. In several occasions new parties 
were successful in gaining seats in parliament, but they never had a chance of 
participating in government and having a strong impact on public policy. This typical 
majoritarian feature of the political system made it easier for the Labour party to 
persist its radical policy programme.
 New Zealand has a relatively homogeneous society, with a majority descending 
from Anglo-Saxon immigrants and a minority of the indigenous Maoris. As elsewhere 
in Western democracies, traditional party adherence declined. The signifi cance 
of the socio-economic division in society declined as well. There was a tendency 
among voters to shift to other parties, but the electoral system prevented the 
development of real alternatives.  
 For a long time, unions were relatively strong, but they were considerably 
weakened in the 1980s and 1990s by the labour market reform. Unions lost their 
monopoly in wage bargaining, thereby losing many members. Traditional actors 
lost ground and are not as powerful anymore.
Institutions
To what extent do institutions in New Zealand deviate from the other Western 
democracies? Compared to the other countries, New Zealand’s political system 
was typically majoritarian until 1996. The level of corporatism was medium to low 
compared to that of others. There was room to manoeuvre for actors for institutional 
change. This is in contrast with the Netherlands, where change of formal rules is 
limited and informal rules have regularly been adjusted. In New Zealand the formal 
rules of the game changed. 
Linkages between consensus democracy and corporatism
Consensus democracy and corporatism appear to be separate arenas and each 
has its own dynamics. Consensus democratic practices were enhanced in New 
Zealand, while corporatism became less important in the 1990s. The labour market 
deregulation in the 1980s and 1990s proves that the political system is dominant 
to the socio-economic arena. Government can impose rules on unions, employers’ 
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organisations and wage bargaining. In New Zealand, government sets the rules 
that determine the room to manoeuvre for the actors, which is in this case very 
limited.
Socio-economic performance
New Zealand’s economy was steady for a long time. Many aspects were strongly 
regulated and a substantial part of exports, mainly consisting of agricultural products, 
was secure due to trade with the UK. Since the 1970s economic growth saw a strong 
decline. Infl ation increased since the 1970s and unemployment increased since 
the 1980s. Socio-economic performance was quickly deteriorating and urged the 
actors to change. In the 1980s the Labour government implemented unprecedented 
policy reforms according to a neo-liberal programme. Neo-corporatist strategy did 
not play a strong role in New Zealand to solve socio-economic problems. Since 
the 1980s, remaining elements of corporatism were removed as well. Hence, there 
was a clear impact of socio-economic performance on preferences of actors and 
their strategy and on institutions. This impact was not towards corporatism, but a 
step away from it. The radical policy programme was not implemented on basis 
of consensus and cooperation, but by a single-party government. No consensual 
institutions, but majoritarian institutions were used. These majoritarian and pluralist 
institutions did not appear to have much success. Only in the 1990s infl ation 
decreased and economic growth increased, unemployment remained high.
 It is diffi cult to determine whether performance would have been better with 
consensual and corporatist institutions. Consensus democracy would have 
contributed to more support of the radical programme among the voters. In New 
Zealand, the combination of radical reform and majoritarianism led to a loss of 
support in the political system and to electoral reform in the long term. Coordinated 
and centralised wage bargaining could possibly have contributed to wage 
moderation, which could mitigate infl ation and stimulate economic growth. In New 
Zealand a neo-liberal strategy of fl exibility of wages and contracts was chosen that 
weakened both trade unions and the position of individual workers.
Central bank
For a long time, the central bank in New Zealand was controlled more strongly by the 
government than in most other Western democracies. In the 1980s the government 
implemented a monetarist strategy to control infl ation and unemployment, however 
without success. The Reserve Bank Act of 1989 made price stability the sole 
objective of the central bank (Kelsey 1995:160). Trade and employment were 
no longer a goal of the Reserve Bank. There was no direct government control 
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anymore, which increased central bank independence. This change of the role 
of the central bank contributed to lower infl ation in the 1990s. At the same time, 
unemployment levels increased and remained quite high. This indicates that price 
stability was achieved at the cost of rising unemployment.
International context
For a long time New Zealand’s economy was heavily dependent on the UK. Most 
of the exports consisted of agricultural goods. UK’s integration in the European 
economy, contributed to the decline of New Zealand’s exports. Due to its isolated 
position, it was diffi cult to get access to new markets. Moreover New Zealand met 
fi erce competition from Southeast Asian countries. For this reason, it is extremely 
diffi cult for New Zealand to promote economic growth by an export-stimulating 
strategy.
8.6 Socio-economic problem-solving
In Chapter 1, two stages of socio-economic problem-solving are distinguished. 
First, actors acknowledge the existing crisis and change their behaviour. This 
stage emphasises the impact of performance on actors’ behaviour and institutional 
arrangements. Second, policy is reformed and institutions are changed to optimise 
performance. This stage focuses on the impact of institutions on performance.
 In New Zealand bad economic performance urged the actors to change their 
behaviour. This resulted in different policy choices and in crucial changes of the 
institutional context. In the case of New Zealand we can even speak of revolution 
and experiment. Here we see an interesting connection between the type of 
institutional arrangements and the kind of policy choices. In the 1980s dissatisfaction 
led to radical changes in socio-economic policy. Protection by the government of 
national companies against international competition was lifted in many areas. New 
Zealand’s welfare state reforms were unparalleled in the Western world.
 The majoritarian political system of New Zealand gives a dominant role to a single 
political party. And for this reason radical policy changes are easier to conduct. The 
Labour Party played a crucial role in changing socio-economic policy. The social 
democratic character of the governing party contributed to the acceptance of the 
policy change by potential opponents, such as trade unions and left-wing voters. 
While a conservative and neo-liberal government would have caused strong 
opposition from the side of the labour movement, the fact that a social democratic 
party was involved weakened resistance. Although in a majoritarian democracy 
a radical policy reform appears easier to conduct, it is still politically risky. The 
lack of economic success resulted in a continuing dissatisfaction with the political 
system.
 The New Zealand case shows that a socio-economic crisis can induce policy 
change. In New Zealand, however, the crisis persisted. As a reaction institutional 
arrangements were changed, without much success. The socio-economic crisis 
resulted in policy reform and institutional change, but these changes hardly led to 
better performance. New Zealand shows no strong impact of changing institutions 
on performance. In this chapter the opposite relationship was found. A crisis resulted 
in change of policy choices and institutional reform. In this respect the relations in 
the model, as displayed in Figure 4.1 in Chapter 4, are different from what could 
be expected. Actors’ behaviour and institutions do not change performance, but 
performance changes actors and institutions.
8.7 Conclusions
This chapter has analysed the institutional framework of New Zealand. Lijphart 
(1984) regarded New Zealand as an example of the majoritarian or Westminster 
model of democracy. This chapter shows that New Zealand political system has in 
some respects more characteristics of a consensus democracy than often assumed. 
The same holds for the interest groups system. New Zealand had certainly had 
some features of corporatism, but the system of arbitration has been removed and 
the role of trade unions has been weakened by the government.
 From 1978 on, dissatisfaction grew over the electoral system that promoted a 
two-party system in which one of the two parties gained all political power. After 
two referendums – in 1992 and 1993 – the fi rst-past-the-post system was replaced 
by the mixed-member proportional list system, which was applied for the fi rst time 
in the 1996 elections. The introduction of a new electoral rule led to a multi-party 
system and the novelty of a coalition government. These institutional changes 
moved New Zealand closer to the model of consensus democracy. The degree of 
corporatism decreased because of neo-liberal labour market reforms. However, 
these changes were not successful for socio-economic performance. Although the 
infl ation rate decreased to an acceptable level, the unemployment rate remained 
very high. Moreover, the growth of the GDP per capita in the period after 1985 was 
much lower than in the period 1971-1985.
 Does this mean that the liberalisation of the economy and the cutting down on 
the welfare state were not worth the effort? Of course this is hard to prove since 
we do not know what would have happened if New Zealand was still a country with 
extreme governmental economic control on top of a welfare state. If New Zealand 
had continued on this road, the present situation might have been even worse. 
The fact remains that although New Zealand’s export to the UK declined during the 
1970s, the main part of today’s export still is agricultural. New Zealand’s isolated 
position makes it extremely diffi cult to keep up with global economic developments. 
Especially when the closest economic trade partners – with the exception of 
Australia – are the Southeast Asian countries, which have a unique combination 
of high-tech industry and cheap labour. Any country would have a diffi cult time 
competing with these economies.
 Several theoretical conclusions can be drawn from the New Zealand experience. 
It confi rms that the institutions of majoritarian type of democracy allows for radical 
policy reform. New Zealand is a strong case where consensus democracy and 
corporatism developed in different ways. This shows that these institutions each 
have their own dynamics.
 New Zealand moved more in the direction of liberal market economies, away from 
coordinated market economies. A neo-liberal economic policy was implemented 
by a social democratic government. The Labour party was more successful in 
removing opposition against the policy by the working class and trade unions than 
the National party could have been. The majoritarian character of the political 
system at that time made that the Labour party could afford to implement such an 
electoral risky policy. Dissatisfaction with performance did not immediately lead to 
loss of votes for the Labour party. A stronger development was the loss of trust in 
the political system. By making the electoral system more proportional, there was 
more support for government policy.
 In New Zealand, socio-economic performance did have a strong impact on 
actors and institutions, but there is no strong impact of (change of) institutions 
on performance. New Zealand shows a clear connection between change of 
institutions and change of policy in order to change performance. Both were induced 
by dissatisfaction among voters. Institutions were changed due to preferences of 
voters, policy change due to preferences, institutions and policy change due to 
performance, but did institutions make a real difference for performance? The main 
conclusion of this chapter is that in New Zealand institutional change is not directly 
related to performance and that a combination of majoritarianism and pluralism 
was not conducive for genuine policy changes.
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Notes
1 In a television debate during the 1987 election Lange announced a referendum in his next term 
(Russell 1996: 240).
2 An example of the chicken game is when two drivers drive toward each other. ‘The one who swerves 
to avoid collision is the chicken and the one who keeps going straight is the winner’ (Dixit & Skeath 
(1999: 111).
3 In 1992 1031257 people voted for change of the electoral system and in 1992 1032919 people 
preferred MMP over FPTP. While the proportion of the votes supporting electoral reform is lower in 
1993, the absolute number is rather constant.
4 The seats are allocated by the method of Sainte Laguë. The number of votes for each party is 
divided by uneven numbers 1, 3, 5, etc. The 120 highest quotients determine the number of seats for 
each party.
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9 PORTUGAL: DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION AND EUROPEAN
 INTEGRATION
9.1 Introduction
Portugal has been selected for a more detailed analysis for several reasons. In the 
comparative analysis of twenty democracies of Chapter 5, Portugal changed from 
performing worse to better than average. Generally speaking, the Portuguese socio-
economic performance has been improving constantly since the 1974 revolution. 
Two events mark the recent political history of Portugal; the transition to democracy 
and the accession to the European Union in 1986. Both events are radical 
institutional changes that played a crucial role regarding the social and economic 
structure and that are of importance for socio-economic performance. During the 
transitional period of 1974-76 a semi-presidential political system was installed to 
combine the advantages of a strong and stable president with a parliament based 
on strong political parties.
 Portugal is selected from the non-corporatist and non-consensus cluster. 
Performance in this cluster is the worst of all four clusters. Yet, Portugal has shown 
remarkable economic recovery. Also for this reason it is an interesting case to 
analyse.
9.2 The political system and party government
Before 1910, when the First Republic saw the light, Portugal was a monarchy. In 
1926 the democratic republic was overthrown by a military junta. In 1932 António 
de Oliveira Salazar became Prime Minister and he installed an authoritarian regime 
that stayed in power until 1974. Salazar, a former Professor of Economics at the 
University of Coimbra, created a conservative corporatist system Estado Novo 
(New State). Only one political party was allowed. Under his rule national economy 
remained rural and underdeveloped.
 In 1968 Salazar became seriously ill and his successor was Marcello Caetano. 
A large part of the army became less and less pleased with Portugal’s colonial wars 
in Africa and organised in the Armed Forces Movement (MFA) they started a coup 
against the New State. Army offi cers were not only discontent with these wars in far 
away Africa, class differences within the army contributed to the revolt as well. Until 
the mid1920s offi cers were recruited from the old aristocracy (Opello Jr. 1985: 66-
67). Since the modernisation programme that begun during the 1920s offi cers were 
recruited from the middle class. These new offi cers behaved like the old aristocratic 
offi cers. Since the colonial wars of the 1960s, fewer offi cers were recruited from the 
middle class and these offi cers were gradually replaced by offi cers from the lower 
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middle class. This caused class differences within the army. The new offi cers from 
the lower middle class clashed with the established offi cers and did not support 
colonial wars.
 By the Carnation Revolution on 25 April 1974, army support to the dictatorship 
came to an end and without the use of violence the authoritarian regime was 
replaced by a provisional government. In 1975 the fi rst elections were held for the 
constituent assembly of the Third Republic. During the turbulent period 1974-76 the 
Council of the Revolution transformed the political system into a democracy. In 1976 
a Constitution was adopted and the fi rst President was elected. The Constituent 
Assembly of 1975 and 1976 was concerned with three dimensions of government 
stability (Manuel 1996: 3): a stable regime, a dominant place for political parties 
and a moderating executive institution to protect the regime against excessive 
parliamentarism. This resulted in a presidential-parliamentarian hybrid, with both a 
prime minister and a president.
 Since 1976, the president of the Portuguese Republic is elected directly. In the 
fi rst years of the republic there was a tense relation between the President, the 
Prime Minister and the Assembly (Colomer 1996: 171). At the same time there also 
was a strong tension between the government and the communists who wanted to 
install a Soviet-style centralised socialist economic system. The fi rst constitution of 
1976 prescribed a transition to socialism through the collectivisation of the principal 
means of production (Colomer 1996: 194-195). This irreversible road to socialism 
was stricken from the constitution at revisions in 1982 and 1989.
 Portugal’s accession to the EU in 1986 has had an enormous impact on socio-
economic  development. First of all, it created new opportunities for Portuguese 
companies to import commodities from abroad and for foreign companies to 
invest in Portugal. Second, Portugal received large contributions from European 
structural funds to improve its infrastructure and to stimulate employment. Third, 
joining the EMU has put drastic constraints on Portuguese monetary, fi scal, social 
and economic policy to meet the criteria of the stability pact. In summary, since 
1974 Portugal is a parliamentary democracy, part of the EU and OECD world.
The party system
The Portuguese electoral system is based on the principle of proportional 
representation, which is explicitly laid down in the constitution (Colomer 1996: 178). 
The Portuguese parliament, Assembleia da República, has only one chamber and 
is elected every four years. The seats are distributed according to the d’Hondt 
method, which means that larger parties are slightly advantaged and the number 
of parties is restricted to some extent. This incites parties to cooperate (Manuel 
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1996: 4). Several electoral coalitions, such as the Democratic Alliance (PSD and 
CDS) and the Democratic Unitary Coalition (PCP and Greens) were the result. The 
number of seats in the Assembly was reduced from 263 in 1975 to 230 in 19911. 
 Two parties dominate the political system: the social democratic Socialist 
Party (PS) and the conservative Social Democratic Party (PSD), formerly known 
as PPD (Popular Democratic Party). The PSD is in no respect social democratic 
notwithstanding the misleading name. Taken together both parties are good for 50 
to 80 % of the votes. The PSD/PPD has played an important role in the stability of 
the government (Manuel 1996: 4). It is a centre to centre-right party supported by 
traditionalist and religious voters.
 The Socialist Party was founded by Mário Soares, the fi rst elected Prime 
Minister and President between 1986 and 1996. The PS is a moderate leftist party 
committed to both socialism and democracy. Several groups on both the left wing 
and the right wing of the party abandoned the party, because they considered the 
party’s ideology to be too moderate.
 The Communist Party (PCP), founded in 1921, was the only party that had 
always been an oppositional force against the dictatorial regime. The PCP is a 
radical communist party that rejects all forms of capitalism. The political importance 
of the PCP has declined since the late 1980s. Since 1991 the communists form 
an electoral alliance with the Greens in the Unitarian Democratic Coalition (CDU), 
but still exist as an independent party. The PS accepts the free market economy to 
some extent, while the PCP has always strived for complete nationalisation of the 
means of production. Nationalisation had been laid down in the fi rst constitution of 
1976 that was formulated after the revolution.
 The support of the conservative Democratic and Social Centre, Popular party 
(CDS/PP) hovers between 4 and 16% of the votes. The party is conservative and 
Christian, more or less Christian Democratic. The party chose the label ‘democratic 
and social’, because in 1974 it was not politically fashionable to name a political 
party conservative or right-wing (Manuel 1996: 5). In 1979 and 1980 PSD, CDS 
and PPM (Popular Monarchist Party) cooperated in the Democratic Alliance (AD).
 The distribution of seats among the parties in the Assembly is shown in Figure 
B.6 (Appendix B). The effective number of parties declined from around four in the 
mid-1980s to around three in the 1990s.
 The President of the Republic is elected every fi ve years with a maximum of two 
consecutive terms (Manuel 1996: 3). Because of the different time intervals and 
methods of electing, the majority in parliament and the government coalitions rarely 
coincide with the majority of parties that supported the winning presidential candidate 
(Colomer 1996: 179). The President has independent authority. The legislative 
168
The institutional dynamics of consensus and confl ict
function rests with the Prime Minister and the Assembly (Manuel 1996: 3). The 
President has to monitor all government activities. In the fi rst year of democracy, 
the President played a dominant role, while later the Prime Minister gained political 
power at the cost of the President. Portugal moved from a presidential political 
system to party government.
 All parliamentary factions have a strong party discipline (Leston-Bandeira 2001: 
142). Representatives usually vote according to party policy. Moreover, members 
of parliament are not allowed to make mid-term party changes.
 There is no parliamentary election of the Prime Minister, but the candidate Prime 
Minister submits himself to a vote of confi dence (Colomer 1996: 192). Table 9.1 
gives an overview of the Prime Ministers and the parties that formed a coalition.
Table 9.1 Coalition governments in Portugal (1976-99)
period Prime minister Supporting parties Type of government 
Parliamentary 
support
1976-78 Mário Soares PS
Single party 
minority government
40.68%
1978 Mário Soares PS CDS Minimal winning 56.65%
1978 Jorge Nobre da Costa caretaker
1978-79 Carlos Mota Pinto caretaker
1979-80 Lurdes Pintasilgo caretaker
1980-81 Francisco Sá Carneiro PSD CDS Minimal winning 51.20%
1981 Francisco Pinto Balsemão PSD CDS PPM* Surplus coalition 53.60%
1981-83 Francisco Pinto Balsemão PSD CDS PPM* Surplus coalition 53.60%
1983-85 Mário Soares PS PSD Minimal winning 70.40%
1985-87 Cavaco Silva PSD Single party minority gov. 35.20%
1987-91 Cavaco Silva PSD Single party government 59.20%
1991-95 Cavaco Silva PSD Single party government 54.00%
1995-99 António Guterres PS Single party minority gov. 44.80%
1999- António Guterres PS Single party minority gov. 50.00%
Note * PSD, CDS and PPM formed the AD electoral alliance. In this respect, it was not a genuine 
government coalition created after the elections, but an electoral coalition created before.
Sources: Magone (1999); Woldendorp, Keman & Budge (2000); Leston-Bandeira (2001).
Between 1976 and 1982 the President played an important role (Colomer 1996: 
193). The President had the power to nominate and dismiss the Prime Minister, 
the government and the Assembly. Presidential powers were reduced in the new 
Constitution of 1982. Portuguese political structure had some semi-presidential 
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features (Leston-Bandeira 2001: 140-141). The directly elected President nominates 
the Prime Minister and has the power to dissolve parliament (Colomer 1996: 194). 
Leston-Bandeira (2001: 140) characterises the political system of Portugal as a 
triangular organisation. The President’s power is counterbalanced by the Prime 
Minister together with the government and the Assembly. Most of the time, the 
majority supporting the President varied from the parliamentary and coalition 
majority. During the consolidation of democracy, President’s role was quite strong 
to prevent undermining of the young democratic system. Once democracy was 
stabilised, Prime Minister and his party government become more important.
Consensual character of the political system
What type of democracy is Portugal? Over the years, the effective number of 
parties has declined. The disproportionality of the electoral system has increased. 
However, the level of disproportionality in 1999 is about the same as in the fi rst 
years of democracy. Figure 9.1 displays the degree of consensus democracy in 
Portugal.
Figure 9.1 Degree of consensus democracy in Portugal (1975-98)
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Most striking of Figure 9.1 is the high degree of variation through time. When 
viewed over the entire period between 1975 and 1998, the level of consensus 
democracy in Portugal fl uctuates around zero. This means that when only the 
average of this index for Portugal over the entire period is taken into account, it may 
lead to a misunderstanding of the degree of consensus democracy. The average 
score between 1975 and 1998 is almost zero, but on several time points, scores 
are either much higher or much lower. Around 1984 for example the degree of 
consensus democracy was low. This marks the transformation of the political system 
from semi-presidentialism to parliamentary democracy. Since 1988, consensual 
institutions became increasingly important.
 The most obvious explanation of this high variation is the fact that Portugal 
was consolidating its democratic system the fi rst ten to fi fteen years. There 
was no defi nitive power balance between the political actors yet. A threat to a 
newly established democratic system comes from electoral and parliamentary 
fragmentation and a high number of parties. Having so many different parties, it 
becomes increasingly diffi cult to form coalitions. After a long period of dictatorial 
rule, most political groups obviously seek parliamentary representation. In 
Spain for example electoral fragmentation was extremely high. Such a high 
fragmentation did not occur in Portugal. First of all, the PCP is the only pre-1974 
party. All other parties were founded after the revolution. Second, Portuguese 
society is rather homogeneous. Although wealth is not equally distributed over the 
regions, regionalism is not strongly developed. And because industrialisation was 
never developed under Salazar and Caetano’s rule, there was no strong class-
consciousness to dominate party structures. PCP is still an exception, being one 
of the few communist parties in the world that survived the 1990s. The existing 
differences, such as centre versus periphery and socio-economic class, did not 
result into a highly fragmented political landscape. Third, the number of ideological 
issue dimensions is not very high. Most salient dimensions are socio-economic 
class, regime support and foreign policy (Lijphart 1999: 78-79). Finally in almost 
every election, alliances of parties were created in order to maximise votes. This 
had a limiting effect on the number of participating parties.
 The type of government contributed considerably to the majoritarian character 
of the Portuguese democratic system in several time periods. The coalition types 
that occurred most frequently were minority governments and minimal winning 
coalitions. The only surplus government was the cabinet led by Prime Minister 
Francisco Pinto Balsemão between 1981 and 1983. The young democracy started 
with a single party minority government, which was the fi rst cabinet led by Mário 
Soares in 1976.
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 The majoritarian character of the political system changed in the 1980s. Leston-
Bandeira (2001: 144) states that majoritarian criteria replaced consensual ones 
in deciding on the distribution of rights and responsibilities in parliament. The 
proportionality rule has lost importance in parliament. The larger parliamentary 
groups gained more control over the political agenda.
9.3 Organised interests
Some elements of the former authoritarian corporatism survived in the democratic 
era. Both employers’ federations and trade unions are organised alongside with the 
government in the Permanent Council of Social Negotiation, CPCS (Colomer 1996: 
195; Barreto & Naumann 1998). On the other hand however, industrial relations in 
Portugal are strongly polarised. Major differences exist between employers and 
unions and within the labour movement itself. Some labour movement groups do not 
only aspire the democratisation of class relations but the elimination of capitalism 
as well (Barreto & Naumann 1998: 395).
 The revolutionary process in Portugal infl uenced the system of industrial 
relations in the fi rst decade. The fi rst years were a period of political radicalisation 
and militant action. Instead of moving towards a liberal democracy, a socialist 
society seemed nearer. Communists and radical socialists dominated the labour 
movement. Unions held considerable power. Employers’ organisations had no 
intention to reach agreements with these unions (Barreto & Naumann 1998: 402). 
The relation between unions and employers was confl ict driven.
 Unions were able to capitalise their power by demanding higher wages and 
social security benefi ts. The consequences for socio-economic development were 
bad. Increasing wages pushed infl ation rates and unemployment rose as well. In 
the 1980s, mass unemployment restricted union infl uence. At the same time, the 
state pulled out of the process of collective bargaining. In 1984 national bargaining 
was institutionalised in the tripartite CPCS, which came to play a more important 
role. At the same time the new Prime Minister Cavaco Silva started a neo-liberal 
market policy after Portugal had joined the EU. This caused considerable changes 
in the political climate. Installing a socialist regime appeared no longer an option. 
Portugal wanted to be in step with other Western European countries. The 
Portuguese wanted a stable democracy, embraced the free market and worked 
on more peaceful industrial relations. In Figure 9.2 the scores of Portugal on the 
corporatism index are displayed.
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Figure 9.2 Index of corporatism in Portugal
The average over the entire period fl uctuates around zero, as is the case with the 
index of consensus democracy. By comparing the scores at different time points, 
variation through time can be acknowledged. Figure 9.2 shows an increase of 
corporatism in the 1980s and a decline in the 1990s.
 In 1990 an important agreement was reached by all CPCS members with the 
exception of the communist trade union CGTP (Barreto & Naumann 1998: 420). 
This Economic and Social Agreement was a major step in giving more negotiating 
autonomy to unions and employers’ organisations and the introduction of conciliation 
and arbitration mechanisms. However, this agreement did not end the antagonism 
between some radical unions and employers’ organisations.
 The employers’ organisations are organised according to sector (Barreto & 
Naumann 1998: 406). CIP for industry, CCP for trade and services and CAP for 
agriculture. The major labour unions are CGTP and UGT. Because the Communist 
Party played an important oppositional role in the fi ght against the dictatorial regime, 
it was able to gain control over the labour movement directly after the revolution. 
This is in contrast with the PS, which totally disappeared and re-entered the arena 
in 1973 as a political actor. All communist unions were organised in the Intersindical, 
which later became the CGTP. Intersindical monopolised workers’ representation. 
This provoked a reaction of the other unions, organised in the UGT.
 When looking at the measurement of the degree of corporatism as defi ned in 
Chapter 3, it clearly acknowledges the dynamic development. In the period after the 
revolution, the tense relation between capital and labour is refl ected in a negative 
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score for corporatism. Rapprochement of unions and employers’ organisation in 
the late 1980s/ early 1990s and the Economic and Social Agreement is found back 
in a positive score in this period. In the 1990s, trade unions have become weaker 
organised and the coverage rate of wage bargaining has declined. This is refl ected 
in a reduction of the degree of corporatism.
9.4 The development of socio-economic policy in Portugal
The fi rst post-revolution years not only put Portugal up to a political test but most 
of all to an economic challenge. Salazar’s heritage was a bad economic situation. 
One third of Portuguese employment was in agriculture2. Infrastructure was 
underdeveloped. Obviously, the installation of a democratic regime in 1974 did not 
bring everyone prosperity immediately. In the fi rst few years the real wages per capita 
dropped (Manuel 1996: 75). Together with increasing unemployment, the situation 
seemed disastrous. However, from the 1980s on the situation strongly improved, 
largely due to the radical policy reforms of the Cavaco Silva government.
 The infl ation rate in the fi rst years was staggering, but steadily decreased 
to near EU average in the 1990s. The stabilisation of the exchange rate of the 
Portuguese Escudo contributed to price stability, together with the accession to 
the EU in 1986. Until the beginning of the 1990s Portugal saw a strong economic 
growth. This changed into negative growth in 1992-93, when European recession 
hit the Portuguese economy (European Commission 1997: 1). Figure 9.3 shows 
the development of the GDP per capita of the four poorest EU members as a 
percentage of the EU average.
Figure 9.3 GDP per capita as % of EU-average
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Ireland had the strongest growth. In the late 1990s Ireland’s GDP per capita overtook 
the EU average. Portugal’s development had been stronger than that of Spain and 
Greece. By overtaking Greece, Portugal no longer was the poorest EU member.
 How can the economic success of Portugal be explained and how is it related to 
the institutional structure of the political system? Several factors have contributed 
to the economic development: joining the EU, which gave access to large amounts 
from the structural funds to Portugal; joining the EMU, which required a stable 
monetary and fi scal policy; the policy reform by Cavaco Silva; the changing labour 
market, in particular the increase of female labour participation. Figure 9.4 gives an 
overview of some of the major economic indicators in Portugal the past 35 years.
Figure 9.4 Socio-economic performance in Portugal
Figure 9.4 makes the impact of the 1974 revolution clearly visible. In the fi rst years, 
infl ation exploded to 30%, economic growth was negative and offi cial unemployment 
rates were increasing. Only after 1986, all these indicators turned into a positive 
direction. Infl ation, measured by the consumer price index, decreased to a 
reasonable level, unemployment decreased and economic growth remained high. 
The negotiations in the 1980s to join the EU urged Portugal to adjust its economic 
system to European standards. 1986 marked a major institutional change, when 
Portugal became an EU member.
 EU structural funds enabled numerous investments in infrastructure in particular. 
Between 1989 and 1993, Portugal received 8.5 billion Euro; between 1994-99 19.2 
billion Euro and between 2000-09 19 billion Euro. Joining the EU gave Portugal 
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access to an enormous market. Export and import increased, especially to and 
from Spain. Before joining the EU, the relation with its sole neighbour country was 
far from good. Both countries basically ignored each other. Nowadays they are 
important trading partners.
 European integration had a huge impact on Portugal’s development, not only 
because of structural funds and the immediate access to a large market. Another 
crucial effect has been the linking of its monetary policy to the EMU. Since 1992, 
the Portuguese Escudo was linked to the German Mark. And in 1999, the Euro was 
introduced. This made a large contribution to internal and external price stability. But 
at least as important was that joining the Euro-zone put heavy constraints on fi scal 
and monetary policy and on governmental budget discipline of the government. 
Portugal had far less trouble to meet the Maastricht criteria than for instance 
Germany.
 The labour market has changed since the revolution. In 1960, a large proportion 
of total employment was found in agriculture. This share has declined drastically, 
but it still ranks among the highest in the EU. The persistence of the farm sector has 
moderated Portugal’s unemployment. During worsening economic periods, people 
went back to the country for work.
 A second major change of the labour market is the increase of female labour 
participation. During Salazar’s regime women were no part of the labour market. 
Women were expected to take care of their family. They needed their husband’s 
permission to take a job, to go into higher education or to get a passport (Economist 
2000: 5). Female labour participation rate has increased from one of the lowest 
in Europe, 20% in 1960, to around EU average, 63% in 2000. The expenditures 
on labour market policy in Portugal were comparatively high, second highest 
after Sweden (Lang 2000: 73). In contrast to Spain, Portugal was able to keep 
unemployment rates under 10%.
 Until 1985, there were many short-lived coalition governments. In 1985, the 
PS-PSD coalition was terminated because Prime Minister Soares wanted to run 
for president (Manuel 1996: 58). In 1985, the fi rst PSD government, led by Cavaco 
Silva, was only supported by a minority in parliament. But in 1987 the PSD received 
a majority of the votes. This was the beginning of a period of political stability. The 
fi rst ten years of democracy were used to fi nd a balance between all political actors. 
The domestic socio-economic situation improved in the mid1980s. Between 1987 
and 1995, the government was supported by a single party, the PSD, with a majority 
of the seats in the Assembly. This gave the government more political control. In this 
period, the Portuguese political system was at its most majoritarian, as can be seen 
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in Figure 9.1. The effective number decreased and the parliamentary support of 
the coalition became smaller. In 1986 Soares became the fi rst elected non-military 
president of Portugal.
 Prime minister Cavaco Silva promised to liberalise the economy. He wanted to 
reduce state involvement and increase private investment in the economy (Manuel 
1996: 64). Shares of many state-owned companies were sold. Together with the EU 
structural funds money, the infrastructure was improved. In this period, economic 
growth in Portugal ranked among the highest in Western Europe.
9.5 Actors, institutions and socio-economic performance
This section focuses on how the role of actors relates to institutional change 
and changing socio-economic performance. Creating democratic stability and 
stimulating socio-economic development were the main goals since the regime 
change of 1974. The Portuguese road of institutional change was mainly confl ict-
driven instead of cooperation and consensus-based.
Actors
The main political parties in Portugal are the social democratic PS, the centre-right 
PSD and the conservative CDS. Governments always consist of one or two of these 
parties. The communist PCP does not play a role with regard to party government, 
but it is a strong force at least outside parliament in mobilising opposition against 
ruling governments. In particular during the fi rst post-revolutionary period, the 
communists had a strong support in certain areas and among certain groups of 
voters. However, in shaping socio-economic policy-making, only the three largest 
parties are of importance.
 After the revolution, socio-economic actors were quite militant. Unions attempted 
to change the economic structure through nationalisation. Firms on the other hand, 
tried to protect their possession of the means of production. The potential confl ict 
between workers and capital was moderated by the political parties. In particular 
the social democratic PS and its leader Soares played an important role in the 
consolidation of the democratic system.
 The social democratic party and the unions were operating at two different 
levels. Their voters and members demanded a radical social, political and 
economic revolution. At this electoral level, it was important that they were seen 
as representatives and as credible among their support. At party government level 
they tried to come to cooperation with the other parties. Radicalism and polarisation 
at electoral level was mitigated by cooperation at party government level.
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Institutions
In the post-revolutionary period the president played a strong role. The task of the 
president was to secure the political system and to give the democratic institutions 
time to establish themselves. Democracy was under pressure by both radical left-
wing and right-wing forces. During the 1980s the role of the president was weakened. 
Portugal developed from a semi-presidential to a parliamentary democracy. The 
political system became less consensual and more majoritarian.
Consensus democracy
From a comparative perspective, Portugal is not a typical case of consensus 
democracy. Consensual institutions, such as oversized coalitions, certainly 
contributed to a relatively peaceful transition to democracy. For the democratic 
system, stability was the fi rst priority. It was therefore important that all groups 
supported the political system. Consensus democracy in Portugal had a spill 
over effect on socio-economic performance. By stabilising the political system, 
democratic representations and free elections were secured. In the 1980s the 
possibility of transforming the economic free market structure into a socialist plan 
economy, disappeared. Once the political and economic system was stable, foreign 
investors had a renewed interest in participating in Portuguese fi rms. Establishment 
of a stable democracy and a well-functioning free market economy attracted 
international capital and avoided export of national capital. Added to European 
investments from the structural funds these factors stimulated economic growth.
 Portugal shows that consensus democracy contributes to political stability and 
support for the political system. A stable political system had a spill over effect on 
socio-economic policy. This means that consensus democracy did not only have a 
positive effect on democratic performance, but also on socio-economic performance. 
The effect of consensus democracy in Portugal must not be overestimated, since 
the degree of consensus democracy is quite modest. From a static point of view, 
Portugal is actually a non-consensus democracy, but the dynamic developments 
indicate an increasing relevance of consensus democracy in the fi rst ten to fi fteen 
years after the revolution. Once the political system was stabilised and economic 
development improved, the political system became more majoritarian.
Corporatism
Portugal had a tradition of an authoritarian form of corporatism, which can be linked 
to fascism and Salazarism. This type of corporatism aims to abolish every possible 
confl ict between workers and fi rms. Since it operates in a non-democratic political 
system without any right of freedom of organisation, this type functions entirely 
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different from the type of neo-corporatism that is discussed in this thesis. Portugal’s 
system of labour and economic relations under Salazar was under total government 
control that possessed monopoly of organisation. The goal was not a voluntary 
cooperation between different socio-economic classes, but a planned and state-
controlled economy. After the regime change, this authoritarian corporatist tradition 
disappeared. The relations between socio-economic classes were certainly not 
based on consensus and cooperation but were confl ict driven. In the years after the 
revolution, workers’ organisations tried to take over political and economic power.
 It took some time to establish a democratic system and a free market economy. 
In this period the polarisation between workers and fi rms diminished which 
contributed to more peaceful industrial relations. In the late 1980s, early 1990s, the 
degree of corporatism increased. And in the 1990s several social pacts were made 
in Portugal, like in other European countries – such as Italy and Ireland - in the light 
of European integration and the stability pact of the EMU. The pacts can be seen as 
additional institutional arrangements that were developed between actors to affect 
policy outcomes. These pacts aimed to moderate the negative external effects on 
domestic policy-making (Ventura Campos Lima & Naumann 1997; Campos Lima & 
Naumann 2000).
Linkages consensus democracy and corporatism
Since Portugal does not show a strong institutional pattern of consensus democracy 
and corporatism, a clear connection is not to be expected. Interest groups have no 
strong links with political parties and vice versa. There is a slight exception for 
the working class. Radical workers are organised in trade unions and member of 
the communist party. Since the revolution there is close cooperation between the 
General Confederation of Portuguese Workers CGTP and the communist party 
(van Biezen 2001: 97). These groups are concentrated in certain areas in and 
around Lisbon and in the South of Portugal. Rising wages for workers and the 
decline of the blue-collar employment weakened their position.
 There was some increase of consensus democracy and corporatism in the 
1980s and some decline in later years. In the fi rst period there was slightly more 
consensus democracy and the second period slightly more corporatism. In the last 
years, however both consensus democracy and corporatism declined. Corporatism 
declined as a structural feature, but revived in the form of several social pacts in the 
1990s.
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Socio-economic performance
The events of 1974 threw the Portuguese economic system into a profound crisis 
(Brandão de Brito 1998: 109). The main fi nancial-economic groups and sectors 
were nationalised. The awareness of an economic crisis had an impact on actors’ 
preferences and institutions. The social democratic PS avoided a further polarisation. 
Political institutions became more consensual. Democratic transition contributed to 
economic prosperity. From a comparative perspective the gap between Portugal 
and other European countries is becoming smaller (see Figure 9.3).
 In the fi rst years after the transition consensus democracy was more important in 
establishing the democratic and economic system. Later the degree of corporatism 
increased. Cooperation between trade unions and employers’ organisations became 
stronger. In the fi rst years economic growth and employment were the main priority, 
while in later years, social policy and the welfare state were developed. When 
related to institutions, this leads to the conclusion that consensus democracy is 
more important for political and economic performance than corporatism.
International context
International factors also played a crucial role in Portugal’s economic development. 
The EU invested substantial amounts of money in the Portuguese economy and 
facilitated trade with other European countries. Participation in the EMU did not 
only constrain Portuguese fi nancial and economic policy; budget control limited the 
government’s budget and the expansion of the welfare state.
Two phases of socio-economic policy-making
The fi nancial crisis of 1981-82 – the rise of the strong US Dollar, the new oil shock, 
increasing interest rates - led to an agreement between the IMF and the Bloco 
Central government, a coalition of PS and PSD (Brandão de Brito 1998: 110). This 
meant that international fi nancial-economic developments forced national actors 
to create additional institutional arrangements. This is an example of the impact of 
a severe crisis on preferences and strategies of actors and as a result leading to 
changing or adjusting institutions.
 There is no evidence that consensus democracy and corporatism were the 
institutions that brought economic prosperity, employment and social welfare in 
Portugal. However, increasing consensus democracy and corporatism seems to 
coincide with better socio-economic performance, although it must be emphasised 
that Portugal is neither typical consensus democracy nor a corporatism type of 
country. The coincidence of both institutions and performance can be explained by 
the maturing of the democratic and economic system since the regime change of 
1974.
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9.6 Socio-economic problem-solving
In the post-revolution era, Portugal has had at least two main goals: stabilising 
its democratic political system and reforming its economic structure. Similar to 
the Netherlands and New Zealand actors in Portugal were preference driven. 
The actors in Portugal realised the urgency for change of their behaviour and for 
development of new institutional arrangements. In other words, the revolutionary 
period can be understood as a crisis where transition to democracy and economic 
development were at stake.
 Hence, Portugal shows a pattern of actors adapting their behaviour and changing 
institutional arrangements in order to enhance democratic stability and to improve 
socio-economic performance. In the fi rst post-revolution years, Portugal relied on 
consensual institutional arrangements. Consensus democracy excels in fi nding 
a broad support from relevant actors. And particularly during a period in which 
the democratic system was not fully established this broad support was needed. 
Portugal shows that consensus democracy can function well in the developing 
phase of a democracy. Of course, it was not just because democracy was young that 
broad consensus in the actors’ behaviour was important. These actors were also 
strongly divided about the perception of what policy choices had to be made. These 
differences were a serious threat to the political system. Consensus democracy 
contributed in securing democratic stability in the fi rst post-revolution phase. The 
rules of the new political system were not yet fully established and the actors were 
not yet sure about their political strength.
 From the mid-80s on, after the period of establishing democracy, the Portuguese 
government focused more on socio-economic development. The global socio-
economic crisis had an impact on Portugal as well. Apart from fi ghting this cyclical 
crisis, the economy needed structural reforms. Interestingly, this change in socio-
economic policy was accompanied by an institutional change. Since democratic 
stability was no longer at stake, socio-economic reform had top priority. During the 
1980s the institutional structure shifted towards a more majoritarian democracy. 
Broad support and consensus were less important, changes in socio-economic 
policy were easier to achieve without extensive consultation. The conservative 
government implemented a neo-liberal socio-economic policy that was not 
supported by the leftist parties at all. At this stage, Portuguese democracy was 
consolidated enough to neglect interests of the communist party. In sum: fi rst 
consensus democracy was developed to secure the stability of the political system 
and second Portugal shifted towards majoritarian democracy for economic reform.
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Portugal shows an interesting pattern of changing institutional arrangements and 
actors’ behaviour as a reaction to a situation of crisis and revolution. Moreover, 
these changes have been effective in securing democratic stability and changing 
the national economic structure. In this respect the model of Figure 4.1 in Chapter 
4 helps us to understand how the interaction between the actors’ behaviour and 
institutional change contributed to changes in policy choices and performance.
9.7 Conclusions
In the period between 1975 and 1986 Portugal’s political system was characterised 
by serious confl icts. There were strong tensions between the anti-system Communist 
Party and the other parties and between the President and the government (Colomer 
1996: 207). Removing the socialist goals from the constitution and limiting the power 
of the President contributed to a stable political system from the mid 1980s on. The 
character of the Portuguese political system was most majoritarian between 1987 
and 1995. The Cavaco Silva government was supported by the PSD, which held a 
majority of the seats in parliament.
 Socio-economic policy has developed as well. Most striking is the shift of the 
policy goals. During the fi rst post-revolution years, several political groups and 
unions were focused on transforming the former authoritarian corporatist regime 
into a socialist economy. Communists and radical socialists dominated the labour 
movement and had a strong impact on the political agenda. Many companies were 
nationalised, scaring off many foreign investors.  When Cavaco Silva became 
the PSD Prime Minister the option of installing a socialist state came to an end. 
Completely in line with the political trend in other countries at that time, his 
government started a neo-liberal policy. Companies were (re)privatised and the 
power of the unions was restricted. During the 1990s, this policy appeared to be 
successful. Mass unemployment disappeared and the infl ation rate stabilised at an 
acceptable level. Portugal met the criteria of the stability pact and as a result was 
allowed to join the EMU from the start in 1999.
  Finally, there were strong tensions between labour and capital. After World War 
II no other Western European country came as close as Portugal to becoming a 
socialist state. In the fi rst post-revolution years, trade unions were powerful and 
demanded higher wages. This frustrated economic development. It took a long 
time before unions and employers’ organisations were prepared to cooperate in 
collective wage bargaining, like they did in 1990 when they agreed on an important 
pact.
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 At least three major institutional changes have occurred, which have had an 
effect on political stability and economic development. First, a new political system 
had to be built up after the 1974 revolution. The new semi-presidential system 
combined the advantages of a strong democratic elected head of state with political 
parties that were deeply rooted in society. This hybrid political system contributed to 
a successful transition to democracy. The character of the political system shifted 
several times from more consensual to majoritarian and back. In the fi rst decade, 
the political system was predominantly consensual whereas the second decade was 
predominantly majoritarian. Consensus was essential to build up the democratic 
system and to prevent that radical groups, such as the communists or the ultra-
conservatives, would no longer support the democratic regime. The success can 
be illustrated by the fact that terrorism was limited to a single group that was active 
around 1980. In the second phase of democratisation Portugal moved towards 
a majoritarian democracy. A powerful single-party government pushed through 
several drastic policy reforms.
 Second, the accession to the EU and the EMU was very crucial to the 
economic development of Portugal. There is absolutely no doubt that this led to 
huge investments in infrastructure, opened the market and stabilised the national 
currency. The fact that unemployment remained high in Spain, even after joining 
the EU, illustrates that integrating into Europe was not the sole explaining factor for 
Portugal’s success. It was also due to a more active labour market policy.
 Third, the relation between workers and employers was very tense during the 
early years. It took a long time before a rapprochement between labour and capital 
was realised. The industrial confl icts harmed economic development. However, 
there is no proof that more peaceful, industrial relations were the main explanation 
of the prosperous economic growth of the 1990s.
 Based on this analysis of Portugal, the conclusion can be reached that 
consensus democracy may be more important in realising support for a young 
democratic regime. Majoritarianism may be useful to enforce strong policy reforms. 
Consensus democracy contributed to political stability which stimulated economic 
performance. Corporatist institutions did not play an important role for socio-
economic performance.
Notes
1 The distribution of the electoral votes and seats in parliament between 1975 and 1999 can be found 
in Figures B.5 and B.6 in Appendix B.
2 The share of agricultural employment in total employment decreased from 35% in the 1960s to 
almost 10% in the early 1990s (Bover, García-Perea & Portugal 2000: 391).
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10 SWEDEN: FROM MODEL TO MUDDLING
10.1 Introduction
Sweden has been subject of many studies due to its generous welfare state and its 
successful system of industrial relations: the Swedish model. It has served as both a 
scientifi c and political model to understand how a combination of strongly organised 
interests, a strong social democratic party and a neo-Keynesian economic policy 
can contribute to successful macro-economic policy-making. The model appealed 
to politicians and scholars in political science and economics alike (Milner 1989; 
Castles 1978; Korpi 1983; Armingeon 1983; Esping-Andersen 1985; Therborn 
1989; Katzenstein 1985; Lane 1991; Gruisen 1996; Ryner 2002; Whyman 2003).
 Sweden is selected here for its variation of both economic performance (from 
performing better than other countries until the 1980s to declining performance in 
the 1990s) and its institutional context (from a corporatist model to decentralisation 
of wage bargaining). Swedish corporatism has been regarded as an explanation 
for the good performance until 1990, when unemployment was still much lower 
than in other Western countries. Sweden however has changed in two respects. 
The system of corporatism has decentralised wage bargaining (Kjellberg 1998; 
Pestoff 2001; Fulcher 2002) and in the 1990s the Swedish model of national 
wage bargaining seemed to have vanished. Surprisingly, at the end the 1990s, 
after the 1998 elections, social partnership re-appeared on the political agenda 
(Pestoff 2002). In the 1990s Sweden experienced a real economic crisis, with 
unprecedented infl ation and unemployment rates. Did the decline of Swedish 
corporatism contribute to changing socio-economic performance?
 Sweden belongs to the cluster where consensus democracy and corporatism 
go together. Sweden has a long tradition of cooperation of workers’ and employers’ 
organisations at national level. Its association with consensus democracy is less 
obvious.
 This chapter argues that until the 1980s corporatist institutions in Sweden 
correlated with better socio-economic performance. In the 1990s both corporatism 
and socio-economic performance declined. Sweden is a case where a socio-
economic crisis urged actors to adjust institutions. The new institutional road of 
decentralising industrial relations cannot be considered already successful for 
socio-economic policy. Sweden developed from a model of national corporatism to 
muddling through, fi nding a new institutional structure that is suitable for restoring 
its former excellent socio-economic performance.
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10.2 The political system and party government
As is the case in other Scandinavian countries, the political system of Sweden 
has characteristics of both majoritarian and consensus democracy. It has a 
single dominant party – the social democratic party - which is in power almost 
continuously, and a culturally homogeneous population. Parliamentary power is not 
very fragmented; the party system is not divided into many cleavages. The electoral 
system is proportional, despite the electoral threshold of 4%. Although minority 
governments are formed, they carry the support of non-coalition parties. The style 
of decision-making is a mix of adversarial and compromise politics (Lane & Ersson 
1997: 255). The degree of consensus democracy and corporatism in Sweden does 
not strongly deviate from the other Nordic countries (see also Figure 4.2).
The Swedish political system has two large blocs of political parties. One bloc 
consists of the leftist parties, of which the social democratic party is the dominant 
actor. The other bloc is the bourgeois bloc, which is more divided. At least three 
parties compete for a dominant role in the conservative opposition: the conservative 
Moderate Party, the agrarian Centre Party and the liberals. In recent years, the 
Christian Democrats have gained electoral power. Lane (1991: 1) argues that the 
Swedish model can be characterised as a compromise or a hegemony model. 
Compromise is needed between the socialist camp and the bourgeois parties, 
between the rightwing parties to form a strong opposition, between the leftist parties 
to support the social democratic government and between labour and capital. At 
the same time, the Swedish model is characterised by a strong social democratic 
hegemony.
 For a long time the main division in society was the same as refl ected in the 
party system and industrial relations: namely working class versus capital (cf. 
Milner 1989). Since the 1960s, this division has lost its predominance. Employment 
in the service sector exceeded industrial employment. And because of the rapid 
growth of the Swedish welfare state, many people – women in particular – worked 
in the public sector. As a consequence many people did not feel an exclusive bond 
with organisations representing the blue-collar work force.
 In 1995, Sweden joined the European Union but it does not to participate in 
the Economic and Monetary Union. European integration has infl uenced both the 
economic and political system of Sweden (Algotsson 2001). Due to European 
integration fi rms felt less constrained by national political solutions and economic 
bargains (Pestoff 2001: 12). Firms already lost interest in the Swedish model of 
collective bargaining and are focused either on the international arena or at the 
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sectoral or fi rm level. National political and economic institutions lost importance. 
European integration combined with the process of decentralisation diminished the 
possibilities of the central government to steer the economy.
The party system
Sweden has a list proportional electoral system. The proportionality of the electoral 
system is diminished by a 4% threshold. The goal of this threshold is to avoid 
excessive fractionalisation (Lane & Ersson 1997: 257). The largest party in Sweden 
is the social democratic Sveriges Socialdemokratiska Arbetarepartiet (SAP). Ever 
since 1935 this party has obtained the largest share of the votes and seats. In 
1968 it won an absolute majority of the seats in parliament, Riksdag. The Moderata 
Samlingspartiet (MSP) is the largest conservative party. From 1991 to 1994 it was 
the governing party under leadership of Carl Bildt. It was the fi rst non-socialist 
government in a long time. Since 1998, the third largest party is the left-wing 
Vänsterpartiet (VP). The fourth party is the Christian Democratic party Kristen 
Demokratisk Samling (KSP). They gained considerable political power in the 1990s, 
while the centre party (Centerpartiet CP) and the liberals (Folkpartiet FP) lost both 
seats and votes. The smallest party to gain more than the required 4% of the votes 
in 1998 was the environmental party (Miljöpartiet de Gröna). All other parties failed 
to reach the threshold and are not represented in parliament. The distribution of the 
votes from 1964 can be found in Figure B.7, in Appendix B.
 The Swedish party system has two blocs which both receive a stable share of 
votes. Votes mainly shift between parties within each bloc. Changes are smallest 
in the leftist bloc. The social democratic party lost some of its support to the 
Vänsterpartiet and the Greens. Volatility has been larger in the conservative bloc. 
Both liberals and centre party lost votes to the conservative moderate party and the 
Christian Democrats.
 The high effective number of parties indicates that the impact of the threshold 
on the electoral and parliamentary fragmentation is rather small. The effective 
number of parties in parliament is almost equal to the effective number of electoral 
parties. Furthermore, the effective number of parties increased over time. The party 
system developed from 3 to 3.5 parties to 4 to 4.5 parties. The increasing number 
of effective parties is caused by the success of several new parties in the 1990s. 
Until 1988, Sweden traditionally had fi ve political parties. Social democrats and 
communists on the left side and moderates, liberals and agrarians on the right 
side. In 1988, the Greens won seats in parliament for the fi rst time as did the 
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Christian Democrats and the xenophobic New Democrats in 1991. While the New 
Democrats disappeared from the parliamentary arena in 1994, the Greens and 
Christian Democrats repeated their success in 1998.
 Swedish party system lacks a strong multi-dimensionality (Arter 1999: 146). 
Most parties can be ordered on a traditional socio-economic left-right scale. At the 
left, we fi nd the former communist party - now left party - and the social democrats. 
At the right, the liberals and moderates. The agrarian party – now centre party 
- can be placed in the middle of the political spectrum. This socio-economic 
division dominates the Swedish political landscape; other dimensions play a less 
pronounced role. There is division between urban and rural separating the agrarian 
party from the other parties. Since the 1980s, environmental issues have entered 
Swedish politics. Most of the parties tried to incorporate these new issues in their 
political programme. Another new dimension is the Swedish role in European 
integration. While most parties support joining the EU, the Greens and the left-wing 
Vänsterpartiet are strongly opposed to the EU in its present form.
 Despite some of the shifts described above, the Swedish party system is one 
of the most frozen systems in the world, in terms of Lipset & Rokkan (1967). The 
present party system still resembles that of 1922 (Bergström 1991: 9). Although 
several new parties have entered the political stage, the social democratic party still 
dominates Swedish politics in many respects.
Table 10.1 Coalition governments in Sweden (1964-98)
period Prime Minister Supporting parties Type of government 
Parliamentary 
support
1964-68 Erlander, T. SAP Single party minority government 29.5%
1968-69 Erlander, T. SAP Single party minority government 32.6%
1969-70 Palme, O. SAP Single party minority government 32.6%
1970-73 Palme, O. SAP Single party minority government 42.5%
1973-76 Palme, O. SAP Single party minority government 44.6%
1976-78 Fälldin, T. CP, FP, MSP Minimal winning 51.6%
1978-79 Ullsten, O. FP Single party minority government 11.2%
1979-81 Fälldin, T. CP, FP, MSP Minimal winning 50.1%
1981-82 Fälldin, T. FP, CP Multi party minority government 29.2%
1982-85 Palme, O. SAP Single party minority government 47.6%
1985-86 Palme, O. SAP Single party minority government 45.6%
1986-88 Carlsson, I. SAP Single party minority government 45.6%
1988-90 Carlsson, I. SAP Single party minority government 44.7%
1990-91 Carlsson, I. SAP Single party minority government 44.7%
1991-94 Bildt, C. MSP, FP, KDS, CP Multi party minority government 46.7%
1994-96 Carlsson, I. SAP Single party minority government 46.1%
1996-98 Persson, G. SAP Single party minority government 46.1%
1998- Persson, G. SAP Single party minority government 37.5%
Source: Woldendorp, Keman & Budge (2000).
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Table 10.1 shows the Swedish prime ministers from 1964 on and the parties 
supporting the governments. Most governments are led by a social democratic 
Prime Minister. Only between 1976 and 1982 and between 1991 and 1994 was the 
Swedish government in conservative hands. Governments are stable, hardly ever 
they break up before elections (see Woldendorp, Keman & Budge 2000).
 An important feature of Swedish governments is the high proportion of (single 
party) minority cabinets. Since 1965, 67% of the time a single minority government 
was in power and 14% of the time a multiparty minority coalition. This means that 
most of the time the government had no formal majority in parliament. In order 
to govern a minority government depends on opposition party support. This 
leads to the typical Swedish politics of seeking compromise and consensus. The 
social democratic party seems to have a dominant position in both parliament 
and government. Because they lack a parliamentary majority, they are forced 
to cooperate with opposition parties. Until 1991, there was no viable alternative 
coalition. Figure 10.1 shows the degree of consensus democracy in Sweden from 
1965. 
 
Figure 10.1 Degree of consensus democracy in Sweden
Although Sweden is taken from the consensus democracy and corporatist cluster, 
it cannot be considered a very strong case of consensus democracy. This is mainly 
due to the large proportion of minority governments. This type of governments 
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is based on a small formal parliamentary support. This does not coincide with 
the principle of broad and oversized coalitions, which is a feature of consensus 
democracy. Nevertheless, over the past 35 years the degree of consensus 
democracy has slightly increased, mainly due to the increasing effective number 
of parties. Moreover, Swedish electoral system is very proportional. The fading 
hegemony of the SAP and the increasing effective number of parties contributed to 
the urgency of consensus in the Swedish political system. Since the mid1990s the 
degree of consensus democracy is above average.
10.3 Organised interests
Sweden has been an agrarian society for a long time. Several developments 
have launched Sweden into the modern age. Employment shifted from farming to 
industry, people moved from the country to the cities and new ideologies became 
popular (Micheletti 1991: 146). An agrarian society transformed into an industrial 
society, with specialised workers who rely on companies and urban structure. 
Between 1850 and 1920 many social organisations were founded that came to 
play an important role in the Swedish system of interest groups representation 
(Castles 1978).
 In the 20th century, interest groups became very important in Swedish policy 
formation and implementation. Political decision-making was not isolated from 
interest groups, but these groups were strongly intertwined. Swedish corporatism is 
characterised by dialogue and mutual respect rather than by class-confl ict (Micheletti 
1991: 148). Moreover, this ‘dialogue between opposing political actors became a 
Swedish institutional tradition’ (Micheletti 1991: 148). What began as a mode of 
operating between actors, resulted in a model, the basis of neo-corporatism in a 
mixed economy, which other countries considered to adopt in order to reconstruct 
their own institutional structure according to this Swedish model.
 After World War II, traditional blue collar workers organisations lost importance. 
Many young workers found a job in the service sector instead of the industrial 
sector, female labour participation increased even further and due to the increasing 
welfare state, the public service sector became very important.
 The major workers’ organisation is Landorganisationen (LO). This federation of 
trade unions represents blue-collar workers. The Svenska Arbetsgivareföreningen 
(SAF) is the most important employers’ confederation. Both actors have played a 
dominant role in Swedish industrial relations.
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 The heydays of the Swedish model were characterised by self-regulation and 
centralised bargaining. The willingness of the Swedish social partners to cooperate 
was unique to Western mixed economies. At the same time, the government was 
prepared to give social partners certain autonomy to make their self-regulation 
possible.
 This model of compromise and consensus did not come overnight. The 1920s 
and 1930s were plagued by serious confl icts between labour and capital. Strikes 
vexed this pre-war period (Kjellberg 1998: 81). In the second half of the 1930s an 
agreement was reached stating that the social democratic government would not 
challenge the capitalist nature of production (Kjellberg 1998: 75).
 Sweden, like the other Nordic countries, has a typical combination of central 
and decentralised industrial relations. National unions draw up collective contracts, 
while shop fl oor organisations are operating at fi rm level. The third level is the 
negotiation of centralised agreements. Because of this three-tier system, unions 
are centralised in federations as well as decentralised in local unions, national 
unions and workplace organisations.
 This system started to erode during the 1980s. Attempts from employers’ 
organisations to break down centralised wage bargaining to fi rm level met with 
strong union opposition. Several developments undermined the central role of LO 
and SAF. First of all, the growth of the public sector weakened the position of the 
LO. Second, the proportion of blue-collar workers decreased due to increasing 
service sector employment. Third, women returners increased the already high 
share of female labour participation. The combination of these effects weakened the 
position of the traditional unions, and slowly the employers’ organisation became 
increasingly dominant. In the 1980s, relations between social partners were no 
longer determined by cooperation, but by increasingly militant strategies which 
fuelled their confl icts.
 The withdrawal of the employers’ organisations from the centralised negotiations 
provoked government intervention. In order to restore the central corporatist model, 
the government tried to re-centralise collective bargaining. Self-regulation was 
replaced by state regulation (Kjellberg 1998: 79; Pestoff 2001). The role of the 
national government was also challenged by internationalisation and European 
integration.
 In 1998, corporatism seemed to make a comeback (Pestoff 2001: 8). Several 
unions and employers’ organisations along with the government tried to negotiate 
a new wage agreement. This Alliance for growth could have helped to stimulate 
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growth and employment (Pestoff 2001: 8). In December 1998 however, all 
negotiations were broken off although an agreement was within reach. The social 
partners were still unwilling to overarch their differences and the Swedish model did 
not yet reappear.
 The scores for Sweden on the corporatism index from Chapter 3 are visualised 
in Figure 10.2.
Figure 10.2 Degree of corporatism in Sweden
Figure 10.2 shows a slight decline of Swedish corporatism after 1985, but the 
degree of corporatism is still higher than in most other countries.
10.4 The rise and fall of the Swedish model
The developments of the corporatist institutions in Sweden are discussed in 
Section 10.3. This section analyses the link between institutional context and socio-
economic performance. Sweden developed from a corporatist model contributing to 
an effi cient economy and good socio-economic performance to a case of institutional 
sclerosis. In the 1990s, cooperation between labour and capital became less and 
unemployment levels rose to ever-new heights.
 The 1938 Saltsjöbaden Agreement was the foundation of the Swedish model 
(Lane 1991: 4). This agreement between trade unions and employers’ organisations 
had to maximise cooperation. Years later this agreement still had an impact on the 
industrial relations. The main characteristics of the policy choices of the Swedish 
model are a Keynesian economic policy, an active labour market policy and a large 
welfare state.
4.001985-92 41975-841965-74
1.7
1.6
1.5
1.4
1.3
1.2
1.1
1.0
191
Sweden
 Sweden has multinational fi rms operating on world market level (Pestoff 2001). 
A large proportion of the Swedish economy is dependent on exports. These 
multinationals moved parts of the production to other countries, but many have kept 
their head offi ce in Sweden. Although the domestic free market is strongly corrected 
and steered by the central government, these multinationals were accountable for 
a substantial part of Sweden’s economic growth.
 Katzenstein (1985) argued that corporatism could be functional in open 
economies as a strategy to improve the competitiveness of companies on the 
world economy. Sweden is a small country with little impact on the global market. 
Adapting to global economic developments is therefore their only option. The 
institutions of corporatism in Sweden allow agreements in the collective interest. 
These agreements are not feasible in countries where interest groups only serve 
their own short term interests.
Figure 10.3 Unemployment and infl ation in Sweden
Figure 10.3 shows that unemployment remained low until the late 1980s. From 
1990 on the unemployment rate increased sharply. The infl ation rate was high for 
even a longer time, but has been on the decline for several years now.
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 Comparing the development of unemployment in Figure 10.3 with the degree of 
corporatism in Figure 10.2 makes it clear that the degree of corporatism decreased 
ten years before the level of unemployment started to rise.
 Kjellberg (1998: 93) argues that internationalisation and European integration 
weakened national corporatist representation. In a small country like Sweden - 
combining an open economy with large fi rms – the role of the national state is 
limited (Pestoff 2001). At the same time, Swedish companies have made several 
attempts to decentralise wage bargaining from central to fi rm level. These trends 
of internationalisation and decentralisation lessen the capacity of the national 
government to infl uence Swedish economic development. Recent attempts to 
re-centralise the Swedish corporatist model did not prevent the government from 
losing control (Pestoff 2002).
10.5 Actors, institutions and socio-economic performance
How are actors and institutions related in shaping socio-economic policy and 
performance? For a long time Sweden showed a pattern of corporatist institutions 
and a stable political system. This combination contributed to good socio-economic 
performance and a generous welfare state. Sweden belongs to the richest countries 
of the world, citizens are well protected against social risks and fi rms are able 
to compete successfully on the world market. Sweden is a clear case where, for 
a substantial period, corporatist institutions proved to be successful in promoting 
economic growth and maintaining full employment. This model appeared to erode 
in the 1990s. Firms found that the system of wage bargaining was too rigid, socio-
economic performance deteriorated and the welfare system came under pressure. 
The success of Swedish corporatism faded in the 1990s. Worsening performance led 
to a change of actors’ preferences and institutions. When success and satisfaction 
diminished, actors changed their strategies and tried to reshape the institutions. 
Employers’ organisations did not support centralised wage bargaining anymore. 
The social democratic party continued to lose votes to conservative parties, which 
as a result came in government in the 1990s.
Actors
The main actors in socio-economic policy-making in Sweden are the social 
democratic party, the conservative parties, trade unions and fi rms. LO is the 
main general federation of trade unions and TCO is the public sector union. LO is 
quite militant in trying to protect the corporatist tradition of Sweden. The Swedish 
Employers’ Confederation SAF was in the 1990s strongly opposed to the corporatist 
structures. Social democrats (SAP) have been in power for a long time. This party 
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has been very important for the building and maintaining of corporatist structures in 
Sweden. Under Prime Minister Bildt, conservative parties started an active policy 
of decentralisation and deregulation (Pestoff 2002: 295-296). Social partners lost 
their organisational representatives in the governing bodies of public administration 
boards. This policy was supported by the employers’ organisations SAF. A return of 
social democrats in government in 1994 did not restore this unique system of lay 
representation.
Institutions and linkages between consensus democracy and corporatism
Through time Sweden has shifted from a majoritarian and to a more consensus 
democracy. Lewin (1998: 204) states that ‘during the 1990s cooperation and 
consensus between parties is again the dominant trend’. Having a rather 
homogeneous society, there was no strong need for consensual institutions to 
mitigate potential political confl ict. The degree of consensus democracy has 
increased by a higher effective number of parties. This means that electoral 
fragmentation has increased. Algotsson (2001) argues that Swedish democracy 
has become less majoritarian by its accession to the EU. Since then, the power 
of central government is combined with vertical separation of powers of the EU. 
Although the national decision-making capacity is constrained by the EU, this has 
not caused a strong increase of the consensual character of Swedish national 
political institutions.
 Compared to other countries, Sweden was for a long time, one of the most 
corporatist countries in the Western world. For decades, Sweden was a role model. 
Bother workers’ and employers’ organisations cooperated. It was in the interest 
of both parties, not only in the interest of workers. Soskice (1999: 103) stresses 
that ‘in those advanced economies in which business has been strongly organized 
that industrial relations systems have remained important’. In the 1990s, Sweden’s 
system of wage bargaining was decentralised by the conservative government, 
which was pushed by fi rms (Pontusson & Swenson 1996; Swenson & Pontusson 
2000; Fulcher 2002: 290). According to Soskice (1999: 132) Swedish skilled 
workers’ unions have agreed with fl exibilisation of wage bargaining to prevent that 
business organisations succeeded in a total deregulation. Trade unions complied 
with this second-preferred option. In 1998, workers’ organisations proposed the 
pact ‘Alliance for growth’. The reappearance of social partnership was still resisted 
by employers’ organisations.
 There is some coincidence of consensus democracy and corporatism in Sweden, 
although the former has never been very strong. There was a connection between 
a dominating social democratic party in the political arena and trade unions in the 
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political-economic arena. To some extent there was a shared ideology of mitigating 
class confl ict. Both in the political and the political-economic arena cooperation 
was strong and there were relatively few confl ict and strikes. Interest groups were 
involved in both decision-making and policy implementation.
Socio-economic performance
What has been the impact of consensus democracy and corporatism on socio-
economic performance in Sweden? As already argued, Swedish corporatist 
institutions formed a unique model of cooperation between unions and employers’ 
organisations on socio-economic issues. There was coordination on several levels 
of wage bargaining, workers and employers were involved in social policy and there 
was strong commitment to full employment. 
 The degree of consensus democracy in Sweden is not very high. Yet, Swedish 
political system is relatively stable and peaceful. An important determinant of this 
stability is the dominance of the social democratic SAP. A stable government, 
although it was often only based on a minority in parliament, contributed to 
the successful socio-economic policy. There was a rather consistent ideology 
of corporatist industrial relations. In this respect, consensus democracy and 
corporatism strengthened each other.
 In the 1990s there was strong dissatisfaction with socio-economic performance. 
Especially employers demanded a change of the system of wage bargaining. 
Swedish fi rms threatened to move production to other countries and they even 
considered moving their head offi ce to other places.
 Dissatisfaction about socio-economic performance paved the way for a right-
wing coalition in 1991. Infl ation rates did decrease, but unemployment continued 
to increase to a level of about 10%. Worsening socio-economic performance in 
Sweden put the generous welfare state under pressure. Swedish active labour 
market policy, which had been a success for a long time, became very expensive 
with so many people dependent on social assistance.
 Corporatist institutions certainly contributed to the success of the Swedish model 
until the 1980s, but some country-specifi c aspects added to the success as well. 
There was a strong social democratic ideology and fi rms developed internationally 
and were highly competitive. When socio-economic performance deteriorated 
employers’ organisations and conservative parties attacked successfully the 
corporatist institutions. Trade unions and left-wing parties aimed to protect the 
system of policy concertation. With declining corporatism in Sweden, unemployment 
remained high, but infl ation rates decreased. The right-wing government was more 
devoted to lower infl ation, even at the cost of unemployment. Full employment was 
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no longer a priority because there was less involvement of workers’ organisations 
in policy-making. At the same time, Swedish active labour market policy was 
weakened.
Central bank
For a long time, Sweden’s central bank independence has been relatively low. 
Franzese & Hall (2000: 184) argue that increasing central bank independence when 
wage bargaining is coordinated helps to obtain lower infl ation without increasing 
unemployment. Swedish monetary policy had become more non-accommodating 
during the 1990s (Iversen & Pontusson 2000: 18). The central bank was certainly not 
totally independent from the government. Sweden has devaluated its currency and 
liberated the capital market. In the 1990s, infl ation decreased, but unemployment 
remained high. Central bank independence in Sweden is still comparatively low and 
the system of wage bargaining became more decentralised in the 1990s. These 
events can to some extent explain why infl ation decreased, while unemployment 
remained high.
10.6 Socio-economic problem-solving
The pattern of socio-economic development in Sweden deviates from that of the 
other analysed cases. While the other countries have experienced a long period of 
worse performance and socio-economic crisis, Sweden performed comparatively 
better. This good performance was largely explained by the corporatist institutional 
structure. For a long time there was no reason for actors to adapt their behaviour 
because of a crisis. Sweden is a case where a strong awareness of the possibility 
of a crisis was largely absent. And therefore actors had no reason to change their 
behaviour nor was there need for institutional reform. This partly explains why the 
institutional arrangements of consensus democracy and corporatism are quite 
stable, at least compared to other countries. This absence of a severe crisis and 
the absence of changing behaviour and institutions contrast the other analysed 
cases. In these other cases a crisis instigated different actors’ behaviour resulting 
in different institutional arrangements, while Sweden lacked this urgency for change 
for a long time. This can be seen as a confi rmation that a deep crisis can lead to 
changing institutions and that absence of such a crisis contributes to institutional 
stability. In other words, it shows that the actors’ behaviour related to institutional 
arrangements is largely determined by their perception about the socio-economic 
situation.
 In the early 1990s, Sweden, like most other Western countries, was hit by an 
economic crisis. This crisis affected especially the behaviour of the employers’ 
organisations. They largely blamed the Swedish corporatist institutional structure. 
196
The institutional dynamics of consensus and confl ict
Together with a conservative government they tried to reform corporatist platforms 
and to implement a neo-liberal socio-economic policy. Despite decentralisation 
of wage bargaining, Sweden did not manage to restore its former excellent 
performance.
10.7 Conclusions
The Swedish political system appears to be rather stable. No fundamental changes 
in terms of consensus democracy have occurred. Most of the characteristics used 
in this study to measure the degree of consensus democracy have not changed 
in Sweden. The only apparent development is a slight increase in the number of 
parties.
 The real changes in Sweden took place in the system of industrial relations. 
After a substantial period of consensus and compromise between work and capital, 
the Swedish model folded in the 1990s. All actors involved changed strategies. 
Employers attempted to decentralise wage bargaining, unions became increasingly 
militant and the government again tried to re-centralise the whole process.
 Sweden can be seen as a case where all social actors were forced to change 
their strategy due to international pressure. The Swedish economy is open and is 
dependent on world market developments. Sweden hosts many multinationals. For 
a long time, workers and employers were prepared to make agreements on wage 
moderation in order to preserve the Swedish position on the world market.
 From the 1980s on, employers have tried to undermine the centralist system of 
wage bargaining. The government attempted to end a period of confl ict between 
labour and capital. This resulted in a shift from self-regulation to state regulation. 
The emphasis on cooperation and consensus was replaced by state intervention. 
While most Western European countries show a trend towards revitalisation of 
social partnership, Sweden has lost much of its once praised harmonic model. An 
attempt to reinstall social partnership in 1998 failed. From their increasing dominant 
position, employers have undermined the system of peaceful industrial relations. 
Unions are internally divided by changes within the labour force. The government 
is trying to get a renewed grip on the political economy. Sweden has still a long way 
to go before it reaches a new equilibrium.
 For a long time, until the late 1980s, in Sweden corporatist institutions were 
successful in promoting economic growth, guaranteeing full employment and low 
infl ation rates. The Swedish model worked well as long as all conditions were 
supportive and the model worked longer than in most other Western countries. When 
conditions changed in the 1990s, the institutional structure was unable to cope with 
the economic crisis. Already before that time, employers’ organisations attempted to 
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decentralise national corporatism. Firms were increasingly internationally focused. 
At the same time national policy-making was increasingly constrained by European 
integration. Employers’ organisations felt less committed to national coordination 
of socio-economic policy and wage bargaining. Firms became more international 
players and did no longer need the traditional national corporatist institutions. 
Pestoff (1999: 15) observes that ‘SAF is stuck with Sweden, and Sweden with SAF’. 
They successfully limited national corporatism and implemented decentralisation of 
wage bargaining.
 Trade unions became increasingly divided. In the 1990s they had not 
enough power left to obstruct decentralisation, which was pushed by employers’ 
organisations and a conservative government. Moreover, European integration 
made workers’ organisations realise that it had become more diffi cult for Sweden 
to pursue its own policy.
 Decentralising national corporatist institutions did not lead to better performance. 
The main conclusion is that in Sweden corporatist institutions were effi cient under 
good socio-economic conditions. This positive effect lasted longer than in other 
countries, but in the end, Swedish corporatist institutions could not prevent an 
economic crisis. This means that although a national strategy of corporatism may 
to a certain level limit the impact of an international economic crisis, it does not 
make a country entirely insensitive for external infl uences.
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11 CONCLUSIONS 
11.1 Goal of this study
This study has analysed the relations between different types of institutional 
arrangements and their impact on socio-economic policy-making and performance. 
Consensus based versus confl ict based institutional arrangements are contrasted. 
Institutional arrangements of consensus versus majoritarian democracy are used 
in the case of political decision-making. Institutional arrangements of corporatism 
compared to pluralism are used in the case of policy concertation among organised 
interests. Do these consensual institutions make a difference? The institutional 
patterns have been analysed comparatively for twenty developed democracies. 
The results and fi ndings are discussed in this chapter.
 The research question underlying this thesis is: under what conditions and to what 
extent do the institutions of consensus democracy and corporatism contribute to 
better socio-economic performance in twenty developed democracies? There have 
been various studies on the impact of consensus democracy and corporatism on 
performance with different conclusions. This study attempts to take a next step. First, 
it focuses on differences and similarities of the institutions of consensus democracy 
and corporatism. This study shows that both types of institutions differ and have 
different effects on performance. Second, both formal and informal institutions are 
taken into account. Third, instead of a static approach, a more dynamic approach 
has been developed. This study does not only measure variations over time, but 
focuses also on the interactions between actors and institutions. The institutional 
dynamics comes to the fore in how actors’ behaviour is adjusted by institutions 
and in turn how these actors attempt to infl uence performance and how variable 
performances change actors’ strategies to cope with socio-economic change.
11.2 Comparative fi ndings
This study compares twenty democracies by means of a quantitative approach and 
focusing on four cases out of these twenty countries in more detail in a qualitative 
manner. First of all, the institutions of consensus democracy and corporatism are 
defi ned and measured. The conceptual and empirical linkages are presented as 
well as their effects on socio-economic performance. This has been presented in 
Part II of the book.
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The institutions of consensus democracy
Chapter 2 deals with the following sub-questions: what is consensus democracy, 
how is it defi ned and how can it be measured properly in comparative research? 
How did consensus democracy develop in twenty developed democracies between 
1965 and 1998?
 The comparative study of political institutions of consensus democracy goes 
a long way back. It started as an explanation of events in individual countries and 
developed empirical models for comparative analysis. Consociational democracy 
was developed to explain democratic stability in a social-culturally heterogeneous 
society. Consensus democracy, however, is a set of institutional arrangements of 
political decision-making associated with broad consultation of parties and organised 
interests as opposed to majoritarian democracy that enhances the development of 
a dominant party.
 Lijphart made an important contribution to comparative politics by developing the 
concept of consensus democracy. The consensus versus majoritarian dichotomy 
makes a crucial distinction between the way institutions deal with social divisions 
and potential political confl icts. The main problem with Lijphart’s refi nements of 
his model is that by taking too many different kinds of indicators into account, 
it has become too much of a container concept with a too high degree of multi-
dimensionality. Central bank independence, for example, matters for governance 
and socio-economic performance, but is not an institutional feature that necessarily 
contributes to consensus and confl ict-solving. Corporatism may well enhance 
infl uence of interest groups in socio-economic policy-making, but it functions almost 
by defi nition in a different arena, as already is shown. Lijphart’s federal dimension 
of consensus democracy is redundant. Federal institutions give certain actors veto 
power, but this does not necessarily lead to consensual behaviour. Of the countries 
analysed here, Switzerland is the only case of a small country with a heterogeneous 
society and a long history of federalism. Lijphart’s model of consensus democracy 
is important in order to understand comparative institutional patterns of confl ict-
solving, but in my view, he developed it too much in an all-embracing concept of 
democracy.
 Chapter 2 presents a more parsimonious and dynamic operationalisation 
of consensus democracy. There is considerable variation in the presence of 
consensus democracy both through time and across countries. Switzerland, Finland 
and Belgium are the strongest cases of consensus democracy, while Canada, 
New Zealand and the United Kingdom have the highest degree of majoritarian 
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democracy. According to my analysis, the Netherlands, France, Italy and Australia 
show the largest fl uctuations in the degree of consensus democracy over time. 
In sum, the index of consensus democracy presented in Chapter 2 is a valid and 
reliable indicator of consensus politics with regard to policy-making.
The institutions of corporatism
What is corporatism, how is it defi ned and how can it be measured in comparative 
research? How did corporatism develop in twenty developed democracies between 
1965 and 1998?
 Corporatism, in my opinion, should be considered a special institutional 
arrangement of socio-economic policy-making between employers’ organisations 
and trade unions. Contrary to pluralism, interest groups have preferential access to 
the processes of policy-formation and implementation and it is a closed shop and 
not a free for all system. Industrial relations are characterised by consensus and 
cooperation rather than by confl ict. The main contribution of cooperation between 
interest groups and government on socio-economic issues is that agreements can 
be reached to represent the common good and that are more stable over time. 
Coordinated and centralised wage bargaining avoids short-term behaviour (such as 
strongly increasing wages in specifi c sectors for specifi c groups) that undermines 
the general interest. In other words, corporatist institutions change a ‘one shot’ 
game (with a sub-optimal solution as an outcome) into an iterated game, in which 
a Pareto outcome appears more feasible. That is – at least – the underlying idea of 
many students of corporatism.
 Many operationalisations  have been developed to measure empirically the role 
of corporatism. This study presents an alternative index that aims at a concept 
which allows for a more refi ned, more precise measurement of the existence of 
corporatist institutions and which is simultaneously dynamic by applying it to four 
different time periods. It should be noticed that the role of government is explicitly 
not taken into the measurement of corporatism to avoid overlap with consensus 
democracy, which – as we pointed out – is seen as the institution where government 
is central. Hence, we have two institutional models representing the infl uence of 
actors within democracies regarding policy-making. Therefore, linkages between 
corporatism and consensus democracy are of special interest in this study.
Linkages between consensus democracy and corporatism
What are both the conceptual and the empirical relation between consensus 
democracy and corporatism; which relations can be found between both institutional 
arrangements, cross-national and through time?
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 On a conceptual level there are differences between the models of consensus 
democracy and corporatism as well as commonalities. One connection between 
consensus democracy and corporatism is that both institutional models enhance 
the input of many different groups and interest interests in decision-making and 
policy formation and implementation. They differ in the arena of decision-making, 
but both institutional models share a broad range of incorporated and involved 
actors. This is in contrast with majoritarian democracy, which excludes groups 
or at least hinders the access of various (minority) groups. Moreover consensus 
democracy and corporatism can be considered to function complementary. While 
certain groups may not succeed in gaining infl uence in the political decision-making 
arena, they may gain access to the policy-making process – in this case through 
institutionalised forms of socio-economic policy formation.
 The most obvious similarity between consensus democracy and corporatism is 
the style of decision-making that is used. Both models are based on cooperation 
and compromise as basic mechanism. Therefore, consensus and confl ict are 
distinguished as the opposite ends of a scale. Consensus democracy and 
corporatism belong to the category where compromise is the major style, while 
majoritarian democracy and pluralism represent the opposite category.
 Despite some connections and overlap, there are some fundamental differences 
between consensus democracy and corporatism. Most prominent of which is the 
arena in which they function: the political and the socio-economic arena respectively. 
Another difference concerns the actors involved. While consensus democracy 
applies to the decision-making between voters, parties and governments, 
corporatism concerns with trade unions and employers’ organisations.
 Although consensus democracy and corporatism may well coincide in their 
underlying ideas, they have their own dynamics. Our comparison of consensus 
democracy and corporatism has led to the conclusion that these institutional 
arrangements should indeed be distinguished from each other, both conceptually 
and empirically. Both institutional arrangements apply to different decision-making 
arenas in which different actors are involved. Of course, governments operate in 
both arenas dealing with both political parties and with trade unions and employers’ 
organisations. And socio-economic policy is not solely shaped by political decision-
making. Of course, both institutional arrangements are not closed systems and have 
relations with other institutions. Yet, this is no reason to mix consensus democracy 
and corporatism up, as is done by Lijphart (1999) and Lijphart & Crepaz (1991). 
Lane & Ersson (2000) and Keman & Pennings (1995) are correct in claiming that 
these two sets of institutions must be clearly distinguished. This claim is clearly 
upheld in this study.
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Impact on socio-economic performance
What is the relationship between the institutions of consensus democracy and 
corporatism and socio-economic performance? To what extent do these institutions 
contribute to better performance? An important conclusion of Chapter 5 is that the 
institutions of consensus and cooperation are not systematically related to better 
performance. The effect of these institutions on performance is infl uenced by other 
factors as well, such as openness of the economy, central bank independence and 
so on. This fi nding implies that existence of the institutions of consensus democracy 
and corporatism is not by defi nition the best medicine for a good socio-economic 
performance. In Chapter 5 a number of hypotheses were tested by means of 
multivariable regression. The result demonstrates that indeed the link between 
consensus democracy and corporatism with performance is weak, especially if 
controlled for contextual factors.
 Generally speaking, we conclude that consensus democracy and corporatism 
are associated with several performance indicators, but this effect mostly disappears 
if and when controlled for other variables. Only the positive effect of corporatism 
on social expenditures remains when controlled for other factors. In other words: 
unemployment, infl ation, economic growth and GDP per capita are not dependent 
on the existence of consensus democracy and corporatism. Hence, the infl uence 
of consensus democracy and corporatism is at best indirect and matter only under 
certain conditions, i.e. in combination with other factors. For example, openness 
of the economy is associated with lower infl ation rates, higher GDP per capita and 
higher social expenditures. Central bank independence is associated with lower 
unemployment rates and higher GDP per capita. If and when these coexist one may 
indeed expect a higher performance in combination with consensus democracy 
and corporatism.
 Corporatism does matter for social expenditures. This means that corporatist 
institutions have no robust impact on socio-economic performance, but instead lead 
to other policy choices. This observation does not hold for consensus democracy. 
Consensus democracy does not matter strongly for socio-economic performance 
indicators or for social expenditures. This demonstrates that it is hazardous to use a 
broad operationalisation of consensus democracy, like Crepaz (1992) and Lijphart 
(1999) have done. They found indeed positive effects of consensus democracy, 
because several factors, such as central bank independence and corporatism were 
included as indicators of their concept of consensus democracy. It appears that 
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each of these have an isolated effect. Moreover, our fi ndings show that the effects 
of consensus democracy and corporatism on performance differ. This confi rms that 
these institutions are not the same.
11.3 Case analysis
The comparative analysis indicates that corporatism and consensus democracy are 
not strongly related to socio-economic performance. However, this does not mean 
that the relationship between institutions and performance is totally irrelevant. From 
the set of twenty countries, four cases have therefore been selected to analyse the 
mutual infl uence of institutions on performance. The cases also allow for taking into 
account the role of actors. In the analysis of the relations among actors, institutions 
and performance the framework of two phases, two arenas and two levels of socio-
economic policy-making is used. The four cases - the Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Portugal and Sweden - show – as expected - different institutional patterns and 
socio-economic performance. For each case we have attempted to analyse in 
more detail how and in what way institutions and actors are interrelated and have 
interacted.
The Netherlands
The improvement of socio-economic performance that occurred in the 1990s is 
not solely due to the level and change of the institutions of consensus democracy 
and corporatism. An external factor, namely natural gas revenues, were still a 
substantial source of income for the government which was used to maintain the 
high and generous level and entitlements of social benefi ts (Hemerijck, Unger & 
Visser 2000: 213). Among other things, the Dutch disease was caused by a lack of 
direct pressure to cut in social security despite increasing unemployment. For a long 
time, there was ample active labour market policy. Since the fi rst Kok government, 
both levels and entitlement of social benefi ts were reduced. Benefi t recipients were 
offered subsidised jobs, fi rst in the public sector, later also in the market sector. 
Labour contracts were made more fl exible and temporary employment agencies – 
supplying part-time labour - were promoted by the government. There was a state-
organised job agency and there was even a collective agreement for temporary 
workers. Increasing part-time employment and the entrance of women in the labour 
market made it possible to benefi t strongly from the cyclical economic growth of 
the 1990s. The resulting shift from low to high employment has been labelled the 
‘Dutch miracle’ (Visser & Hemerijck 1997).
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 Comparatively, performance in the Netherlands developed from below to 
average. The institutions of consensus democracy and corporatism have always 
been present in the Netherlands, but there was no strong increase in importance 
of these institutions that could explain the better performance. In the 1990s, 
government had become more dominant. The consensual institutions were used by 
the government to create support from interest groups for reforms in social security 
and regulating labour market. There were no voluntary agreements between 
interest groups, but the government involved these groups in the policy-making 
process. Political actors played a dominant role compared with social and economic 
actors. Consensual institutions in the Netherlands allowed input of interest groups 
in decision-making without having the opportunity to obstruct policy reforms. This 
legitimated political decisions and prevented loss of support for the political system. 
Nevertheless, Dutch consensual institutions were not responsible for better socio-
economic performance as such. The implementation of radical policy changes 
that contributed to better performance was facilitated by these institutions. In other 
countries, consensual institutions could have led to obstruction of policy change. In 
the Dutch case, these institutions contributed to stronger support – at least during 
the 1990s. This means that institutions as such cannot explain policy change and 
better socio-economic performance, but the way they were used by the actors 
appear to have facilitated policy-making. Hence, there is no Dutch miracle in which 
a certain confi guration of institutions solves socio-economic problems, but rather 
– as we showed in our comparative analysis – that other factors together with a 
consensual confi guration is more likely to coincide with a proper socio-economic 
performance.
New Zealand
In New Zealand, a Labour government initiated a neo-liberal socio-economic 
policy in 1984. Later, the National Party reformed the welfare state. New Zealand 
exempted much of its labour market and wage bargaining regulations and adopted 
a neo-liberal strategy of individual wage bargaining. Despite these policy reforms, 
socio-economic performance trailed behind that in other countries.
 The existing majoritarian political system made radical policy reforms possible, 
since, the ruling party has a secure majority and meets little opposition. Yet, the New 
Zealand case shows there is also a limit to radical policy reform. Dissatisfaction 
about socio-economic performance became visible in the electoral results of the two 
alternating parties in government, which undermined the legitimacy of the political 
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system. This contributed to the change of the electoral system that in 1996, after a 
long debate, became more proportional by the introduction of the mixed-member 
proportional system.
 In New Zealand performance did have an impact on actors’ strategies and 
institutions were adjusted. The institutions of consensus democracy and corporatism 
were adjusted in opposite directions. On the one hand, wage bargaining was 
decentralised and the role of trade unions was drastically cut back. The infl uence 
of interest groups on socio-economic policy-making was limited. On the other 
hand, the electoral system became more proportional and instead of single party 
governments, coalitions were formed. This pattern of moving even further away 
from corporatism and moving closer to consensus democracy did not contribute to 
a signifi cantly better socio-economic performance.
Portugal
Portugal’s political system has moved from a moderate consensus democracy into 
the direction of a more majoritarian democracy. In the post-revolution transition 
period, consensus seemed essential to consolidate democracy. Hence, institutional 
arrangements were developed to enhance political stability, not for socio-economic 
policy. In the 1980s, these consensual institutions became less important. Once 
political stability was secured, the democratic system became more majoritarian. 
Simultaneously, a more neo-liberal policy was implemented.
 Socio-economic development in Portugal must be explained otherwise than 
by the institutions of consensus democracy and corporatism. The economy was 
liberalised and opened for foreign investments. International trade increased 
signifi cantly. Trade openness was stimulated by European integration. After joining 
the EU, substantial money from the European structural funds were invested 
to improve infrastructure. The transition to democracy and accession to the EU 
changed Portugal fundamentally and brought it in a modern age. In Portugal 
consensual institutions contributed to more political stability, but there is no direct or 
strong connection with socio-economic performance. Thus consensus democracy 
and corporatism have not developed in performance and apparently it was not in 
the interests of politicians and capital and labour.
Sweden
In Sweden, corporatist institutions have for a long time contributed to a comparatively 
sound socio-economic performance. Although in the 1980s corporatism was on the 
decline in several other countries, Sweden still had a much more active labour market 
policy and unemployment still was much lower. The Swedish social democratic 
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model of corporatism was increasingly under pressure of fi rms and employers’ 
organisations in particular, but it did not change overnight. Social democrats remained 
the strongest party, institutions were rigid and enhanced a path-dependent social 
policy. Due to the declining support from fi rms for corporatism, wage bargaining 
was slowly decentralised. During the 1990s performance in Sweden deteriorated. 
Sweden did not manage to achieve full employment any more. Increasing 
unemployment in the 1990s coincided with the erosion of corporatist institutions. 
Hence, performance seems to be the effect-producing factor. However, adopting a 
more neo-liberal policy in the 1990s did not lead to an end of the Swedish economic 
crisis. Employers’ organisations did apparently see no future for corporatism. Yet, 
there appears not to be a viable alternative for the corporatist model that can lead 
to a resurge of Swedish economy.
Table 11.1 Summary of the four cases
Consensus democracy Corporatism
Linkage consensus 
democracy and 
corporatism
Nether-lands
From consociationalism to 
depoliticised elitism
From tri- to bi-partism
Strong
New Zealand
Away from majoritarianism 
by electoral reform (more 
proportional);
From bipolar party system 
to coalition governments
End of system of 
arbitration; decentralisation 
of wage-bargaining
Not present
Portugal
Shifting between 
majoritarianism and 
consensus; less 
presidentialism
Social partnership in the 
1990s
Weak
Sweden
No change of the political 
system
From the Swedish model 
to decentralised bi-partism
Medium
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Table 11.1 continued
Performance
Actors’ 
role
International dimension
Nether-lands
From low labour 
participation to low 
unemployment
Unions weak; government 
dominant over interest 
groups
Open economy and 
member EU
New Zealand
Lower infl ation at 
the cost of more 
unemployment
Labour implemented neo-
liberal reforms;
National Party reformed 
welfare state
Isolation from world 
market; export to UK 
declined since UK entered 
EU
Portugal
Economic growth and 
employment
After revolution 
polarisation; since 1985 
conservative government 
dominates and neo-liberal 
reforms
EU stimulated investments 
and part of EU market
Sweden
Full employment 
disappeared in the 
1990s
Strong social democratic 
party and divided 
opposition; 1990s: fi rms 
and conservatives urged 
for decentralisation wage 
bargaining
Open economy; member 
of EU since 1995, but not 
of EMU
Each case is selected from one of four clusters. Sweden, from the consensus 
and corporatist cluster, showed good performance in the past, but this advantage 
disappeared through time. This resembles the connection between corporatism 
and performance through time, although in Sweden corporatism remained strong 
for a longer time than in most other countries. New Zealand performed worse than 
other countries in the majoritarian and pluralist cluster. The non-consensus and 
non-corporatist cluster, to which Portugal belongs, performed signifi cantly worse 
than the other clusters. For a long time Portugal lagged behind other countries, but 
through the democratic transition and joining the EU, Portugal achieved increasing 
economic growth and reducing unemployment. A long time, the Netherlands, from 
the consensus or corporatist cluster, had average performance. It was not until the 
mid 1990s that employment increased.
 The fi ndings in the cases can be summarised as follows. Corporatism is useful 
as a transient strategy to keep infl ation and unemployment under control. Yet, 
since the late 1980s, the positive effect of corporatism on performance has been 
declining. In Sweden corporatism became less important and ways different than 
a corporatist strategy were tried to improve socio-economic performance. Better 
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performance in the Netherlands in the 1990s cannot entirely be explained by 
corporatism and consensus democracy, but rather by other factors such as fl exible 
labour contracts, part-time jobs and the entrance of women on the labour market.
 Consensus democracy is relevant for system support and political stability. 
In New Zealand dissatisfaction with electoral results weakened the majoritarian 
political system. In Portugal consensual institutions seem to have played a role 
during the transition to democracy. Majoritarian democracy can be useful for radical 
policy change. In New Zealand a neo-liberal policy and a welfare state reform were 
implemented that would have met much stronger resistance under a consensus 
democracy. In Portugal neo-liberal socio-economic policy reforms were introduced 
in a period in which the political system moved towards majoritarianism. These 
reforms were in part needed to prepare Portugal for accession to the EU. In all 
4 cases, the role of trade unions has weakened. In Sweden and New Zealand, 
regulations have limited the power of unions. In the Netherlands, unions lost a 
great deal of their members. In all Western democracies corporatist institutions 
have been under pressure, but they did certainly not disappear entirely. However, 
these confi gurations appeared incapable to reverse worsening socio-economic 
conditions.
 Obviously, the international dimension should not be neglected in this case 
comparison. The Netherlands and Sweden have very open economies that are 
largely dependent on international trade. Because of their competitive position in 
the world market, wage costs are crucial for their economic growth. That explains 
why the system of wage bargaining has played such an important role in Sweden 
and the Netherlands. Portugal is a case where since the 1980s integration in the 
European political and economic system constrained domestic socio-economic 
policy-making. The European Union has been a stimulating factor for economic 
development as well as a constraining factor of national policy choices. New 
Zealand was forced to make other socio-economic policy choices, when the trade 
with the UK declined. International factors have been crucial in all these cases, but 
still they show different institutional patterns of socio-economic problem-solving.
 The four cases analysed show the importance of the role of actors. Institutions 
may shape the room to manoeuvre for actors, while actors make decisions about 
policy choices and adapt to changing institutions. This conclusion shows the 
usefulness of the actor-centred approach of institutional analysis. Both institutions 
and actors appear to be important.
 The role of the government - which is not part of the measurement of corporatism 
- appears important. The case analysis shows that governments played a dominant 
role in making socio-economic policy. Moreover, governments are able to overrule 
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agreements made between trade unions and employers’ organisations. This means 
that corporatist institutions seem to work if and when allowed for by the political 
arena. Corporatism can function in addition to consensus democracy, but it certainly 
has not the same role as political decision-making. Again, as was concluded earlier, 
consensus democracy and corporatism are not he same phenomena, they function 
differently and – in the end - their effect depends on the actors.
11.4 The institutional dynamics of consensus and confl ict and socio-economic 
problem-solving in twenty developed democracies
The institutional dynamics of consensus and confl ict is understood in this study by 
how actors and institutions are related with performance. To understand how the 
institutions of consensus democracy and corporatism are connected to other policy 
choices and socio-economic performance, two phases, two levels and two arenas 
of socio-economic problem-solving has been distinguished.
 The relation between actors, institutions and performance consists of two phases 
of socio-economic problem-solving. The fi rst phase focuses on how performance 
changes actors’ strategies and in the second phase actors adjust institutions in 
order to achieve better performance. The process of socio-economic problem-
solving can also be understood as a two level game. Actors and institutions operate 
at two levels. Parties interact with voters and parliamentary parties cooperate in 
government formation. There is interaction between interest organisations and 
their members. In the socio-economic arena trade unions interact with employers’ 
organisations. Actors shift between two arenas: political decision-making and 
policy concertation among organised interests. In the former a distinction between 
consensus and majoritarian democracy is made, while in the latter corporatism 
versus pluralism.
 With regard to these three distinctions of socio-economic problem-solving (two 
phases, two levels and two arenas) three conclusions can be drawn. First, when 
looking at the two phases of socio-economic problem-solving this study shows 
that the impact of socio-economic performance on actors and their strategies and 
institutions is important and has a strong infl uence on the role of institutions and 
actors.
 Second, actors, such as political parties and interest groups, play a game at 
two levels. Parties interact with other parties in government formation and political 
decision-making and they interact with voters in gaining political power. Interest 
groups interact with other groups in wage bargaining shaping socio-economic 
policy and they interact with their members. In New Zealand, drastic policy reforms 
contributed to dissatisfaction among voters about the electoral system. Institutional 
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reform was needed to secure support. In Portugal the democratic system and socio-
economic policy was under permanent pressure from different groups. Consensus 
democracy contributed to system support during the transition period. In Sweden, 
employers gave up their support for the system of centralised wage bargaining. 
This made it a different type of corporatism. This means that changes in the support 
of voters and interest group members can lead to changes in institutions. These 
changes are often driven by dissatisfaction about policy choices and socio-economic 
performances and result in more or less disfunctionality of existing institutions.
 Third, two different arenas with two different institutions must be distinguished; 
actors have the option to move from one arena to the other arena when no satisfactory 
decision can be made. Institutions of consensus allow political actors to obstruct 
development of new policy or adjusting existing policy. Actors can move to the arena 
of policy concertation and use corporatism for policy reform or development. In the 
1990s corporatism was no longer related to better socio-economic performance, but 
in several countries it has allowed actors to reform the welfare state. Majoritarian 
democracy may help to keep the welfare state comparatively smaller, but it does 
not mean a better socio-economic performance than elsewhere.
 The distinction between consensus and majoritarian democracy and between 
corporatism and pluralism proved to be relevant. Actors adjusted institutions in the 
direction of either of these types. This change was driven by the urge for political 
stability and socio-economic performance.
 This thesis started from the expectation that additional institutional arrangements 
or informal institutions are created when formal institutions do not function. Our 
conclusion is that actors themselves adapt and adjust the rules of the original 
game within the existing confi guration. The institutional dynamics of consensus 
and confl ict is found in the two phases and the fact that actors can shift between 
levels and arenas.
 The central question of this study has been under what conditions and to what 
extent consensus democracy and corporatism contribute to better socio-economic 
policy-making and better performance in twenty Western democracies. Four 
hypotheses are tested:
1 institutions are not static but dynamic;
2 consensus democracy and corporatism are different institutional confi gurations 
and have a different relation with socio-economic performance;
3 consensus democracy and corporatism lead to better socio-economic 
performance;
4 consensus democracy and corporatism are characteristic for a larger welfare 
state.
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 The fi ndings in this study confi rm the fi rst hypothesis that institutions are 
dynamic. Yet, the main fi nding is that not only institutions do change, they also 
appear to be driven by both actors’ strategies and by (changes in) socio-economic 
performance. The dynamics is shown by comparative analysis and is reinforced by 
the four cases.
 Consensus democracy and corporatism share some underlying characteristics, 
but they are indeed different types of institutions and they have different effects. The 
impact of consensus democracy and corporatism on socio-economic performance 
is generally modest. In particular when other factors are taken into account, the 
effects are weak. This means that hypothesis 3 is not confi rmed by this study. The 
only effect that appears to be robust is the positive effect of corporatism and - to a 
lesser extent - of consensus democracy on social expenditures. This confi rms the 
fourth and last hypothesis.
 The conceptual model in Figure 1.2, Chapter 1, shows that actors’ preferences 
are transformed into policy choices and affect performance through the institutions 
of consensus democracy and corporatism. This Eastonian approach emphasises 
the effect of institutions on policy choices and performance, but also leaves room 
for feedback effects. The effect of performance on institutions, as suggested in 
the two phases of socio-economic problem-solving in Section 1.6, Chapter 1, was 
indeed found in the case analyses.
 The main fi ndings of this study are that the institutions of consensus democracy 
and corporatism are not always most preferable and that the relation between 
institutions and performance must be understood as a two-sided process. This 
study concludes that the institutions of consensus democracy and corporatism still 
matter, but they do not always contribute to better socio-economic performance. 
The positive effect on performance is not the same for all countries, in all periods 
and under all circumstances. This means that the institutions of consensus 
democracy and corporatism are probably not feasible and viable for all political-
economic systems. The theoretical framework and the comparative methodology 
used in this study shows that one must not only focus on the impact of institutions 
on performance, but that performance can change actors’ behaviour and institutions 
as well.
 The comparative analysis of this study shows that the impact of institutions on 
performance varies cross-nationally and across time. The case analysis shows that 
the role of actors is important, but also variable across the cases. There is not found 
a one-way relationship between institutions and performance. Instead of institutions, 
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it appeared that contextual variables largely shape macro-level performance. 
National confi gurations of institutions and actors contribute to socio-economic 
performance (until 1990s) but appear amendable if and when performance is low.
 In cross-national and cross-time analyses this infl uence of actors is often 
underrated. Actors’ preferences and strategies appear to be relevant and can be 
made visible at the case level. Performance may well be in part directed by institutions 
and actors but only to a limited degree: socio-economic performance is a central 
factor which drives actors’ strategies and institutional change. The comparative 
analysis emphasises the impact of institutions on socio-economic performance. 
The case analysis shows the role of actors and how they in relation with institutions 
both try to infl uence performance and are infl uenced by performance.
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APPENDIX A CODE BOOK VARIABLES
The range of the data set is 1965 to 1998 (variable year)*. 
Number of countries = 20
Main variables and their meaning
cdx  index of consensus democracy (annual scores; range 1965-98*)
  
  cdx = efnpp – reduc – elecsys + tog + domgov
central centralisation of wage bargaining
3 central level
2 sector level
1 fi rm level
conscorp presence of consensus democracy and corporatism
4 consensus and corporatist
3 consensus or corporatist
2 non-consensus and non-corporatist
1 majoritarian and pluralist
coord coordination of wage bargaining
3 central coordination
2 sectoral coordination
1 fi rm or no coordination
corpx  index of corporatism (scores in four periods: 65-74*; 75-84; 85-92; 
  93-98)
  corpx = central + coord + tdens + cover
cover  coverage rate of collective bargaining(percentage of workers that are   
  covered by collective agreements)
cpi  infl ation
disprop Gallagher index G = √(1/
2
.∑(v
i
-s
i
)2),  
  v
i
: vote share of party i
  s
i
: seat share of party i
domgov dominance of government over opposition
efnpp  effective number of parliamentary parties
efnep  effective number of electoral parties
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elecsys electoral system
gdpgr  economic growth
gdppcap gdp per capita
imex  openness of the economy
misery  misery-index = unem + cpi
reduc  disproportionality (reduction of proportionality) calculated as:
  (efnep – efnpp)/efnep
tdens  trade union density (percentage of workers that is member of a trade   
  union)
tog type of government
unem  unemployment
zperform (standardised) performance-index = gdpgr - unem - cpi 
* except for Greece, Portugal and Spain
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APPENDIX B ELECTION RESULTS CASES
The Netherlands
Figure B.1 Distribution of the votes in Dutch elections
Figure B.2 Distribution of the seats in Dutch parliament
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New Zealand
Figure B.3 Distribution of the votes in New Zealand
Figure B.4 Distribution of the seats in House of Representatives in New Zealand
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Portugal
Figure B.5 Distribution of the votes in Portuguese elections
Figure B.6 Number of the seats in the Portuguese Assembly
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Sweden
Figure B.7 Distribution of the votes in Swedish elections
Figure B.8 Distribution of the seats in the Swedish Riksdag
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APPENDIX C COMPARATIVE TABLES
Table C.1 Recalculated scores on the fi rst dimension of Lijphart’s consensus 
democracy (1965-98)
Country minimal winning cabinet effective number dispro- integration lijphart’s
& one party durability of parliamentary portionality of the consensus
cabinets in days parties Economy* dimension 1**
au 61.6% 781 2.48 10.01 2.89 -0.42
at 72.4% 1228 2.54 1.87 4.63 0.07
be 36.5% 1032 6.66 3.13 3.88 1.06
ca 89.3% 1275 2.36 12.45 1.73 -1.39
dk 26.9% 857 4.89 2.22 4.19 1.03
fi 8.5% 900 5.16 3.31 4.21 1.19
fr 20.9% 734 3.33 14.80 2.08 -0.28
de 39.1% 1150 3.06 2.86 4.13 0.36
gr 84.3% 971 2.19 9.25 1.80 -1.00
ir 55.0% 1028 2.76 4.25 2.39 -0.28
it 11.6% 504 4.31 6.71 2.52 0.62
nl 35.1% 1379 4.74 2.59 4.00 0.58
nz 91.3% 829 2.12 12.79 2.30 -1.09
no 44.8% 925 3.59 5.38 4.63 0.53
pt 61.8% 961 2.81 5.25 2.38 -0.45
es 66.3% 1041 2.74 9.24 1.93 -0.79
se 49.8% 877 3.46 2.33 4.68 0.65
ch 0.0% 365 5.48 3.57 4.38 1.65
uk 99.1% 1297 2.15 13.69 1.96 -1.54
us 81.2% 2047 1.92 7.24 1.96 -1.49
Mean 51.8% 1010 3.48 6.58 3.21 0.00
Source: own calculations based on Lijphart (1984; 1999).
Notes:
 * The variable ‘integration of the economy’ is the index developed by Siaroff (1999) and used by Lijphart 
(1999: 177) but labelled as ‘interest group pluralism’. It is not another variable, but the original label is 
used instead of Lijphart’s label.
** These are own recalculations of Lijphart’s dimension 1.
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Table C.2 Recalculated scores on the second dimension of Lijphart’s 
consensus democracy (1965-98)
Federal and Bicameralism Constitutional Judicial Central lijphart’s
decentralised rigidity review bank consensus
Country government independence dimension 2*
au 5.0 4.0 4.0 3.0 0.42 1.25
at 4.5 2.0 3.0 3.0 0.55 0.70
be 3.4 3.0 3.0 2.2 0.27 0.09
ca 5.0 3.0 4.0 3.7 0.52 1.35
dk 2.0 1.3 2.0 2.0 0.46 -0.47
fi 2.0 1.0 3.0 1.0 0.28 -0.84
fr 1.2 3.0 1.4 1.9 0.32 -0.61
de 5.0 4.0 3.5 4.0 0.69 1.82
gr 1.0 1.0 2.0 2.0 0.38 -0.83
ir 1.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 0.41 -0.55
it 1.3 3.0 2.0 2.8 0.26 -0.34
nl 3.0 3.0 3.0 1.0 0.48 0.09
nz 1.0 1.1 1.0 1.0 0.19 -1.61
no 2.0 1.5 3.0 2.0 0.17 -0.67
pt 1.0 1.0 3.0 2.0 0.28 -0.75
es 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 0.25 0.19
se 2.0 1.2 1.7 2.0 0.29 -0.86
ch 5.0 4.0 4.0 1.0 0.60 1.06
uk 1.0 2.5 1.0 1.0 0.31 -1.10
us 5.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 0.56 1.72
Total 2.8 2.5 2.7 2.2 0.39 0.00
Source: own calculations based on Lijphart (1984; 1999).
Note: * These are own recalculations of Lijphart’s dimension 2.
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Table C.3 Scores on index of consensus democracy
index of consensus democracy
country 1965-74 1975-84 1985-92 1993-98 1965-98
au -0.32 0.12 -0.81 -0.07 -0.26
at -0.06 0.00 0.73 0.60 0.26
be 0.82 1.33 1.05 0.88 1.03
ca -1.17 -1.21 -1.20 -1.52 -1.25
dk 0.33 0.66 0.65 0.52 0.54
fi 1.33 1.53 1.36 1.26 1.38
fr -0.38 0.03 -0.78 -1.26 -0.51
de 0.05 0.00 0.03 -0.12 0.00
gr -0.60 -0.25 -0.37 -0.43
ir -0.58 -0.46 -0.32 -0.22 -0.42
it 0.40 0.35 1.03 1.09 0.66
nl 1.19 0.82 0.44 0.78 0.83
nz -1.40 -1.48 -1.39 -0.98 -1.35
no -0.01 -0.29 0.01 -0.10 -0.10
pt 0.10 -0.25 -0.20 -0.10
es -0.67 -0.37 -0.28 -0.45
se -0.04 0.12 0.38 0.37 0.18
ch 2.00 1.96 2.08 2.13 2.03
uk -1.24 -1.42 -1.47 -1.42 -1.38
us -0.92 -1.00 -0.93 -1.09 -0.98
Source: own calculations based on Table 2.5.
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Table C.4 Scores on index of corporatism
index of corporatism
country 1965-74 1975-84 1985-92 1993-98 1965-98
Australia -0.08 0.49 0.45 -0.46 0.14
Austria 1.71 1.23 1.23 1.18 1.36
Belgium 0.75 0.51 0.63 0.72 0.64
Canada -1.58 -2.08 -1.91 -1.60 -1.81
Denmark 0.81 0.79 0.59 0.73 0.74
Finland 0.56 1.13 1.19 1.32 1.01
France -1.31 -0.51 -0.20 -0.04 -0.59
Germany 0.59 0.62 0.71 0.74 0.65
Greece 0.01 0.01 0.20 0.06
Ireland 0.06 0.46 0.69 0.30 0.37
Italy -0.47 -0.31 -0.33 0.49 -0.22
Netherlands 0.16 -0.23 -0.26 0.02 -0.08
New Zealand -0.77 -0.03 -0.57 -1.78 -0.68
Norway 0.63 0.41 0.76 0.83 0.63
Portugal -0.21 0.15 -0.03 -0.04
Spain -0.50 -0.40 -0.12 -0.37
Sweden 1.47 1.62 1.23 1.09 1.39
Switzerland -0.10 -0.53 -0.38 -0.25 -0.32
UK -0.65 -0.37 -1.02 -1.18 -0.75
USA -1.78 -2.50 -2.55 -2.15 -2.24
Correlation between consensus democracy and corporatism
Pearson’s r 0.47 0.41 0.51 0.64 0.54
signifi cance 0.055 0.070 0.020 0.002 0.014
Number of cases 17 20 20 20 20
Sources: Centralisation (3 = centralised, 2 = intermediate, 1 = decentralised): OECD (1997); Calmfors 
& Driffi ll (1988); IPD (1996); Coordination (3 = coordinated, 2 = intermediate, 1 = un-coordinated): 
OECD Employment Outlook, (1991: 97-134; 1994: 167-191); Calmfors & Driffi ll (1988); IPD (1996); 
Union density (percentage of labour force member of trade union): Ebbinghaus & Visser (2000); 
Coverage rate (percentage of labour force covered by collective agreement): OECD (1997); Traxler 
et al. (2001). Corporatism index: standardised scores of the sum of centralisation, coordination, union 
density and coverage rate.
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Table C.5 Contextual variables (mean per category) 
1965-74
Cluster 1 2 3 4
Cabinet composition (from right to left) 1.85 1.34 2.43 3.03
Left parties in government (%) 20.90 8.12 32.61 50.95
Centre parties in government (%) 35.13 5.84 43.17 28.40
Right parties in government (%) 43.97 81.69 23.45 18.73
% left votes 26.65 18.72 42.43 40.88
% right votes 71.71 34.93 53.02 50.12
Work days lost due to strike 13694 1743 4595 328
Number of industrial disputes 2153 1618 1308 151
Central bank independence -0.10 -0.70 0.19 0.37
Federalism 2.00 1.33 1.75 1.67
Presidentialism 0.50 0.83 0.50 0.83
Population. in millions 73.3 19.5 32.7 6.8
Imports + exports as % of GDP 38.2 43.6 62.3 64.5
Openness 9.6 6.8 10.8 9.7
European union (1=member; 0=non) 0.05 0.40 0.75 0.20
% agriculture employment 6 17 14 12
% industry employment 37 35 42 41
% service employment 57 48 44 47
Conscorp categories: (1) majoritarian and pluralist (2) mixed (3) corporatist or
consensus democratic (4) corporatist and consensus democratic.
Sources: cabinet composition (1) rightwing (5) social democratic Schmidt (1996: 160) & CPDS; central 
bank independence (Franzese & Hall 2000; Busch 1993: 60); federalism 1=unitary. 3=federal (Lane 
& own estimations added); presidentialism (0) no (1) weak (2) strong (Lijphart 1984: 88); openness: 
combined index of openness of the economy CPDS.
1975-84
Cluster 1 2 3 4
Cabinet composition (from right to left) 1.58 2.04 2.68 2.90
Left parties in government (%) 14.30 26.44 40.99 48.72
Centre parties in government (%) 32.41 19.10 38.80 25.55
Right parties in government (%) 53.29 44.85 19.94 22.81
% left votes 23.44 39.26 42.16 40.35
% right votes 73.59 52.16 53.04 49.48
Work days lost due to strike 2967 4703 364
Number of industrial disputes 1091 1813 802 429
Central bank independence -0.11 -0.70 0.17 0.38
Federalism 2.00 1.33 1.75 1.67
Presidentialism 0.50 0.83 0.50 0.83
Population, in millions 79.60 21.30 34.00 7.00
Imports + exports as % of GDP 46.1 54.3 72.4 76.4
Openness 11.2 7.7 11.3 10.8
European union (1=member; 0=non) 0.25 0.35 0.75 0.33
% agriculture employment 5.7 11.5 8.6 8.1
% industry employment 32.2 32.7 36.6 35.3
% service employment 62.0 55.7 54.8 56.6
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1985-92
Cluster 1 2 3 4
Cabinet composition (from right to left) 1.72 3.15 2.34 2.56
Left parties in government (%) 18.24 53.39 30.80 38.79
Centre parties in government (%) 0.00 5.32 51.37 25.59
Right parties in government (%) 81.76 34.27 17.16 34.61
% left votes 24.06 40.45 39.89 37.27
% right votes 72.72 52.42 51.55 49.77
Work days lost due to strike 3677.31 2642.26 1167.51 265.62
Number of industrial disputes 385.38 999.17 423.63 197.96
Central bank independence -0.11 -0.70 0.19 0.38
Federalism 2.00 1.33 1.75 1.67
Presidentialism 0.50 0.83 0.50 0.83
Population, in millions 83.80 22.50 35.60 7.10
Imports + exports as % of GDP 45.0 56.7 68.5 77.1
Openness 13.5 10.4 12.7 12.0
European union (1=member; 0=non) 0.25 0.77 0.75 0.33
% agriculture employment 4.8 8.5 6.5 6.2
% industry employment 27.0 28.1 31.5 31.9
% service employment 68.3 63.5 62.0 61.8
1993-98
Cluster 1 2 3 4
Cabinet composition (from right to left) 1.29 2.92 2.63 2.97
Left parties in government (%) 6.95 46.73 38.96 51.36
Centre parties in government (%) 45.83 14.41 36.45 26.70
Right parties in government (%) 47.14 33.09 15.01 20.01
% left votes 19.63 40.11 35.71 35.52
% right votes 61.46 49.68 48.13 48.34
Work days lost due to strike 1948.68 748.52 602.93 192.81
Number of industrial disputes 170.25 710.67 329.33 72.42
Central bank independence -0.01 -0.64 0.23 0.36
Federalism 2.00 1.50 1.75 1.83
Presidentialism 0.50 0.83 0.50 0.83
Population, in millions 89.00 23.30 39.60 74.00
Imports + exports as % of GDP 52.5 63.7 69.7 82.1
Openness 13.8 12.5 13.9 13.0
European union (1=member; 0=non) 0.25 0.83 0.75 0.67
% agriculture employment 4.9 5.1 4.9 6.0
% industry employment 24.0 25.5 30.6 29.3
% service employment 71.0 69.4 64.6 64.7
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Table C.6 GDP per capita (in constant US Dollars)
 1965-74 1975-84 1985-92 1993-98 1965-98
consensus and corporatist
at 2011 8858 17198 26241 15996
be 2659 9670 16095 24418 15447
dk 3304 11593 21495 31655 19910
fi 2431 9581 20264 22621 16388
se 4335 12712 22573 26091 19268
ch 3498 14745 27553 38339 24866
mean 3040 11193 20863 28228 18646
consensus or corporatist
de 2741 9826 17782 26832 16721
gr 1390 4456 6829 10801 6803
it 2003 6650 15425 19484 12848
nl 2713 10378 16463 24430 15827
mean 2212 7828 14125 20387 13050
non-corporatist and non-consensus democratic
no 3285 13601 23257 32207 21365
au 3242 10904 15607 20499 14710
ir 1430 5215 10730 18841 10523
fr 2825 9900 17109 24044 15790
pt 834 2517 5746 10309 5600
es 1158 4746 10131 14210 8932
mean 2129 7814 13763 20018 12820
majoritarian and pluralist
nz 2275 6621 11078 15287 10243
ca 3989 11059 17883 19821 15411
uk 2219 7572 14063 19946 12825
us 5000 12706 21103 28748 19477
mean 3371 9490 16032 20951 14489
Source: Comparative Political Data Set (Armingeon, Beyeler & Menegale 2000), own calculations.
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Table C.7 Economic growth
 1965-74 1975-84 1985-92 1993-98 1965-98
consensus and corporatist
at 4.9 2 2.9 1.8 3
be 4.7 1.8 2.6 1.9 2.9
dk 3.4 2.1 1.5 2.7 2.5
fi 4.9 2.8 1.3 3.8 3.2
se 3.5 1.6 1.3 1.9 2.1
ch 3.7 0.6 2 0.8 1.9
mean 4.2 1.8 1.9 2.2 2.6
consensus or corporatist
de 3.9 1.8 3.3 1.2 2.6
gr 6.5 3.2 2 1.9 3.7
it 4.4 2.6 2.4 1.4 2.9
nl 4.8 1.6 2.9 2.9 3.1
mean 4.9 2.3 2.7 1.9 3.1
non-corporatist and non-consensus democratic
no 4.3 4 2.5 4 3.7
au 4.9 2.6 3 4.4 3.7
ir 4.4 3.1 4 7.5 4.5
fr 4.9 2.1 2.5 1.5 2.9
pt 6.6 2.4 4.1 2.5 4
es 6.3 1.5 3.5 2.4 3.5
mean 5.2 2.6 3.3 3.7 3.7
majoritarian and pluralist
nz 4.2 1.3 0.4 3.2 2.3
ca 5.4 3.3 2.4 3.2 3.7
uk 2.6 1.5 2.4 3 2.3
us 3.4 2.8 2.8 3.6 3.1
mean 3.9 2.2 2.0 3.3 2.9
Sources economic growth (annual change of real GDP): Comparative Political Data Set (Armingeon, 
Beyeler & Menegale 2000); OECD Economic Outlook, various years, own calculations.
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Table C.8 Unemployment
 1965-74 1975-84 1985-92 1993-98 1965-98
consensus and corporatist
at 1.57 2.51 3.44 4.2 2.75
be 2.46 8.78 8.46 9.43 6.96
dk 1.33 8.05 7.14 7.17 5.7
fi 2.3 5.53 6.01 15.05 6.37
se 2.02 2.46 2.81 9.43 3.64
ch 0 0.48 1.05 3.95 1.09
means 1.61 4.64 4.82 8.21 4.42
consensus or corporatist
de 0.92 4.34 5.66 8.8 4.43
gr 3.96 3.82 7.65 10.08 5.87
it 5.59 6.49 9.3 11.65 7.8
nl 1.48 6.83 7.08 6.02 5.17
means 2.99 5.37 7.42 9.14 5.82
non-corporatist and non-consensus democratic
no 1.59 2.23 3.99 4.82 2.91
au 1.88 6.53 8.13 9.12 5.99
ir 5.37 9.19 15.59 11.95 10.06
fr 2.34 6.16 9.84 12.03 6.94
pt 2.42 7.4 5.9 6.5 5.42
es 2.69 10.46 18.91 21.92 12.19
means 2.72 7.00 10.39 11.06 7.25
majoritarian and pluralist
nz 0.25 2.51 6.66 7.37 3.68
ca 4.83 8.72 9.25 9.72 7.88
uk 3.14 7.55 9.45 8.4 6.85
us 4.52 7.63 6.39 5.57 6.06
means 3.19 6.60 7.94 7.77 6.12
Source unemployment (OECD standardised unemployment rate): OECD Economic Outlook, various 
years, own calculations.
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Table C.9 infl ation (cpi)
 1965-74 1975-84 1985-92 1993-98 1965-98
consensus and corporatist
at 4.96 5.6 2.68 2.16 4.12
be 5.11 7.46 2.64 1.89 4.65
dk 7.57 9.66 3.6 1.92 6.25
fi 6.98 10.84 4.74 1.26 6.58
se 5.73 9.97 6.4 2.02 6.48
ch 5.24 3.63 3.25 1.23 3.59
means 5.93 7.86 3.89 1.75 5.28
consensus or corporatist
de 4.12 4.35 2.21 2.21 3.4
gr 6.53 17.94 17.71 8.77 12.91
it 6 16.27 6.1 3.51 8.61
nl 6.1 5.88 1.55 2.27 4.29
means 5.69 11.11 6.89 4.19 7.30
non-corporatist and non-consensus democratic
no 5.95 9.34 5.34 2.05 6.12
au 5.61 10.29 6.33 2 6.52
ir 7.75 14.83 3.53 1.95 7.82
fr 5.67 10.65 3.36 1.58 5.87
pt 8.87 22.66 12.1 3.99 12.83
es 8.23 16.26 6.63 3.57 9.39
means 7.01 14.01 6.22 2.52 8.09
majoritarian and pluralist
nz 6.39 13.37 8.26 1.94 8.1
ca 4.77 8.78 4.19 1.4 5.22
uk 6.94 12.63 5.68 2.74 7.57
us 4.77 7.77 3.83 2.54 5.04
means 5.72 10.64 5.49 2.16 6.48
Source infl ation (annual % change of consumer price index): OECD Economic Outlook, various years, 
own calculations.
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Table C.10 Misery-index
 1965-74 1975-84 1985-92 1993-98 1965-98
consensus and corporatist  
at 6.5 8.1 6.1 6.4 6.9
be 7.6 16.2 11.1 11.3 11.6
dk 8.9 17.7 10.7 9.1 12
fi 9.3 16.4 10.8 16.3 13
se 7.8 12.4 9.2 11.4 10.1
ch 5.2 4.1 4.3 5.2 4.7
mean 7.5 12.5 8.7 10 9.7
consensus or corporatist  
de 5 8.7 7.9 11 7.8
gr 10.5 21.8 25.4 18.9 18.8
it 11.6 22.8 15.4 15.2 16.4
nl 7.6 12.7 8.6 8.3 9.5
mean 8.7 16.5 14.3 13.3 13.1
non-corporatist and non-consensus democratic
no 7.5 11.6 9.3 6.9 9
au 7.5 16.8 14.5 11.1 12.5
ir 13.1 24 19.1 13.9 17.9
fr 8 16.8 13.2 13.6 12.8
pt 11.3 30.1 18 10.5 18.2
es 10.9 26.7 25.5 25.5 21.6
mean 9.7 21 16.6 13.6 15.3
majoritarian and pluralist  
nz 6.6 15.9 14.9 9.3 11.8
ca 9.6 17.5 13.4 11.1 13.1
uk 10.1 20.2 15.1 11.1 14.4
us 9.3 15.4 10.2 8.1 11.1
mean 8.9 17.2 13.4 9.9 12.6
Misery index = unemployment + infl ation (own calculations).
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Table C.11 Performance index
 1965-74 1975-84 1985-92 1993-98 1965-98
consensus and corporatist 
au 1.06 0.16 0.58 0.29 0.55
be 0.91 -0.68 0.03 -0.18 0.05
dk 0.45 -0.74 -0.2 0.26 -0.09
fi 0.79 -0.44 -0.28 -0.19 0
se 0.59 -0.36 -0.11 -0.18 0.01
ch 0.87 0.2 0.54 0.15 0.47
mean 0.78 -0.31 0.09 0.03 0.16
consensus or corporatist  
de 0.94 0.06 0.51 -0.32 0.36
gr 1.09 -0.86 -1.51 -0.9 -0.45
it 0.45 -1.12 -0.43 -0.66 -0.42
nl 0.93 -0.37 0.34 0.37 0.31
mean 0.85 -0.57 -0.27 -0.38 -0.05
non-corporatist and non-consensus democratic
no 0.82 0.34 0.18 0.8 0.52
au 0.98 -0.53 -0.19 0.48 0.17
ir 0.3 -1.11 -0.39 1.01 -0.15
fr 0.93 -0.65 -0.2 -0.5 -0.05
pt 1.03 -1.88 -0.27 0.06 -0.3
es 0.99 -1.79 -1.15 -1.43 -0.76
mean 0.84 -0.94 -0.34 0.07 -0.09
majoritarian and pluralist  
nz 0.88 -0.77 -0.9 0.36 -0.12
ca 0.89 -0.43 -0.26 0.17 0.11
uk 0.13 -1.14 -0.42 0.14 -0.37
us 0.4 -0.35 0.18 0.59 0.16
mean 0.58 -0.67 -0.35 0.31 -0.06
Performance index = economic growth – unemployment - infl ation (own calculations).
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Table C.12 Social security expenditures (as % of GDP)
 1965-74 1975-84 1985-92 1993-98 1965-98
consensus and corporatist 
Austria 18.1 22.4 25.2 27.4 22.2
Belgium 18.5 26.1 27.2 28.7 24.2
Denmark 14.8 25.4 27.7 32.1 23.5
Finland 12.7 19.1 25.8 33.7 20.2
Sweden 18.1 29.5 33.1 35.7 27.3
Switzerland 10.3 14.7 17.9 24.8 15.6
mean 15.4 22.9 26.2 30.4 22.2
consensus or corporatist  
Germany 18.1 24.5 25.6 29.3 23.2
Greece 11.3 16.4 16.8 12.4
Italy 14.9 18.9 21.8 24.9 19.0
Netherlands 18.6 28.0 29.1 28.6 25.4
Mean 17.2 20.7 23.2 24.9 20.0
non-corporatist and non-consensus democratic
Norway 14.2 19.3 24.8 28.9 20.6
Australia 7.8 11.8 12.8 16.1 11.2
Ireland 10.3 18.3 20.6 19.6 16.5
France 16.9 25.8 27.3 29.8 23.9
Portugal 9.7 12.7 18.5 10.8
Spain 15.4 19.0 22.0 17.7
mean 12.3 16.7 19.5 22.5 16.8
majoritarian and pluralist  
New Zealand 10.8 17.3 19.9 19.0 16.1
Canada 12.3 14.6 17.8 19.0 15.1
UK 13.7 18.5 20.1 22.9 17.8
USA 9.1 12.9 13.7 16.2 12.2
mean 11.5 15.8 17.9 19.3 15.3
Sources: OECD Social expenditures Database, Comparative Political Data Set.
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Table C.13 Changes in misery and performance index 
change misery index change performance index
 Period
65-74/ 
75-84
75-84/ 
85-92
85-92/ 
93-98
65-74/ 
75-84
75-84/ 
85-92
85-92/ 
93-98
4) consensus and corporatist
Austria 1.58 -2.00 0.25 -0.90 0.43 -0.30
Belgium 8.67 -5.14 0.23 -1.59 0.71 -0.22
Denmark 8.81 -6.97 -1.65 -1.19 0.54 0.47
Finland 7.09 -5.62 5.56 -1.22 0.16 0.09
Sweden 4.68 -3.22 2.24 -0.95 0.26 -0.07
Switzerland -1.13 0.19 0.88 -0.67 0.34 -0.39
Mean 4.95 -3.79 1.25 -1.09 0.40 -0.07
3) consensus or corporatist
Germany 3.65 -0.82 3.14 -0.88 0.45 -0.83
Greece 11.27 3.60 -6.51 -1.95 -0.64 0.61
Italy 11.17 -7.36 -0.24 -1.57 0.69 -0.23
Netherlands 5.13 -4.09 -0.34 -1.31 0.72 0.03
Mean 7.81 -2.16 -0.99 -1.43 0.30 -0.11
2) non-corporatist and non-consensus
Norway 4.03 -2.25 -2.46 -0.48 -0.16 0.62
Australia 9.33 -2.37 -3.34 -1.51 0.34 0.67
Ireland 10.90 -4.91 -5.21 -1.41 0.72 1.40
France 8.80 -3.61 0.41 -1.58 0.44 -0.30
Portugal 18.77 -12.06 -7.51 -2.91 1.60 0.33
Spain 15.80 -1.18 -0.05 -2.78 0.64 -0.27
Mean 11.27 -4.40 -3.03 -1.78 0.60 0.41
1) majoritarian and pluralist
New Zealand 9.24 -0.96 -5.62 -1.65 -0.12 1.26
Canada 7.90 -4.06 -2.33 -1.32 0.17 0.44
UK 10.10 -5.06 -3.99 -1.26 0.72 0.56
USA 6.11 -5.19 -2.11 -0.75 0.53 0.41
Mean 8.34 -3.82 -3.51 -1.25 0.32 0.67
Sources: Tables C.10 & C.11 (Appendix C), own calculations.
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       *   Values more than 3 box-lengths from 75th percentile (extremes)
       0   Values more than 1.5 box-lengths form 75th percentile (outliers)
  Largest observed value that is not an outlier
50% of cases
have values
within the box
  75th PERCENTILE
  MEDIAN (symmetric / skewed)
  25th PERCENTILE
  Smallest observed value that is not an outlier
  Values more than 1.5 box-lengths from 25th percentile (outliers)      0
          
      *   Values more than 3 box-lengths from 25th percentile (extremes)
Figure C.1 Sketch of a boxplot 
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Dutch summary
De institutionele dynamiek van consensus en confl ict. Consensusdemocratie, 
corporatisme en sociaal-economisch beleid in twintig ontwikkelde 
democratieën (1965-1998).
Dit proefschrift analyseert de relatie tussen verschillende vormen van de politiek-
institutionele  inrichting van een land en de invloed hiervan op sociaal-economisch 
beleid. De instituties, d.w.z. de formele en informele regels van het politieke ‘spel’, 
van consensusdemocratie dragen ertoe bij dat zoveel mogelijk partijen en groepen 
uit de samenleving betrokken zijn bij politieke besluitvorming; dit in tegenstelling 
tot een meerderheidsdemocratie, waarin alle macht geconcentreerd wordt in één 
partij. In corporatistische landen is sprake van geïnstitutionaliseerde samenwerking 
tussen werkgeversorganisaties en vakbonden, al dan niet in overleg met de 
overheid. In pluralistische systemen is er veel minder sprake van coördinatie en 
centralisering van overleg over sociaal-economisch beleid.
De centrale vraag van het proefschrift luidt:
Onder welke omstandigheden en in welke mate dragen de instituties van 
consensusdemocratie en corporatisme bij tot een adequaat sociaal-economisch 
beleid in twintig geïndustrialiseerde democratieën?
In een drietal opzichten draagt dit proefschrift bij aan bestaand onderzoek op het terrein 
van de vergelijkende politieke economie. Ten eerste worden consensusdemocratie 
en corporatisme expliciet met elkaar vergeleken. Deze typen van institutionele 
inrichting worden niet als onderdeel van elkaar beschouwd, maar de relatie tussen 
beide concepten wordt onderzocht, alsmede hun invloed op sociaal-economisch 
beleid. Ten tweede worden zowel formele als informele instituties in de analyse 
opgenomen. Instituties bestaan uit de regels of de mechanismen die voorkeuren 
van actoren omzetten in collectieve besluiten. Formele regels zijn vastgelegd in 
wetten en zijn extern afdwingbaar. Informele regels zijn gebaseerd op afspraken 
tussen betrokken actoren. Ten derde wordt er een dynamische - in plaats van een 
statische - analyse uitgevoerd. Dit betekent dat niet alleen variaties door de tijd 
heen onderzocht worden, maar ook de interacties tussen actoren en instituties. Het 
gaat hierbij om hoe actoren instituties aanpassen om andere beleidsuitkomsten 
te verkrijgen en hoe verschillende beleidsuitkomsten strategieën van actoren 
beïnvloeden.
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 Het empirische onderzoek van dit proefschrift valt uiteen in twee onderdelen. 
In deel II worden twintig democratieën1 vergelijkenderwijs onderzocht met behulp 
van de empirisch-analytische benadering, gebaseerd op  kwantitatieve gegevens. 
In deel III worden vier landen geselecteerd uit de groep van twintig voor een meer 
gedetailleerde analyse. De selectie van deze gevalsstudies heeft plaatsgevonden 
op basis van de gevonden patronen in deel II. Hierdoor is het mogelijk de algemene 
patronen en resultaten van Deel II te verdiepen en te valideren.
Vergelijking van twintig landen
De studie naar consensusdemocratie is begonnen met enkele landenstudies waarin 
werd verklaard hoe politieke stabiliteit mogelijk is, ondanks een sterk verdeelde 
samenleving. Zo heeft Lijphart in 1968 aangetoond dat de verdeeldheid op basis 
van religieuze tegenstellingen in de Nederlandse samenleving ten tijde van de 
verzuiling gecompenseerd werd door samenwerking van de elites van de zuilen. 
Steiner heeft in 1974 laten zien hoe door informele afspraken over coalitievorming, 
de zogenaamde toverformule, een stabiele regering gevormd kan worden in 
Zwitserland, ondanks etnische en taalverschillen. Deze en andere landenstudies 
laten zien hoe het ontstaan van informele regels voorkomt dat er een patstelling 
ontstaat wanneer louter de formele regels toegepast zouden worden.
Consensusdemocratie
In hoofdstuk 2 worden de institutionele kenmerken besproken die in een politiek 
systeem bijdragen tot consensus en overleg. Twee kenmerken zijn essentieel 
voor een consensusdemocratie: het kiesstelsel is gebaseerd op evenredige 
vertegenwoordiging en coalitieregeringen worden in de regel gevormd op basis van 
een brede meerderheid in het parlement. Een meerderheidsdemocratie wordt juist 
gekenmerkt door het tegenovergestelde. Door het kiesstelsel, het zogenaamde 
districtenstelsel, zijn er maar twee partijen sterk vertegenwoordigd in het parlement 
en heeft één van deze partijen meestal de mogelijkheid om alleen te regeren.
In dit proefschrift is gekomen tot een nadere uitwerking van de verschillen tussen 
consensus- en meerderheidsdemocratie. Ten eerst wordt electorale fragmentatie 
gemeten aan de hand van het effectieve aantal partijen in het parlement en de 
evenredigheid van het kiesstelsel. Dit laatste wordt geoperationaliseerd met twee 
maatstaven: een classifi catie van kiesstelsels van meest naar minst evenredig 
en de mate waarin de verdeling van de zetels over de partijen afwijkt van hun 
stemaandeel. De mate waarin brede coalities gevormd worden kan gemeten 
worden door een classifi catie van brede tot minimaal winnende coalitieregeringen 
en de omvang van de parlementair steun welke geïndiceerd wordt door het aandeel 
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in het parlement dat de coalitie steunt, boven de noodzakelijke 50%. Met behulp 
van deze kenmerken is een schaal geconstrueerd waarmee landen gerangschikt 
kunnen worden van consensus- tot meerderheidsdemocratie. De in dit proefschrift 
ontwikkelde schaal is adequater en is geschikter om dynamische patronen te 
analyseren dan de oorspronkelijke index van Lijphart, die hij in 1984 ontwikkelde 
en in 1999 verder heeft gepreciseerd.
Corporatisme
Het corporatismedebat in de jaren ’70 vroeg aandacht voor de positieve invloed 
van geïnstitutionaliseerde verhoudingen tussen werknemers en werkgevers op 
sociaal-economisch gebied. Al dan niet in overleg met de overheid, bleken sociale 
partners namelijk afspraken te maken over loonmatiging in ruil voor behoud van 
werkgelegenheid en een redelijk peil van sociale voorzieningen. In tegenstelling 
tot neoliberale economen is een aantal  aanhangers van het corporatisme van 
mening dat samenwerking van werknemers en werkgevers leidt tot coördinatie 
van het macro-economisch beleid, waardoor een bijdrage geleverd wordt aan 
de matiging van werkloosheid en infl atie en aan stimulering van economische 
groei. Verschillende auteurs hebben indicatoren ontwikkeld waarmee de mate van 
corporatisme empirisch gemeten kan worden. Het probleem van deze bestaande 
schalen is dat zij meestal statisch zijn. Ze meten slechts de mate van corporatisme 
op een bepaald tijdstip en zodoende is het niet mogelijk ontwikkelingen door te tijd 
te waar te nemen. Daarom is in dit proefschrift een nieuwe corporatismeschaal 
geconstrueerd. Deze schaal is gebaseerd op drie factoren: de mate van coördinatie 
en centralisatie van loononderhandelingen, de organisatiegraad van vakbonden 
en het aandeel werknemers dat werkt bij een bedrijf waar een collectieve 
arbeidsovereenkomst van toepassing is. Op basis van deze dynamische maatstaf 
kunnen landen in verschillende perioden gerangschikt worden van corporatistisch tot 
pluralistisch. Omdat deze schaal alleen gericht is op de relatie tussen werknemers 
en werkgevers, is deze bij uitstek geschikt om de relatie tussen corporatisme 
en consensusdemocratie te onderzoeken, omdat de rol van de overheid slechts 
gemeten wordt in de index van consensusdemocratie.
Relatie tussen consensusdemocratie en corporatisme
Hoofdstuk 4 bespreekt de conceptuele en empirische samenhang tussen 
consensusdemocratie en corporatisme. Dit samenstel van instituties hebben 
met elkaar gemeen dat ze bevorderen dat zoveel mogelijk groepen en partijen 
bij besluitvorming worden betrokken. Besluitvorming is tevens zoveel mogelijk 
gebaseerd op overleg en het bereiken van consensus. Dit is een effect dat niet 
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of nauwelijks voor lijkt te komen in meerderheidsdemocratie en pluralisme. Deze 
gevallen leiden veeleer tot polarisatie tussen coalitie en oppositie en tussen 
werknemers en werkgevers.
 Alhoewel er conceptueel een sterke overeenkomst is tussen corporatisme en 
consensusdemocratie voor wat betreft de werking van instituties en het gedrag 
van actoren, hebben de verschillende instituties echter betrekking op andere 
besluitvormingsarena’s. Uit de analyse blijkt dat enerzijds corporatisme en 
consensusdemocratie en anderzijds pluralisme en meerderheidsdemocratie niet 
altijd systematisch samengaan. Bovendien is deze samenhang niet overal in gelijke 
mate waarneembaar. Corporatisme en consensusdemocratie dienen dan ook te 
worden beschouwd als verschillende typen van institutionele arrangementen. Ze 
zijn niet hetzelfde en de één is niet slechts een onderdeel van de ander.
Invloed op sociaal-economisch beleid
Consensusdemocratie en corporatisme bevorderen samenwerking en overleg 
tussen actoren en actoren hebben een groter vertrouwen in de instituties. Actoren 
kunnen zo gemakkelijker afspraken maken over sociaal-economisch beleid in het 
algemeen belang en zijn belangengroepen niet alleen uit op maximalisatie van 
hun eigenbelang. Hierdoor zouden deze instituties een positief effect kunnen 
hebben op de economie. Anderen daarentegen beweren dat de betrokkenheid 
van veel actoren bij het besluitvormingsproces juist kan leiden tot stroperigheid en 
besluiteloosheid. Dit zou bijdragen tot vermindering van het aanpassingsvermogen 
van de economie en tot slechtere sociaal-economische prestaties.
 Hoofdstuk 5 onderzoekt de invloed van consensusdemocratie en corporatisme 
op de volgende sociaal-economische indicatoren: Bruto Nationaal Product (BNP) 
per hoofd van de bevolking, economische groei, werkloosheid, infl atie en de 
uitgaven aan sociale zekerheid. Deze indicatoren geven weer wat de invloed is 
van het beleid op de sociaal-economische ontwikkeling van een land.
 De analyse laat zien dat consensusdemocratie en corporatisme niet 
altijd samengaan met betere sociaal-economische prestaties. Echter, het 
tegenovergestelde is ook niet van toepassing: deze institutionele arrangementen 
leiden niet tot slechtere beleidsuitkomsten.
 Het blijkt dat in de jaren ’70 en ’80 consensusdemocratie en corporatisme 
correleren met minder werkloosheid en infl atie, maar dit positieve effect  is grotendeels 
verdwenen in de jaren ’90. Landen gekenmerkt door consensusdemocratie 
en corporatisme hebben wel een hoger BNP per hoofd van de bevolking, maar 
de economische groei is vaak lager dan in andere landen. Corporatisme blijkt 
duidelijker van invloed te zijn op de omvang van de sociale voorzieningen. Landen 
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met een corporatistisch stelsel  besteden een hoger percentage van het BNP 
aan sociale zekerheid dan landen zonder corporatisme. Dit effect blijft aanwezig 
wanneer gecontroleerd wordt voor andere variabelen, zoals de rol van de centrale 
bank en de openheid van de economie.
 Deze analyses zijn gebaseerd op kwantitatieve gegevens van twintig landen. 
Hierdoor kan wel de invloed van instituties op sociaal-economisch prestaties 
onderzocht worden, maar niet hoe interacties tussen instituties en actoren 
van invloed zijn op sociaal-economisch beleid. Daartoe zijn vier casestudies 
uitgevoerd. Op basis van de gevonden patronen in hoofdstuk 5, zijn vier landen 
geselecteerd voor nadere analyse. Zweden wordt gekozen als een land met een 
hoge mate van corporatisme en een behoorlijke mate van consensusdemocratie. 
Nederland is een casus van consensusdemocratie en gold in het verleden als 
een in ieder geval corporatistisch systeem. Portugal wordt niet sterk gekenmerkt 
door consensusdemocratie en corporatisme. Nieuw Zeeland contrasteert omdat 
het tot in jaren 90 gekenmerkt is als een geval van meerderheidsdemocratie en 
pluralisme.
De vier casestudies
Nederland is bekend om haar vorm van consensusdemocratie, ontstaan uit de 
noodzaak om polarisatie en confl ict tussen de verschillende zuilen te voorkomen. 
Ondanks de ontzuiling sinds de jaren ’60, zijn veel institutionele kenmerken van de 
consensusdemocratie blijven bestaan.
 De Nederlandse economie wordt weliswaar gekenmerkt door formele en 
informele overlegstructuren, maar in vergelijking met andere landen is de mate 
van corporatisme niet buitengewoon hoog. Alhoewel werknemers en werkgevers 
betrokken zijn bij het sociaal-economisch beleid, heeft uiteindelijk de overheid een 
beslissende stem. De kracht van de Nederlandse overlegstructuur is dus niet dat 
sociale partners vrijwillig met de overheid tot overeenstemming komen, maar dat 
ondanks de dominante rol van de overheid belangengroepen zich betrokken blijven 
voelen bij het sociaal-economisch beleid en er dus niet voor kiezen om dit beleid te 
ondermijnen.
 Tot aan het einde van de jaren ’80 kende de Nederlandse economie een 
dramatische combinatie van lage arbeidsparticipatie en een hoog niveau van 
sociale voorzieningen. De regering bleek niet in staat om meer banen te creëren 
noch om de sociale zekerheid te saneren. In de jaren ’90 lukte het om te profi teren 
van de opleving van de wereldeconomie. Flexibele arbeidsvoorwaarden en de 
ruime mogelijkheden tot deeltijdwerk droegen er toe bij dat vrouwen gemakkelijker 
op de arbeidsmarkt konden treden. De snelle inzet van een arbeidsreserve heeft 
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bijgedragen aan sterke economisch groei in de jaren ’90. Het stelsel van sociale 
zekerheid bleef grotendeels in tact, maar op een aantal terreinen is de regering er 
toch in geslaagd om veranderingen door te voeren.
 Volgens de analyse blijkt dat consensusdemocratie en corporatisme niet van 
doorslaggevend belang zijn geweest voor het sterke economische herstel in de 
jaren ’90. Er bestond weliswaar overleg met belangengroepen, maar over het 
algemeen speelde de overheid een dominante rol.
 Nieuw-Zeeland heeft sterke veranderingen doorgemaakt van zowel 
instituties als van sociaal-economisch beleid. Tot de jaren ‘80 was er sprake van 
overheidsregulering van de economie. Echter, nadat het Verenigd Koninkrijk 
toegetreden was tot de Europese Gemeenschap, verdwenen de voorkeursrechten 
in de handel voor Nieuw-Zeeland. Dit leidde tot een ernstige en langdurige 
economische crisis. In de jaren ’80 maakte de Labour-regering een einde aan de 
overheidsregulering en startte men een neoliberaal beleid. De daarop volgende 
conservatieve National Party-regering startte een rigoureuze hervorming van de 
verzorgingsstaat.
 Naast radicale economische veranderingen, kende Nieuw-Zeeland ook 
veranderingen van instituties. Tot in de jaren ’90 was sprake van een typische 
meerderheidsdemocratie. Ontevredenheid onder burgers en politieke partijen 
over electorale resultaten en het economisch beleid maakte de weg vrij voor 
het invoeren van een gemengde vorm van het evenredig kiesstelsel en het 
districtenstelsel. Daarnaast werden in de jaren ’80 de loononderhandelingen 
volledig gedecentraliseerd. Iedere vorm van coördinatie verdween en de invloed 
van de vakbonden is nu sterk gereduceerd.
 Nieuw-Zeeland vertoont een interessant patroon van veranderingen van 
instituties van meerderheidsdemocratie in de richting van consensusdemocratie. 
Bovendien schoven de politiek-economische instituties duidelijk op in de richting 
van pluralisme. Deze veranderingen hebben echter niet sterk bijgedragen aan 
betere sociaal-economische uitkomsten.
 Het politieke systeem van Portugal heeft een belangrijke verandering 
doorgemaakt tijdens de overgang naar een democratie in de jaren ’70. Bovendien 
heeft de toetreding tot de Europese Gemeenschap sterk bijgedragen aan 
verbeteringen van de economische structuur en versterking van de handelsrelaties 
met Europese landen.
 Tijdens de postrevolutionaire periode hebben instituties van consensusdemocratie 
bijgedragen aan de ontwikkeling van een stabiel politiek systeem. Toen de politieke 
stabiliteit eenmaal gerealiseerd was, kreeg het systeem meer kenmerken van een 
meerderheidsdemocratie. Consensusdemocratie is niet direct van belang geweest 
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voor het sociaal-economisch beleid, maar wel voor een succesvolle transitie naar 
democratie. Het effect van consensusdemocratie is hooguit indirect te noemen. 
Door de bijdrage aan een stabiel politiek systeem, werd Portugal aantrekkelijk voor 
buitenlandse investeerders. Bovendien werd mede hierdoor de toetreding tot de 
Europese Gemeenschap mogelijk.
 Van sterke corporatistische verhoudingen na de revolutie is in Portugal geen 
sprake geweest. In de eerste jaren na de revolutie, waren de verhoudingen tussen 
vakbonden en werkgeversorganisaties bijzonder slecht. Samen met linkse politieke 
partijen streefde radicale vakbonden naar nationalisatie van grote bedrijven met 
als einddoel het stichten van een socialistische economie. Nadat in de jaren ‘80 
het politieke klimaat wat meer gematigd was, verbeterden langzamerhand de 
verhoudingen tussen arbeid en kapitaal. In de jaren ’90 was weliswaar incidenteel 
sprake van een nationaal akkoord, de verhoudingen tussen vakbonden en 
werkgevers kreeg geen sterk geïnstitutionaliseerde vorm.
 Het Zweeds politieke systeem is nagenoeg onveranderd gebleven. De 
veranderingen in Zweden zijn te vinden in de relatie tussen werknemers en 
werkgevers. Zweden heeft jarenlang model gestaan met haar succesvolle 
corporatistische instituties. In vergelijking met andere landen, kende Zweden 
een veel langere periode van economische groei en hoge arbeidsparticipatie. In 
de jaren ’90 verslechterde echter het Zweedse economische klimaat. Hierdoor 
ontstond ontevredenheid bij werkgevers en conservatieve politieke partijen over het 
corporatistische model. Ze hebben het stelsel van arbeidsverhoudingen aanzienlijk 
gedecentraliseerd. Vooralsnog heeft dit niet bijgedragen tot een duidelijke 
verbetering van de economische prestaties.
De institutionele dynamiek van consensus en confl ict en de aanpak van 
sociaal-economische problemen
Dit proefschrift heeft aangetoond dat de instituties van consensusdemocratie en 
corporatisme van elkaar onderscheiden moeten worden en dat ze verschillende 
effecten hebben op macro-economisch beleid. De positieve effecten van 
consensusdemocratie en corporatisme worden over het algemeen overschat. 
In de jaren ’70 en ’80 hebben consensus democratie en corporatisme in zekere 
mate bijdragen tot minder werkloosheid en infl atie, maar dit positieve effect is 
grotendeels verdwenen in de jaren ’90. Het tegendeel is echter ook waar. Er is geen 
enkele reden om aan te nemen dat de instituties van meerderheidsdemocratie en 
pluralisme beter zijn. Corporatistische landen besteden wel een groter percentage 
van het Bruto Nationaal Product aan sociale zekerheid dan andere landen.
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 Wanneer we de interactie tussen actoren en instituties beschouwen, kunnen we 
twee arena’s, twee niveau’s en twee fasen van economisch beleid onderscheiden. 
Allereerst is er sprake van besluitvorming in de politieke arena en de verhoudingen 
tussen werknemers en werkgevers, al dan niet samen met de overheid. De politieke 
arena staat duidelijk boven die waarin sociale partners opereren. Op cruciale 
momenten is de rol van de overheid doorslaggevend. Ten tweede opereren de 
belangrijkste actoren op tenminste twee niveau’s. Politieke partijen, vakbonden en 
werkgeversorganisaties onderhandelen met elkaar, maar ze zijn tevens afhankelijk 
van steun van hun achterban, op een lager niveau. Ten derde kunnen we stellen dat er 
wederzijdse beïnvloeding is tussen het gedrag van actoren (binnen de institutionele 
ruimte) en het economische beleid. In de eerste fase heeft de economische situatie 
invloed op het gedrag en de strategie van actoren. Vervolgens trachten deze actoren 
in de tweede fase instituties aan te passen om resultaten te verkrijgen die meer in 
overeenstemming zijn met hun eigen voorkeuren. In deze studie is gebleken dat 
deze wisselwerking tussen actoren, instituties en economisch beleid een verklaring 
vormen voor de processen in hedendaagse Westerse democratieën.
 Met deze benadering levert dit proefschrift een theoretisch bijdrage aan de 
vergelijkende politieke economie. De combinatie van kwantitatieve vergelijking 
en kwalitatieve casestudies heeft nieuwe empirische onderzoeksresultaten 
opgeleverd. Hierbij is gebruik gemaakt van verbeterde empirische indicatoren om 
institutionele ontwikkelingen te meten. De nieuwe inzichten zijn allereerste relevant 
voor de politicologie, maar zullen uiteindelijk ook van dienst kunnen zijn voor het 
politieke en maatschappelijke debat.
Noten
1 Australië, België, Canada, Denemarken, Duitsland, Finland, Frankrijk, 
Griekenland, Ierland, Italië, Nederland, Nieuw-Zeeland, Noorwegen, Oostenrijk, 
Portugal, Spanje, Verenigde Staten, Verenigd Koninkrijk, Zweden en Zwitserland. 
Omdat deze geïndustrialiseerde landen veel kenmerken gemeenschappelijk 
hebben, is het most similar system design van toepassing.
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